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The emergence of Zika virus in 2015 challenged conventional ideas of mosquito-
borne diseases, tested the resilience of health systems and embedded itself within 
local sociocultural worlds, with major implications for environmental, sexual, 
reproductive and paediatric health. This book explores this complex viral epi-
demic and situates it within its broader social, epidemiological and historical con-
text in Latin America and the Caribbean. The chapters include a diverse set of 
case studies from scholars and health practitioners working across the region, 
from Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia, the United States and Haiti. 
The book explores how mosquito-borne disease epidemics (not only Zika but also 
Chikungunya, Dengue and malaria) intersect with social change and health gov-
ernance. By doing so, the authors reflect on the ways in which situated knowledge 
and social science approaches can contribute to more effective health policy and 
practice for mosquito-borne disease threats in a changing world.
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Prologue: The anatomy of a viral birth
The name Zika comes from a small forest patch along the shores of Lake Victoria 
in Uganda, not far from Entebbe International Airport. The word itself means over-
grown in the local Lugandan language, a descriptor of the tall jungle canopy but 
also, since 2015, an apt metaphor for a virus that has, like an inconspicuous vine, 
crossed continents and borders, invaded millions of human bodies, raised political 
alarm bells and disrupted the intimacy of pregnancy and childbirth. None of this 
was known, of course, in 1947 when researchers at the Yellow Fever Research 
Institute, then funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, isolated the new virus from 
a feverish rhesus monkey (Rhesus 766), caged in the canopy of the Zika forest, 
and confirmed its transmission by Aedes “tiger” mosquitoes (Dick et al., 1952).
In the preceding 60 years, a mere 14 human cases of Zika were recorded, 
although sero-surveys suggest the virus was widely distributed in much of Africa 
and Asia (Gubler et al., 2017). Endemic across the tropics, it was likely confused 
with some of the other 70 flaviviruses and alphaviruses known to science (yellow 
fever, Dengue, West Nile, Chikungunya, Japanese encephalitis) or other com-
mon infections such as malaria or leptospirosis. It would have been hard, if not 
impossible, to anticipate the surge in attention that started in northeastern Brazil 
in 2015. On the other hand, we should not be too surprised. These types of recur-
ring plagues and pestilences (HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Avian Influenza, SARS) often 
jump the species barrier from animals/insects to humans and do not emerge in a 
vacuum: certain social, ecological and political conditions help drive, facilitate 
and maintain their emergence from the virosphere. Before 2015, Zika was a low-
ranking member of the more than 500 other anthropod-borne diseases known to 
science (Higgs, 2016). It was a little known, mild febrile illness – that is, until it 
caused its first known epidemic and began its journey to the maternity wards of 
Pernambuco State, Brazil.
This journey began in 2007, when doctors from the tiny Pacific island of Yap, 
Micronesia, began noticing a spike in illness cases (rash, fatigue, fever, joint 
pain and conjunctivitis), lasting about a week. Some patients tested positive for 
Dengue fever, also transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes. Despite the similarities, the 
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for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States, where Zika was 
confirmed. The single-stranded RNA virus is exceedingly difficult to find, par-
tially due to its molecular kinship to other arboviruses which has made develop-
ing rapid diagnostic tests very challenging. Although scientists later estimated, 
through antibody testing, that 73% of the 7,000 people on Yap had been infected 
over a 6-month period, there had been fewer than 200 reported cases (Duffy et 
al., 2009). The Yap outbreak told us that Zika could cause epidemics and that the 
virus, in most cases, was mild and asymptomatic (the current conventional wis-
dom is that 80% of Zika infections do not cause clinical disease): nothing much 
to worry about.1
A second epidemic, this time in Tahiti, hit the main island of French Polynesia 
in late 2013, some 5,000 miles away from Yap. Over the next six months, there 
were more than 8,500 reported cases including travellers who returned to the 
United States and Europe; later studies estimated this to be closer to 30,000, or 
12% of the total population. The Polynesian outbreak revealed that Zika could no 
longer be viewed as a benign disease: Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS), a debilitat-
ing autoimmune disorder and one of the most common neurological emergencies 
worldwide, was linked to the virus in 42 people. More than a dozen were rushed 
off to intensive care units (Musso et al., 2017).2 Zika was added to the list of nearly 
100 known causes of GBS, which also includes Dengue and Chikungunya.3
The virus then quietly spread throughout the rest of the Pacific until, in early 
2015, physicians in northeastern Brazil began noticing a spike in a mild, Dengue-
like illness. At first, people described it as an “awful allergy” and treated the tell-
tale rash with antihistamines, which quickly sold out at local drug shops (Diniz, 
2017: 23). At the same time, cases of a “paralyzing syndrome” (GBS) began 
overwhelming emergency departments. Physicians and bootstrap scientists, at 
first, suspected it might be connected to the recent 2013–2014 Chikungunya virus 
(CHIKV) epidemic (again spread by Aedes mosquitoes) that had just finished 
sweeping through the Americas for the first time, including northeastern Brazil. 
But in June 2015, these local scientists, far from the center of Brazilian science 
and political power, confirmed Zika’s presence and linked it to the rise in GBS.4
Then, slowly, from September onwards, maternity wards and neurology clinics 
across Pernambuco, Bahia and Paraiba began filling up with an unusual surge of 
hundreds and then thousands of crying newborn babies with microcephaly, prone 
to seizures and with abnormal brain calcifications.5 In some cases, the brain was 
almost entirely absent. Their mothers, with dreams of normality now destroyed 
were disparate and frantic for help. These were predominately young and poor, 
Afro-Brazilians, the inhabitants of favelas, who lacked adequate levels of sanita-
tion or screened windows and stored their irregularly supplied water in buckets 
and barrels – all perfect breeding sites for a mosquito well-adapted to the urban 
jungle of tropical towns and cities.
In late 2015, physician waiting rooms became “like death row” as other now 
fearful pregnant women, at least those who could afford it, waited anxiously for 
ultrasound test results (Diniz, 2017: 51). A sudden metamorphosis took place; the 
joys of pregnancy and motherhood transformed into fear, anguish and uncertainty. 
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Microcephaly can be caused by other infectious diseases like cytomegalovirus 
and toxoplasmosis, and so it took pieces falling together, in late October and early 
November, including the isolation of the virus from amniotic fluid, confirming 
that it could cross the placenta, and testing of the blood and tissue from a dead 
infant, to finally confirm Zika’s most pathological effects. The Ministry of Health 
(MoH) announced the discovery at the end of November and called a national 
health emergency; the World Health Organization (WHO) then declared a global 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in February 2016.6 
Zika’s most insidious neurotropic manifestations became tragically visible in the 
physical contortions and cries of innocent children.
Zika dominated the international health news for much of 2016. With most of 
the region home to the dexterous Aedes mosquito, and a checkered vector control 
history, epidemic pandemonium set in. The US CDC issued travel alerts for whole 
countries, even if the virus had only been detected in a small area; it was as if the 
entire southern hemisphere (all of Latin America and the Caribbean) was sud-
denly hazardous. Brazil declared a new war against the mosquito and deployed 
military troops onto the streets armed with fumigators, larvicide and information 
pamphlets in a show of force as the nation prepared for the summer Olympics 
in Rio de Janeiro; at the same time, a group of 200 international scientists peti-
tioned for the games to be cancelled.7 Health ministers from Brazil, El Salvador 
and Jamaica took the unprecedented step of telling women to “not get pregnant 
until more is known about the virus.” Some advised abstaining from child-rearing 
for two years; the media drew parallels with China’s one-child policy, and oth-
ers contemplated whether the outbreak would cause a demographic birth dip.8 
The tourism industry in the Caribbean took a massive blow. Conspiracy theories 
and misinformation circulated on Facebook and Twitter. And climate scientists 
emphasized the severe El Niño year, envisioning a future of recurring mosquito-
borne plagues with rapid climate chaos.
Cases then began in Puerto Rico, Florida, Singapore and elsewhere. Protesters 
took to the streets in downtown Miami to stop the government’s anti-mosquito 
aerial spraying of Naled due to fears about chemical toxicity.9 Millions of honey-
bees then turned up dead in South Carolina due to state-led spraying aimed at pre-
venting Zika, compounding existing fears about declining bee populations already 
under siege from colony collapse disorder.10 Stories emerged of pregnant women 
wearing Hazmat suits in trendy Miami neighborhoods as they sealed themselves 
off in their air-conditioned fortresses.11 For millions of women in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, options were much more limited.
To add to all of these anxieties, Zika was confirmed to be the first sexually 
transmitted disease (STD) spread by mosquitoes, something suggested back in 
2008 when a US scientist, who had worked in Senegal, infected his wife with 
Zika in Colorado after a trip abroad (Foy et al., 2011). With greater evidence, 
“people visiting infected areas”, to say nothing of those who lived there, were 
now advised to avoid all sexual contact for weeks or even months; one man was 
found with Zika in his semen 60 days after infection. Health experts wondered 
aloud how much emphasis they should be placing on condoms and sex education, 
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in addition to labor-intensive vector control activities and calls for repellants and 
long-sleeved clothing. Over time, blood transfusions, urine, saliva and breast milk 
as well as other species of mosquitoes, such as the abundant household culex 
mosquito, were also implicated in Zika transmission; the uncertainty about how 
important these routes were only added to the confusion.
Nothing had been seen like this since the rubella epidemics of the 1960s in 
Europe or the thalidomide disaster which had left thousands of children with 
microcephaly, with many more dying in the womb and others born deaf or blind. 
The prospect of tens of thousands of affected infants was terrifying. Slowly evi-
dence began to emerge that microcephaly was only the tip of a much larger clini-
cal iceberg that could, possibly, take many years to be noticed. A new category 
was created: Congenital Zika Syndrome (CZS). Some contemplated a whole 
“Zika generation” affected by various physiological, neurological and behavio-
ral disabilities. These would prove herculean to track, especially as pediatricians 
wondered if the virus would contribute to rising rates of autism, epilepsy and 
schizophrenia (McNeil, 2016:86).
Anne Schuchat, the principal deputy director of the US CDC at the time, called 
Zika “the most difficult” emergency response the agency had ever had. True, it 
was the first time the agency had to issue an advisory against travel to parts of 
the continental United States. In the immediate aftermath of the 2014–2015 West 
African Ebola epidemic, a WHO official was quoted in the Washington Post as 
saying that Zika was “much more insidious, cunning and evil” than Ebola.12 The 
Zika response took on quasi-theological tones.
But then something happened. Spikes in microcephaly did not emerge in other 
countries, or indeed other areas of Brazil, in the same way that they had in the 
northeast. The Olympics passed with very little epidemiological humdrum, except 
for some new fashionable repellant athletic wear and street protests about gov-
ernment corruption and violence in Latin America’s largest, but most unequal, 
democracy. The WHO’s emergency was called off in November 2016, and refo-
cused on a “long-term” strategy to address the care and support needs of affected 
families, preparedness for future outbreaks and capacity strengthening for vector 
surveillance, prevention and control.
Like Chikungunya before it, Zika became but one more neglected disease, 
co-circulating with other malevolent creatures, a forgotten pathogen of forgot-
ten people. However, at the same time, Zika has also challenged our assump-
tions about mosquito-borne pathogens, generated new investments in arboviral 
science and vector technology and remained a lingering concern for the tourist 
industry and women of reproductive age. The virus tested the resilience of global 
health systems (in the immediate aftermath of the West African Ebola epidemic) 
and embedded itself within local sociocultural worlds with major implications 
for environmental, sexual, reproductive and pediatric health. Two years after the 
PHEIC ended (at the time of writing), uncertainty about the virus remained high; 
outbreaks were reported in 2018 in several places, including Japan, India and 
Angola, with evidence of new clusters of CZS. Some governments have been 
more open than others in reporting Zika, while low capacity for clinic, pediatric 
and vector surveillance also hampers our collective efforts to track it. Although 
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we have not seen a repetition of the high microcephaly rates in northeastern 
Brazil in other locations, 26 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
reported Zika-related microcephaly between 2015 and 2017.13 Why the pattern of 
microcephaly manifested the way it did, and when epidemic Zika will resurface 
in the Americas (possibly influenced, like yellow fever, by an enzootic cycle in 
wild primates) are important, unanswered questions, as is the effect of low-grade 
endemic transmission on health systems and population health.
In this book, a group of engaged social science scholars and public health 
practitioners working and living across the Americas explore and locate the 
response to the 2015–2016 Zika epidemic within its broader biosocial and histori-
cal context. The book brings together a diverse series of case studies from Brazil, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia, the United States and Haiti. Through 
these chapters, we explore how mosquito-borne disease epidemics intersect with 
social change and health governance and reflect on the ways in which situated 
knowledge and social science approaches can contribute to more effective health 
policy and practice for mosquito-borne disease threats. In the remainder of this 
introductory chapter, I provide some context and general reflection on the state of 
epidemic preparedness, response and recovery, based on my work on mosquito-
borne diseases in Haiti and with international organizations, policymakers and 
scientists in the United States.14 
The global health machinery: The governance of epidemics
Evaluating the effectiveness of the response to Zika in the Americas, as a case 
study in epidemic control, is more difficult than one would first assume. On the 
positive side, we can point to improvements in risk communication (including 
travel advisories and efforts by the mainstream media to dispel rumors and mis-
information), rapid investments in new diagnostics and clinical vaccine trials, 
better coordination and data sharing and increases in vector surveillance across 
the region.15 However, by any epidemiological measure the response was, on the 
whole, slow, clumsy, fragmented and inadequate.16 Battered by criticisms about 
the delayed response to Ebola in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, global health 
players sought to be more assertive in 2016. In some ways, this did take place. 
But a number of factors conspired to outpace them: the nature of Zika, the abun-
dance of Aedes vectors, the geographical scale of the pandemic, long-standing 
gaps in vector control capacity, deep-seated socio-political pressures and global 
travel patterns. Few claim anti-mosquito operations had any profound impact, and 
phylogenetic data from Honduras and Haiti (for example) now shows the virus 
was circulating in LAC in mid-2014, one-year before it was even noticed in Brazil 
(Theze et al., 2018; Lednicky et al., 2016). Mosquito-transmission of Zika has now 
been reported in over 84 countries and dependent territories around the world.17
From SARS in 2002–2003, H1N1 in 2009 and Ebola in 2014–2016 (to name 
a few epidemics), much has been written about the need to reform the global 
architecture of epidemic preparedness and response (CHRF Commission, 2016). 
Some have called for a new social movement to “end epidemics” (Quick and 
Fryer, 2018).18 The world’s richest philanthropist, Bill Gates, has stressed the 
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need for greater investments in technological innovation (Gates, 2018). Experts 
agree that we are not well prepared for a global pandemic (a recent Gates-funded 
model simulation showed 33 million people would die in the first 6 months of 
a 1918-like pandemic influenza). Arguments run both ways about whether we 
are better preparedness to face a novel high-impact pathogen on the scale of the 
devastating 1918 Spanish Influenza (estimated to have killed 50–100 million peo-
ple): social, economic and immunological conditions have improved since the 
European trenches and we have better pharmaceuticals, global institutions, rapid 
communication systems and science. On the other hand, the speed and severity 
of the pandemic would quickly overwhelm us and disrupt the global networks on 
which we depend, for food and drugs, and we also have larger and more urbanized 
populations. Political instability and violence, as we now see with a new Ebola 
outbreak in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (begun in 2018), may 
bog us down. Rumors and misinformation spread by digital communication and 
fueled by increasing skepticism about experts and governments may stymie even 
the most effective medical countermeasures.
The speed and scale of the Zika pandemic – across multiple countries in a mat-
ter of a few months – reflects the ability for pathogens to jump our “viral super-
highway” (Armelagos, 1998). Some 34 million flights carried nearly 4 billion 
passengers in 2016 (~10 million per day), not to mention trains, cars and cruise 
ships; tens of millions traveled between the United States and South America and 
the Caribbean.19 There were about 5,500 symptomatic Zika cases reported in the 
continental United States alone. Although most were acquired abroad, more than 
200 were due to local mosquito transmission in Florida (Grubaugh et al., 2017).
During the West African Ebola epidemic, the anthropologist-physician Paul 
Farmer called for “staff, stuff and systems.”20 With Ebola, infections could be 
found, monitored and followed within only a few days or weeks of infection. The 
outbreak could be visibly tracked. A threat that is not easily localized, like Zika, 
is more like an environmental toxin or chemical pollutant. Diffused, it can seem 
to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Mosquito bites go unnoticed. It 
can take nine months to witness any birth defects, and potentially much longer for 
other malformations. Zika reminded us, once again, that our systems move much 
slower than the invisible microbial worlds that threaten to rain down on us like 
the plague. In order to move faster organizations, expertise and “stuff” needs to be 
mobilized not only with greater speed but also agility, which comes from better 
preparedness and stronger healthcare systems. Here, too, Zika is instructive.
With cases reported in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, on 
February 22, 2016, President Barack Obama (who had supported the Global 
Health Security Agenda [GHSA] in 2014)21 requested $1.89 billion in supplemen-
tal funding from a Republican-controlled Congress that had become increasingly 
gridlocked along ideological-party lines since 2010.22 Without any emergency 
funds available, $510 million (including $295 million from USAID) was redi-
rected in April from “existing Ebola resources” that were intended to strenghten 
health systems in West Africa to Zika as a stopgap. A cat-and-mouse game began, 
with multiple efforts to push the bill through the US Congress. But this failed and 
lawmakers went on summer recess just as mosquito season began in the southern 
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United States and more domestic Zika cases hit the newspapers. Eventually, $1.1 
billion of funding for Zika was passed; yet it took seven months to be approved, 
signed by Obama on September 29, 2016. By November, when the WHO declared 
an end to the PHEIC, little US funding had moved out of the treasury. This had 
repercussions for the newly reformed WHO Health Emergencies Program (the 
United States is the major donor), which also took nine months to receive most 
of the funds that it had requested from donors in February 2016.23 Additional 
emergency funding came from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and European agencies and governments.
Some have attributed this delay to xenophobic discrimination among US lawmak-
ers (the framing of Zika as an “immigrant disease” from Latin America), a general 
neglect for Puerto Rico (an unincorporated territory of the United States that saw 
90% of all reported US cases), longstanding conflicts in the use of federal funds 
for sexual and reproductive health (especially abortion), political tensions concern-
ing Obamacare and the low mortality rate of the virus. All certainly played some 
role. Importantly, to actually get the bill passed it was bundled with flood relief in 
Louisiana and the Flint, Michigan water crisis and connected to veteran affairs and 
military defense spending (which tend to gather significant bi-partisan support).
Too often, this is how health emergencies are funded; US funding for a counter-
terrorism operation would have been much more swift. In this case, CDC had to 
redirect finances from routine vaccination and other activities to address Zika, while 
the US government’s broader post-Ebola funding for preparedness and health sys-
tem strengthening efforts in West Africa was severely cut. By the time that Congress 
approved the bulk of its funding, Puerto Rico had already reported 22,358 confirmed 
Zika cases. From an epidemiological standpoint, a lot of basic science work was 
also needed to track and understand this new virus. But, as a frustrated senior global 
health researcher based in the United States told me in an interview at the time:
No one can get money to do the basic science that needs to get done. Where 
is Zika? What is it doing outside Brazil? It is a mess. CDC gave some extra-
mural funds it had available, but they don’t play with others. So they keep 
it in-house. You can’t really go to NIH, since it will take at least one year. 
NSF is small money; you can’t really do anything significant with it. The EU 
bureaucracy is terrible. WHO has no money, and PAHO too. It is a joke.
The lack of funds in epidemic response has helped drive a number of innovations 
in recent years. This includes the World Bank’s new global insurance mecha-
nism, the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), used for the first time 
in the 2018 DRC Ebola outbreak, and the public–private Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which aims to mobilize $1 billion over 5 
years for vaccine development, including for Chikungunya (Yamay et al., 2017). 
Although these are welcomed institutional additions to the pandemic response 
landscape, there are many questions about how effective they will be.
Tied to geopolitics and economic interests, health security moves up and down 
the corridors of international authority and power. Epidemics disrupt the status 
quo: flights stop, consumer behavior shifts, people stay indoors and do not go to 
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work or school and they avoid restaurants, hotels and shopping centers. The cas-
cade effects can be huge, especially for tourism, and epidemics also drive surges 
in other endemic diseases and conditions as they reduce routine health services 
and capacity. The World Bank projected the short-term economic impacts from 
Zika in 2016 to be $3.5 billion or 0.06% of GDP in LAC (World Bank, 2016). 
A separate analysis by IFRC and UNDP (2017) estimated that the pandemic 
would cost LAC $7–18 billion in the short term and billions more in long-term 
costs associated with GBS and CZS (UNDP, 2017). By one estimate, each Zika-
affected child could cost the US health system $10 million. The long-term effects 
on Caribbean cruises and other regional tourism remains murky.
Perhaps the most significant, obvious and yet difficult to put into practice lesson 
from past epidemics has been the importance of robust health systems. Over 57 coun-
tries are classified as being in Human Resources for Health (HRH) crises around the 
world with severe shortages of health care workers, resources and systems, and a health 
sector highly dependent on international aid, NGOs and a fragmented private sector. 
Epidemics exasperate these fault lines. They require task shifting, and reveal govern-
ance and capacity holes, although they can also be times of learning and reform.24 Once 
the US Congress finally approved Zika funding, $230 million of USAID funding was 
unlocked; however, in the end it took until early to mid-2017 to really get the major-
ity of these international projects off the ground. Most focused on Central America 
and the Caribbean, and on small geographical areas. USAID health funding to LAC 
had decreased significantly since Obama took office, which meant there were few 
International NGOs with established links to USAID desks, especially for vector con-
trol.25 By the time this money actually moved into countries, the epidemic itself was 
over. The feeling, then, was that these should be arbovirus preparedness projects, but 
project activities and deliverables had been written for an epidemic response to Zika 
and this limited their scope: what were these projects responding to, exactly (some 
public health experts asked)? The ability to respond rapidly to epidemics requires that 
institutional mechanisms be in place well before an emergency, something discussed 
by Stewart-Ibarra and colleagues in Ecuador in Chapter 6 of this volume.
The Zika epidemic also showed that health communication units across most 
of the LAC region, at the level of Ministry of Health, were overly technical, hier-
archical and under-funded, and in a general state of disrepair. For instance, it was 
common for local media reports to declare only official confirmed Zika cases; 
the simultaneous urgent calls-to-action for community prevention seemed out 
of touch with the scale of the threat, contributing to suspicions, misinformation 
and rumors. Social media posts related Zika emergence and spread to fertilizers, 
transgenic mosquitoes, vaccination campaigns, insecticides/agrochemicals, CIA 
bioweapons, and a global plot to control the population of poor countries by “the 
Rockefellers.” USAID projects aimed to build capacity for health communication 
and community engagement (RCCE).26 Social science research shed light on the 
pitfalls of unrealistic recommendations, like telling women to use repellents and 
wear long sleeves in humid tropical cities, and to abstain from sex and repro-
duction. Initial risk communication messages were often broad and somewhat 
confusing, as public health staff struggled to communicate emerging knowledge 




Remove standing water; Scrub water containers (pilas); Cover 
water containers; Put screens on windows and doors; 
Participate in community cleanup activities; Close trash 
bags and bins; Keep doors and windows closed; Change 
water in pets’ bowls at least 3 times/week; Fill holes in the 
ground with dirt; Keep a lid on garbage cans inside and 
outside the house; Avoid having trash on your patio; Don’t 
throw trash on the street; Cover containers where you 
collect water; Change water and scrub water barrels with 
bleach at least once per week; Eliminate or place a hole 
in containers that can accumulate water; Control breeding 
sites; Wash and scrub water container (untadita) once a 
week; Cover all water containers where you store water; 
Keep your patio and lot of ground clean, free of weeds 
and trash; Clean your drainpipe once a week; Eliminate 
tires, cans, bottles, and lids that can accumulate water; 
Use small fish to eliminate larvae in pilas and barrels. 
In this case, don’t use bleach or larvicides; Cover water 
containers with a robust plastic lid and secure it with tape 
or a rubber band; Change the water in vases and flower 
pots; Turn over containers, crates, cans, or any container 
that has standing water; Cover all containers where you 
store water; Clean rainwater and tap water gutters; Throw 
away bottles, tires, cans, or pots that you don’t use; Store 
tires under roofs to avoid accumulating water; Plant basil 
in a pot; Cut the grass and bushes around the house; 
Keep alert during the morning and evening hours when 
mosquitoes bite; Use insecticide to eliminate mosquitos 
inside the house; Pay attention to fumigation campaigns 
in your community so that you can have your home 
fumigated; Use hermetic seals for water containers. 
Care seeking Attend prenatal visits; Seek information on family planning 
from your provider; Rest; Drink water, juices, soups and 
other; Take acetaminophen; Do not take aspirin; Go to 
health center to confirm whether you have Zika; Visit the 
closest health center if you present symptoms; Drink a lot 
of liquids; Rest; All pregnant women should attend the 
closest health center for consultations.
Personal protection Wear repellent containing DEET or picaridin; Use condoms 
in all sexual relations to prevent sexual transmission of 
Zika; Always sleep under a mosquito net; Wear long 
sleeves and long pants; Wear light colored clothing; Use 
repellent only with doctor’s authorization. 
Note: These behaviors were taken from ZIKV IEC materials. The list is not comprehensive but is 
meant to be illustrative of the wide range of behaviors covered by ZIKV risk communication. Provided 
by Arianna Serino, USAID. 
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on an emerging virus, especially regarding sexual transmission (see Table 1.1 for 
a list of behaviors targeted by risk communication teams). A meta-analysis of 
socio-behavioral data, collected by NGOs and commissioned by UNICEF, found 
that the elimination of stagnant water, cleaning of water containers, sweeping 
and cleaning of the house and yard and use of mosquito nets were the most com-
monly reported community prevention practices undertaken for Zika; however, 
the last two are not particularly effective for Aedes control.27 Activities focused 
exclusively on Zika then had to be adapted, in 2017, to communicate risks from 
Dengue and Chikungunya as USAID projects shifted towards arbovirus prepar-
edness plans more generally. This revealed the tensions between the time-bound 
nature of “emergency” response and the long-term needs of stronger health sys-
tems (Lakoff, 2017), a conflict also made visible in the initial re-appropriation of 
“Ebola preparedness money” to respond to Zika.
Locating mosquito pandemics in the world
So are we really in an era of mosquito pandemics, as the title of this book suggests? 
Yes and no. There has been a precipitous decline in infectious disease over the last 
50 years, as low- and middle-income countries have narrowed gaps in life expec-
tancy and reduced extreme poverty (Rosling, 2018). Today, unlike in the past, infec-
tious microbes are responsible for less than 10% of global death and disability in 
most regions of the world, albeit this is higher in South Asia (20%) and sub-Saharan 
Africa (44%).28 Thomas Bollyky (2018), in his book Plagues and the Paradox of 
Progress, argues that this has occurred in a categorically different way than it did in 
Europe and the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries. Here, epidemics linked 
to their noxious living conditions drove substantial political, cultural and civil action 
for water and sanitation infrastructure, social and educational reforms and broader 
changes in government and trade. While this connection between microbes, govern-
ance and social change are still occurring, Bollyky argues that the deployment of 
vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics today disentangles them from some of the 
past pressures for social, governance and infrastructure reform.
There are two caveats to this argument. First, while infectious disease may 
have decreased, their propensity for disruptive epidemics have not. Outbreak 
events, new spillovers from animals and evolutionary pressures from anthropo-
genic change continue to increase, as do their health and socioeconomic impact 
(Bardosh, 2016). Second, arboviruses fit uneasily into this narrative, as we can see 
with the re-emergence of Dengue, Chikungunya, Rift Valley fever and now Zika. 
Let’s explore this more.
Known as “breakback fever” due to the severe back and muscle pain it causes, 
Dengue only really emerged on the public health radar in the 1950s in Southeast Asia. 
There are four distinct serotypes, and multiple viral lineages; while infection with one 
serotype provides long-term immunity, infection with a different one increases the 
severity and chance of hemorrhagic infection through antibody-dependent enhance-
ment. Today, Dengue circulates in more than 100 countries, a risk to 30% of the 
global population. Estimates vary and are difficult to nail down; a recent analysis 
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found 390 million infections every year, with 96 million (67–136 million) develop-
ing clinical disease, about half-a-million hospitalizations and 25,000 deaths (Bhatt 
et al., 2013). Epidemics occur in cycles of 3–10 years, driven by localized climatic, 
socioeconomic and immunological factors. They are, then, seasonal emergencies.
The global emergence of Chikungunya virus (a Makonde word29 for “to 
become contorted”) has also been remarkable since 2005, through a series of dev-
astating outbreaks linked to genetic shifts that have changed the virus’ virulence 
and vector competence (Schuffenecker et al. 2006). Epidemics in India have been 
particularly bad. From 2013 to 2015, a game of viral tag occurred in the Pacific 
as CHIKV passed through Polynesia months after Zika and reached northeastern 
Brazil in September 2014. Once in the Americas, it caused millions of reported 
cases, killed about 700 and burdened an estimated 400,000 with the long-term 
effects of chronic inflammatory rheumatic disease (Morens and Fauci, 2016).
Estimating the true prevalence of arboviruses is difficult, due to the high num-
ber of asymptomatic infections, the short and self-limiting nature of many clinical 
episodes, the lack of diagnostics and therapeutics and gaps in reporting systems. 
This was all very clear with Zika. The official WHO estimate was that 3–5 mil-
lion people would be infected during 2016. Data from PAHO/WHO (2015–2017) 
shows less than one million cases (Table 1.2).30 With over 650 million people 
in more than 50 countries and territories, and 13 million births each year,31 it is 
clear that the actual number of Zika cases in 2016 in LAC were vastly under-
reported. A study in Mexico estimated the true prevalence as 30–40 times higher 
than the reported number of symptomatic infections (Hernandez-Avila et al 
2018). Modeling studies suggested that 93–117 million people would actually get 
infected, including 1.65 million pregnant women during the first wave (Perkins 
et al. 2016). In Chapter 2 of this book, Henderson and Bardosh discuss the chal-
lenges that modelers and their models faced during the epidemic.
Can we really assume that Zika spread throughout the entirety of each of the 
countries in which it has been reported? Who is still susceptible and when and 
where will another epidemic occur? Colon-Gonzalez et al. (2017) have projected 
that, with endemic Zika virus, an average of 12 million Zika cases (0.7–162.3) 
will continue each year in the Americas. Very few cases have been reported in 
2018, most likely due to herd immunity. Evidence from CHIKV and ZIKV sero-
prevalence studies suggest that upwards of 40–70% of a population is infected 
during an epidemic wave. Zambrana et al. (2018) found ZIKV antibodies in 
36% of a pediatric cohort and 46% in a separate household survey in Managua, 
Nicaragua. It is likely, however, that climactic factors in 2017 and 2018 have also 
helped reduced the force of the epidemic. Data from PAHO, for example, shows 
a significant reduction in Dengue cases, not only Zika, in 2017 and 2018 in the 
Americas (Table 1.3).
It is not coincidental, then, that Zika was discovered in a yellow fever research 
station. Entomologists have recorded over 50 resident species of mosquitoes in the 
Zika forest alone and multiple other viruses including Chikungunya, West Nile 
and Bwamba, Semliki forest, O’nyong’nyong and Kadam viruses.33 Scientists 
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between Dengue, CHIKV and Zika are not uncommon (Singer, 2017). Some pos-
tulate that the previous Dengue epidemic in northeastern Brazil contributed to the 
severity of Zika-related microcephaly in 2015–2016. It is difficult to distinguish 
between these arboviruses in many standard diagnostic tests. And many of these 
viruses can also cause neurological and developmental impairments when infec-
tions occur in pregnancy, something that has been better appreciated as a by-
product of the Zika epidemic and amplified concerns about the maternal-pediatric 
risk of arboviral infections more generally (Mehta et al. 2018).
These viral diseases also share a common method of transmission: the pesky 
mosquito or “flying syringe.” These insects have had an incalculable influence 
on human history shaping empires, deciding battles and helping to define and 
reinforce social and economic relations (McNeill, 2010). Mosquitoes and yellow 
fever, and a mountainous Haitian landscape, prevented Napoleon’s brother from 
crushing the first successful slave revolt in 1804, for example. There are over 
3,000 species worldwide, although only a small fraction (anopheles, Aedes, culex) 
spread the pathogens that sicken millions and kill 700,000 each year.34 Global pro-
grams for lymphatic filariasis (LF) and malaria have significantly decreased these 
parasitic infections; however, biomedical tools have proven to be less effective for 
arboviruses. Part of this has to do with the nature of Aedes agypti and Aedes albop-
ictus (commonly known as Asian Tigers) and their evolutionary past in tropical 
forests. Both feed largely on human blood, bite during the day, have a local flight 
distance (100–400m) and are highly invasive. Mimicking their forest niche in tree-
holes and plant axils, they now breed predominately in the urban and peri-urban 
jungles of modern cities, in plastic buckets and jars, discarded tires, water stor-
age containers, flower vases, cemeteries and blocked gutters. In Miami, the Zika 
epidemic was blamed on the tropical plant – bromeliads – that collects water and 
larvae on manicured hotel lawns. Aedes do not lay all their “eggs in one basket” 
but spread them out over multiple water containers and enjoy taking blood meals 
from multiple human hosts, all of which increases their vector efficiency and viral 
transmissibility. They are also highly invasive, Aedes albopictus more so than Ae 
agypti. Shipments of used tires in the 1980s introduced Aedes albopictus into the 
Americas from Asia, and the mosquito is now found as far north as Canada.
The expansion of Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika has followed a similar 
pattern but, at its core, this expansion has been linked to urbanization, or what 
Table 1.3  Dengue cases reported in the Americas, 2014–2018
Year Dengue cases Lab confirmed Severe Dengue Deaths
2014 1,184,809 366,396 15,982   683
2015 2,416,732 646,103 12,496 1,355
2016 2,174,514 479,148  4,225   913
2017   580,414 117,544  2,065   311
2018   484,111 181,485  2,707   267
Note: PAHO data.32
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Bollyky (2018) called the emergence of “poor cities” in the tropics. In the period 
1950–2014, the world’s urban population rose from 746 million to 3.9 billion. 
Much of this growth was in the tropics; 80% of the populations of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, for example, now live in urban areas, and most of the world’s 
megacities (of 10 million or more) are now in low- and middle-income countries. 
Urban scholars have commented on how this new growth of cities, far outpacing 
the ability of new infrastructure, employment and social policy, may nullify the 
economic benefits that are typically associated with city living (Bollyky, 2018). 
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the proliferation of slums and shantytowns, 
which are expected to grow to be home to 2 billon people by 203035 including 
about 20% of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean.36 Factors con-
spire together in these deteriorated urban ecosystems: rural-urban migration, poor 
planning and infrastructure, colonial histories, social and economic exclusion, an 
absence of government investment, corruption and economic stagnation. The lack 
of nutritious food, education and environmental sanitation compromises health. 
Unemployment and the informal economy are entangled, in some locations, 
with crime, violence and sexual predation. These areas are also prone to climatic 
change and natural disasters, and efforts to address them often disadvantage the 
poor, who lack formal land ownership rights (Figure 1.1).
The slum is a visible manifestation of the social and political pathologies that 
drive arboviruses, but do these infectious RNA strands really affect the poor 
Figure 1.1  Port-au-Prince, home to roughly one-third of Haiti’s 11 million people. Photo: 
author.
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disproportionately? The evidence for Dengue is mixed, as mosquitoes breed along 
the social gradient: in fancy flower vases on a poolside resort, in the storage con-
tainers and backyards of middle-income households and in the plastic and metal 
waste accumulated by some low-income households (Mulligan et al. 2015). In 
many cases, these socio-ecological realities are within flight-distance.
Social inequalities, however, do shape the lack of access to health care, 
employment and political leverage that prevent improvements in basic living 
conditions. Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ (1992) classic ethnographic study, Death 
Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil, described the ways 
in which poor Brazilians in Pernambuco State (what became the epicenter of the 
Zika epidemic) negotiated conditions of sickness, hunger, shantytown violence 
and child death in the 1980s. Re-reading this classic book, I was struck by the 
similarities between her poignant descriptions of the Nordeste region, with con-
temporary scars leftover from colonial-era sugar plantations, and Deborah Diniz’s 
(2017: 107) account of the early days of the Zika outbreak:
We cannot speak of people in terms of ageless, sexless masses; it is young 
women who are pregnant, or planning to be, who are now terrified by 
the mere act of living in the land of Zika. Simply because they are poor 
Northeasterners, ordinary women have been ignored by policies that should 
respond to suffering in a country as unequal as Brazil’s … women from the 
elites will find alternative ways to ensure a safe pregnancy despite Zika.
History also has a long shadow in northern Haiti, where I have worked with 
the Ministry of Health and Population (MSPP) on mosquito control since 2015. 
While Brazil was the last Western nation to free its slave (1888), Haiti was the 
first Black Republic (1804). Brazil is one of the most unequal societies on earth; 
but Haiti, so the saying goes, is the only country with a last name: the poorest 
country in the Western Hemisphere.37 I was in Haiti when the Zika wave hit. I 
noticed more Aedes mosquitoes fluttered around homes, shops, decrepit clinics 
and public health offices. I recall training community health workers as swarms 
of mosquitoes flew overhead in the humidity. I was bitten more than once. As I 
watched the news unfold in Brazil, I also saw there was little preparedness plan-
ning and, really, no surveillance system. In 2016–2017, I asked people, including 
a few American missionaries running a variety of orphanages, about infants born 
with microcephaly and tried to keep track of about a dozen cases. A Haitian friend 
had a miscarriage: was it Zika? At the time, we anticipated tragedy. But as micro-
cephaly cases did not mount, we all signed some relief.
Declarations of an epidemic are political events. In Haiti, the government did 
not declare a public health emergency. US news headlines read: “Forget Zika, 
Haiti has bigger problems – a doctors’ strike” and “While Latin America strug-
gles over Zika, Haiti faces epidemic with a shrug.” During this time, a contested 
national election ushered in an uncertain transitional government (one of many 
since the end of the Duvarier era in 1986), public hospitals were shutdown for 
months as medical residents (paid $150 a month) went on strike, the infamous 
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cholera epidemic – imported by Nepali UN troops in late 2010 – continued in the 
face of meager international donations, hurricanes threatened the coast, allega-
tions of massive fraud in billions of loans from Venezuela’s PetroCaribe surfaced 
and the 13-year-old United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
began its withdrawal (Figure 1.2).
The NGO-ization of Haiti’s health system and the politics of dependence have 
long been themes in the anthropological and political science literatures. The 
2016 presidential election had a 21% turnout rate among a population deeply pes-
simistic with politics and the hollow rhetoric of change; this disenchantment has 
emerged alongside the withering of populist democratic hopes that began in the 
early 1990s. During the Zika epidemic, I was also working on improving mass 
drug administration (MDA) for lymphatic filariasis (LF) in northern Haiti, and 
tried to encourage an emergency Zika control program (funded by USAID) to 
also focus on the street canals, that were infested with culex larvae, and to help 
with the MDA (Bardosh et al. 2017). This town, an important Voodoo pilgrim-
age site, was a hotspot for LF and had already undergone 14 years of MDA (the 
WHO says 5 years should eliminate the parasite). I would occasionally see cases 
of lymphedema and elephantiasis and hear of hydroceles, all untreatable condi-
tions that are immensely painful, debilitating and stigmatizing. There were also 
lots of mosquitoes. Early successes with the LF program had started the lag; local 
health staff had become less motivated once an international NGO had taken over 
and some community members refused to take the medication. It was a simple 
idea: use staff from the Zika program to help organize more community engage-
ment focused on cleaning-up the canals, give out food with the drug (to help with 
side effects) and do house-to-house distribution of the MDA drugs rather than at 
Figure 1.2  A street canal in northern Haiti, clogged with garbage and mosquito larvae. 
Photo: author.
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central points (which is the current standard approach. But the emergency pro-
gram refused: had to stick with the predefined deliverables. Sorry, I was told, we 
can only do household vector control – leaving the canals clogged with garbage 
and mosquito larvae. My Haitian colleagues found this absurd (especially given 
the absence of Zika) but they laughed it off just as they did with more significant 
sociopolitical events occurring at the time. 
In Haiti, and throughout the region, communities found it hard to understand 
how a familiar vector was spreading a new disease. Empirical experience mixed 
with biomedicine and folk beliefs, and people reported different transmission 
routes that included air, food, climate and vectors (Jansen, 2013). In my fieldwork, 
no one spoke or seemed to really care about Zika. Others have highlighted that 
people do not really care about Dengue in the context of multiple other pressures 
in their lives (Nading, 2014). Nading (2014) discussed Dengue epidemics as tem-
poral or “seasonal emergencies” without a clear beginning or end, blurring ideas 
of risk and responsibility – that is, until you or a close family member suffers from 
it. In Haiti, if you spoke about Chikungunya at a community meeting, more than 
half of the crowd would tell you stories about weeks off work, horrendous back 
pain and long-term ailments that they attributed to the virus. As you can see from 
Figure 1.3, local understadings of Chikungunya in Haiti are linked to chronic, non-
communicable disease conditions like hypertension. The health director I worked 
with had long-lasting muscle pain and fatigue, and the epileptic seizures one of 
my Haitian colleagues had had as a child came back after her Chikungunya infec-
tion. CHIKV was a forgotten pandemic, but not so for communities in northern 
Figure 1.3  An advertisement for a local doctor, showing the local aetiological links between 
hypertension, obesity and Chikungunya. Cap-Haitien, Haiti. Photo: author.
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Haiti. In fact, estimates have shown that upwards of 50% of infected people may 
develop these long-term ailments (Schilte et al. 2013). Epidemiological studies 
have begun to explore potential links to kidney disease, heart disease and diabetes 
(de Almeida Barreto et al. 2018). Arboviruses now seem to exasperate non-com-
municable disease conditions on top of their maternal-pediatric risks.
Vector wars and state bureaucracy
One of the great lessons from the West African Ebola epidemic was the impor-
tance of communities in controlling epidemics. Ebola has a strong social com-
ponent to infection: caring for the sick, burying the dead, sharing bodily fluids. 
Paul Richard (2016), based in Sierra Leone, argued in How a People’s Science 
Helped End an Epidemic that: “common sense, improvisation, distributed practi-
cal knowledge and collective action are invaluable elements in a people’s sci-
ence of infection control.” Health interventions are most effective when they 
support this.
Zika’s social dimensions are different, entangled in human–mosquito–ecologi-
cal relationships. They need to be located in the history of vector control, with 
roots in the military tactics of the colonial past, and the urban landscapes now 
increasingly inhabited by female mosquitoes. The general sentiment, for many 
health experts in 2016, was that vector control would do little to stop the virus. In 
Zika: The Emerging Epidemic, veteran New York Times reporter Donald McNeil 
(2016) reflected this dismissal:
I kept asking mosquito experts to name one place I could go where mosquito 
eradication was demonstrably lowering infections rates. I usually heard long 
pauses, followed by ‘I can’t think of one.’
In Haiti, the feeling was mutual. As a senior Ministry of Health and Population 
official told me in early 2016:
As far as I am concerned, there is no hope for any public health prevention 
with Zika. Look around you. The place is rampant with mosquitoes and eve-
ryone needs to store water to survive. You cannot control mosquitos. You 
might reduce them here…but they come back from around the corner … what 
is my public health policy, you ask? It is to hope that everyone gets infected 
quickly, that there are few microcephaly cases and that like Chikungunya, 
the population acquires immunity. … I want people to get the virus, just not 
pregnant women.
The narrative that Aedes are the cockroaches of the mosquito world, that they 
breed in “nothing but” a bottle cap, and thrive where water, sanitation and garbage 
collection services are lacking, was frequently repeated and furthered the sense 
of helplessness. I recall a senior WHO official, working on the concurrent yellow 
fever outbreak in Angola at the time, laughing at me for suggesting that vector 
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control could help. Without a vaccine, McNeil’s recommendation, as an emer-
gency measure, was to protect pregnant women during the epidemic wave, allow-
ing the rest of the population to be infected. In this atmosphere, vector control 
became a show. Large plums of smoke emanating from the gun of the fumigator, 
symbolism of the state’s attempt to assert itself against an enemy that had already 
won. Spray trucks were mostly for political brownie points; government mobi-
lization an exercise in cosmetics. In some places Zika became a political tool; 
garbage management could be improved or starved of funds, or garbage deliber-
ately dumped onto the streets, depending on political loyalties. These issues are 
explored in Chapter 5 of this volume, in the context of the history of vector control 
before and after the Bolivian revolution and the tragic circumstances of contem-
porary Venezuela (Figure 1.4).
There have been two major victories in the annals of Aedes control. The first 
was the source reduction campaigns in the early 20th century, led by William 
Gorgas, the most infamous being in Havana and the Panama Canal. Environmental 
sanitation mixed with economic interests, US imperialism and military tactics. 
Yellow fever, which had devastated US cities since the 18th century, was only 
linked to mosquitoes in 1900 in Cuba. Gorgas’s efforts in Havana, managed 
under US-led martial law during a yellow fever epidemic, centered on various 
Figure 1.4  A vector control officer in Haiti, with hand-held fumigator, early 2016. Photo: 
author.
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chemicals, fumigation and clean-up techniques, including crude oil and sulphur-
based compounds, the closing of bars and cafes and the sealing-off of drinking 
water tanks and use of special larvae-eating fish (Stepan, 2011: 48). The city was 
meticulously mapped, each household visited regularly and fines and penalties 
imposed. Cuba was free from the virus for decades, and the methods were repli-
cated with significant funding from the Rockefeller Foundation in other countries 
including Brazil and Mexico.
The second victory was the Aedes agypti eradication effort run by PAHO, 
started in 1947 under the direction of Fred Soper, with the goal of “species sani-
tation”: the complete eradication of Aedes agypti from the Western hemisphere. 
This replicated many aspects of the Gorgasian campaigns including its disease-
specific focus, detailed mapping and record keeping, general authoritarianism and, 
of course, the central role of chemicals – in this case DDT (Stepan, 2011). By this 
time, yellow fever had reduced significantly in the Americas, so the campaign was 
cast in moral and economic robes and success (and failure) as a problem of politi-
cal will and organization. It was also often linked with malaria eradication efforts 
that were being organized in parallel. By 1964, over 18 countries in South and 
Central America, from Mexico to Argentina, had eradicated the Aedes mosquito, 
and cases (when they did emerge) of yellow fever were predominately found in 
the interior, away from urban foci and in areas with sylvatic transmission. The 
United States was a laggard, preferring to focus on the new yellow fever vaccine; 
areas of Mexico bordering the United States were re-infested because of a lack of 
US interest. The program ended in the late 1960s; DDT was banned in the United 
States in 1972; and severe Dengue epidemics then began in LAC in the 1980s.
The demise of Aedes eradication efforts, abandoned by PAHO and others, coin-
cided with the rise of the primary health care movement, post-Alma Ata (1978). As 
Dengue cases rose, interest in community participation and the integration of vec-
tor control with other health and government services grew. But at the same time, 
the hollowing out of malaria control meant that vectors and their viruses received 
little financial support: labs, insectaries, surveillance systems, basic research and 
entomological expertise reduced. A review of Dengue programs by Horstick et al. 
(2010) in four countries presented a dismal assessment: lack of personnel, budg-
ets and expertise, overreliance on insecticides, little community engagement and 
almost no monitoring and evaluation. As discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume, 
Villegas-Chim and collegues from Mexico discuss the need for a “socio-political 
surveillance” of vector control programs to better understand their functioning.
To complicate things further, the evidence on the effectiveness of the cur-
rent “toolbox” is mixed in terms of arboviral control. A recent meta-analysis on 
Dengue found only 41 rigorous studies from 1980 to 2015 (Bowman et al. 2016). 
Some found no statistical significance; there were few randomised control tri-
als (RTCs) or evaluations of insecticide susceptibility. Overall, things like house 
screening, community-based environmental management and covering water con-
tainers reduced Dengue risk, while indoor residual spraying (IRS), skin repellents, 
insecticide-treated bednets and mosquito coils did not. Study designs and data 
were noted to be of low quality, especially for outdoor fogging, which is the main 
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response to Dengue (and was widely used for Zika) around the world. Most of the 
data focused on entomological indexes and not changes in disease transmission.
Approaches such as PAHO’s COMBI (Communication for Behavioral Impact) 
strategy, developed in the late 1990s, aimed to re-orientate Aedes control to have a 
greater focus on environmental management and community-based interventions. 
Again, here, evidence is mixed (Heintze et al. 2007). A recent RCT, Camino 
Verde (Green Way), piloted in 20,000 households in Mexico and Nicaragua, 
aimed to test chemical-free community mobilization and was found to have low-
ered Dengue infection in children by 30% – the first such trial to demonstrate an 
impact on Dengue infection. But an experimental RCT is very different from a 
national program. Even in this trial, most households continued to believe that 
chemicals (Temephos) were the best control method (Legorreta-Soberanis et al. 
2017). Without piped water, the demand to constantly clean storage containers 
is hard, repetitive work. Volunteers and health staff can be mobilized to conduct 
house visits, clean up public areas and do community education. But this type of 
“evangelical ecology,” as Nading (2014: 96) called it, can only go on for so long. 
Households behind locked gates are not always easily accessible and, in areas of 
political uncertainty, suspicion of government agents entering homes, like spies, 
can surface. In Haiti, some would tell me that to control mosquitoes would require 
that “we change the whole face of the country” (Figure 1.5).
Public health officials cannot assume that, in urban geographies, there is 
enough social cohesion, shared interest and mutual bonds to carry out this type 
of anti-mosquito work. Throughout the Zika pandemic, I would hear phrases like 
“communities are not accustomed to working for the common good.” Others 
would speak about cascade effects: when the state takes care of its citizens, then 
the citizens will help the state. At the local municipal level, we might suspect that 
better vector control could translate into brownie points for elected officials. A 
study in Pernambuco, in northeastern Brazil, however, found that informing citi-
zens about the use of municipal funds to combat Dengue, CHIKV and ZIKV had 
no effect on the major’s reelection bid (Boas and Hidalgo, 2019). There is also an 
important gender dimension here, a feminization of Aedes control. It is females 
in the household that need to control female mosquitoes, a type of interspecies 
housekeeping.38 
Mosquito control, especially environmental sanitation and chemical brigades, 
has often been a method for the state to show its power, to establish its creden-
tials. In the United States and Europe, mosquito control is funded by municipal 
taxes, mostly for nuisance mosquitoes. The Cuban Dengue program developed 
in 1981, after a severe epidemic, is often regarded as one of the most robust in 
the LAC region. It has included elements of community participation on top of 
fines, the use of army brigades, decentralized decision-making and traditional 
chemical vector control. Cuba claimed to have prevented the spread of Zika in 
2016 because of this intersectoral approach (Castro et al. 2017). But this requires 
strong management and funding; for Cuba, this was grounded in one of the best 
primary healthcare systems in the developing world and a one-party communist 
state that has remained in power since the 1950s Cuban revolution. Even here 
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however, more recent genomic analysis has suggested that these intensive vector 
control efforts only delayed the virus in Cuba, with a Zika outbreak emerging in 
2017.39 
In the absence of strong tax revenue, militarized anti-mosquito brigades and/
or strong health systems, perhaps only a vaccine or genetically modified mosquito 
can save things? After two decades of work, Sanofi’s new Dengvaxia vaccine ran 
into controversies in the Philippines in 2017 after it was linked to several deaths 
in children, thought to be due to immunological factors associated with antibody-
dependent enhancement. Zika clinical trials have run into the mud because it has 
been hard to find sero-negative populations. New vector control tools have also 
been hailed as a welcome addition to the armory: endosymbiotic (Wolbachia) 
bacteria and dominant lethal genes, such as those developed by the UK-based 
company, Oxitec. But these too can be problematic. As Bennett discusses in 
Chapter 9 of this book, experimental technologies such as Oxitec’s trial in the 
Figure 1.5  A Zika educational flyer, Haiti, emphasizing the need for community clean-up 
activities.
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Florida Keys can generate a great deal of controversy and are not the magic bullet 
some originally assumed.
The state, human rights and the social determinants of health
Zika’s social dimensions not only involve mosquitoes but also the more intimate 
and private spaces of human sexuality and reproduction, as well as the broader 
social policies and macroeconomic trends that influence people’s lives. Framing 
Zika as a problem of individual behavior change – of cleaning backyards or wear-
ing condoms – ignores the role of the state as a caregiver, of civil society as the 
glue of social change and of the interlocking of Zika with policies on health care, 
sexual and reproductive health, social protection, disability rights and the elephant 
in the room: climate change. During, and after the epidemic, this was articulated 
by families in northeastern Brazil in their struggle to care for their Zika-affected 
children, as well as feminist activists in their search for social justice and repro-
ductive rights (see Pimentel and colleagues in Chapter 4 of this book).
As the WHO moves to embrace Universal Health Coverage (UHC), founded 
on ethical and legal principles of equal access to health care, in some cases even 
preferential treatment for the poor, major disparities exist across the region 
and within countries. From Colombia, Cuba and Costa Rica’s more developed 
health and social protection systems to the erratic public-private mix of Haiti, 
Zika has reflected the challenges and fissures of universalist prescriptions for 
reform. Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory of the United States since the 
1898 Spanish-American war, was in the gripes of an economic crisis during the 
epidemic, accelerated since the 2008 global financial meltdown; 46% live below 
the American poverty line, twice the rate of Mississippi (Gomez et al. 2018). This 
limited Puerto Rico’s resource mobilization in the face of an epidemic, and con-
tributed to over 20% of the population being infected with Zika (85% of all US 
cases) (Rodríguez-Díaz et al. 2017). 
Understanding the state response to Zika requires appreciating various ongo-
ing political and economic struggles across the LAC region, and how these shape 
the unequal expansion of health policies (see Matta and colleagues’ discussion in 
reference to Brazil in Chapter 3). These include the political and social ramifica-
tions of volatile global commodity markets and macroeconomic policies, such as 
the dramatic effects of the oil and gas industry on Venezuelan society and public 
life (discussed in Chapter 5). Tensions and conflicts in the social contract between 
citizens, institutions and elites are linked to the fabric and logics of economic lib-
eralization and democratization itself (Whitehead, Fair and Payne, 2010). Within 
these struggles for a just and equal society, politics takes different forms with 
different implications for health: from revolutionary communist rhetoric, populist 
socialism, liberal democratic sentiment and strongman politics. Political conflict 
also becomes embodied in physical violence. Latin America holds the unfortunate 
global distinction of having the most violence cities, with 41 of the top 50 (includ-
ing 21 in Brazil alone).40 These locations are home to various forms of vigilan-
tism, drug cartels, police corruption and state-directed human rights violations that 
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coexist with the noxious living conditions of shantytowns and the marginalization 
of indigenous peoples. Without taxation, social services and universal health care 
seem a distant fiscal dream – but without trust in the state, who wants to pay taxes? 
This is all reflected, in various ways and at different levels, in sexual and 
reproductive health, albeit interwoven into social and cultural norms, and in the 
response and recovery to Zika. Modeling studies have shown that sexual transmis-
sion, although low in comparison to the significance of mosquitoes, may still be 
able to sustain endemic transmission (Allard et al. 2017). However Catholic bish-
ops and archbishops condemned the use of condoms as Zika spread. Paternalism 
and chauvinism (Machismo) dominated discussions about the links between Zika 
and the prevention of sexual transmission, including problems of access and use 
of contraception and reproductive rights (Guerra-Reyes and Iguiniz-Romero, 
2018).41 An estimated 56% of pregnancies, many from adolescent girls in poor 
communities, are unplanned in Latin America (Bott et al. 2012). According to 
some experts, the lack of public health advice for the postponement of pregnancy 
during the epidemic was “the single greatest travesty” of the Zika response and 
was “hideously racist hypocrisy … female American tourists were given the 
best and safest public health advice, while brown Puerto Rican inhabitants were 
told something else entirely.”42 Data does suggest that Zika had some impact on 
reproductive health decision-making. Studies have found a ~10–15% drop in hos-
pital births during the epidemic’s peak in different Brazilian cities, which may 
have been due to early miscarriages due to infection, delayed pregnancy and/
or increases in abortion (Castro et al. 2018). In 2015, the Guttmacher Institute 
estimated there were 6.5 million abortions in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
95% of which were unsafe.43 Abortion laws are stricter in some nations (Brazil) 
than others (Colombia). A lack of access to ultrasound tests run two ways: they 
can limit a women’s decision for or against an abortion. While much of the dis-
cussion has focused on the right to abortion, emerging reports from India in 2018 
suggest that pregnant women with Zika infection may also be actively pressured 
to undergo abortions by the state and medical professionals.44
Despite promises, support for families affected by the virus has largely fallen 
off the political radar and even scientific studies tracking their insidious neurode-
velopmental impacts have been under-funded, according to some researchers. 
Families with Zika-affected children remain in the aftermath, where Zika is a 
chronic ailment and not a mild virus. As they navigate emotions of apathy, rejec-
tion and develop theologies of hope, they have formed support groups, finding 
ways to survive and address stigma and discriminations that their children are 
“little devils” or the result of sinful sexual transgressions. Most remain “poor 
northeasterners (de Oliveira et al. 2017), and many are single mothers: the men 
often have left. This is to say nothing of the less visible pathogenic effects on 
the “Zika generation.” We are left to wonder how many have fallen through the 
surveillance cracks entirely. In the aftermath, affected families and allied health 
professionals are left to fight for the rights of the disabled, and to remind the state 
and society of the threat of doing nothing to address the systemic risks for future 
arboviral epidemics.
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It is, after all, clear that these mosquito-borne epidemics will continue to cir-
culate in the geographies of northeastern Brazil, in the thousands of cities and 
towns affected by Zika in 2016 and in the urban jungles and “poor cities,” around 
the world, that now define our planet’s ecology. As I left Haiti for Florida one 
day before Hurricane Irma hit in 2017, I was reminded of the impact of climate 
change: destroyed homes, power outages, evacuation orders, disrupted food sup-
plies and compromised health care. Zika was influenced by a particularly severe 
2015–2016 El Niño weather pattern in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean that 
brought multiyear drought to some regions and extreme flooding and humidity 
to others.45 Unfortunately, the continued failures of global climate agreements, 
and of our ability to address unfettered neoliberalism, will remain another factor, 
among many, in the complex web of arboviral causation.
Notes
1 According to a more recent analysis, this may be much less, from 27% to 50% of cases 
being symptomatic (Mitchell et al. 2018).
2 GBS causes neurological problems and paralysis of the limbs, and although it often 
resolves within months, severe complications do occur, especially when it paralyzes the 
breathing muscles and causes brain inflammation, typically in older people. It requires 
sophisticated medical care, including intensive care and rehabilitation services. About 
20% of people continue to have symptoms throughout their lives and 5% die from it 
(Yuki and Hartung, 2012).
3 Data showed that the spike in Polynesia was notable; an estimated 1 GBS case for each 
4,200 Zika infections, 25 times higher than the “normal” background rate.
4 Much of this early account of the pandemic from Brazil comes from Debora Diniz’s 
(2017) excellent book, Zika: From the Brazilian Backlands to Global Threat.
5 By January 2016, over 3,000 cases of microcephaly were under investigation and, by 
mid-2016, over 8,000 with many more possible cases simply forgotten about or ignored 
(Diniz, 2017: 99).
6 The WHO’s declaration of Zika as a PHEIC was a decision that had broad conse-
quences. However it focused not on Zika infection per say but on its relationship to 
increasing cases of neonatal microcephaly in northeastern Brazil and, through a retro-
active analysis of the 2014 outbreak, in French Polynesia. It also considered the poten-














13 Studies have shown that CZS rates range from 1‒19% of women infected with the virus 
in their first trimester, and epidemiological studies continue to turn-up new clinical 
consequences.
26 Kevin Bardosh 
14 This includes: fieldwork in Haiti since 2015 (see Bardosh et al., 2017); extensive in-depth 
interviews I have conducted with scientists, policy-makers, NGOs, funders and public 
health practitioners in the United States and Europe on Zika, including a month of field-
work in Washington, DC, in the fall of 2016; and work for UNICEF analyzing social, cul-
tural and behavioral data collected by NGOs during the epidemic (Bardosh et al., 2018).
15 See also https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/health/zika-virus-response.html
16 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/health/zika-virus-response.html
17 https://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus-tmp/en/
18 The Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future (CGHRF), con-
vened by the US National Academy of Medicine, after the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic 
estimated that pandemics will cost the global economy some $6 trillion in the 21st 
century and recommend spending $4.5 billion per year (or 65 cents per person world-
wide) on upgrading public health infrastructure, improved governance and financing 







22 This included a request for $1.51 billion for the Department of Health and Human 
Services, $335 million for USAID and $41 million for the Department of State. See 
Epstein and Lister (2016).
23 The influence of the United States is significant. Just after confirmation of a Zika-
related microcephaly case in Hawaii and a Zika case in the US Virgin Islands, the WHO 
declared its PHEIC. Hoffman and Silverberg (2018) highlight the political correlation 
between US disease spread and WHO PHEIC announcements.
24 See Mason (2016) for a discussion of pubic health reform in China after SARS.
25 Other US funding included a Grand Challenges round for vector control innovations 
and other funds to support vaccine development.
26 This included a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) resource pack and RCCE 
strategy documents developed by the WHO, PAHO, UNICEF and others. A website 
on social science and ZIKV was launched by WHO, tracking studies across the region, 
and a “Zika Communication Network” was established (see www.zikacommunication-
network.org).
27 This data was from a meta-analysis of 14 quantitative surveys (n = 41,657 participants) 
and 8 qualitative studies gathered in 6 countries in 2016–2017: Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru.
28 From Bollyky (2018).
29 Makonde is spoken by the Makonde, an ethnic group found between the borders of 
Tanzania and Mozambique.
30 The majority of reported cases came from Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador, 








37 Nearly 60% live under the national poverty line of $2.40/day.
38 See Chapter 8 of this volume, where García-Betancourt and team explore the theme of 
belonging in a small Colombian city, in relation to the design of a participatory vector 
control intervention.
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39 https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2018/12/14/496901.full.pdf
40 A study in Colombia, with > 6 million IDPs (12% of Colombia’s population, second 
only to Syria) found a strong association between high homicide rates and Dengue 
infection (Krystosik et al., 2018). See https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/the-
most-violent-cities-in-the-world-latin-america-dominates-list-with-41-countries-in-
top-50-a6995186.html
41 Access to birth control methods across LAC vary from an estimated 73% in Colombia 
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Introduction
In early 2016, the WHO, CDC and other global public health agencies announced 
that Zika virus transmission was widespread in all of Central America, much of 
South America, and many countries in the Caribbean, and that these countries 
should be avoided “until more is known about the virus.”1 Fearful that the con-
sequences of Zika infection, first seen in northeastern Brazil in 2015, were now 
emerging at a larger scale across the continent, disease modelers and their models 
painted a worrisome picture of the future of Zika and of the risks to pregnant 
women and their unborn babies. In a 2016 press briefing, the WHO predicted that 
3 to 4 million Zika cases were expected in the Americas,2 and an early article in 
the New England Journal of Medicine described the disease as “explosive” (Fauci 
and Morens, 2016). Early estimates of the risk of congenital malformation from 
Zika infection during pregnancy were thought to be 14% or higher, frequently 
compared to congenital rubella syndrome (Nishiura et al., 2016). Entomological 
maps depicted moderate-to-high abundance of Aedes aegypti throughout US cit-
ies (including New York, Philadelphia and Washington, DC), suggesting that the 
summer of 2016 would bring with it a new mosquito-borne disease (Monaghan et 
al., 2016). The conversation quickly evolved to emphasize other potential ways 
for Zika to spread, including the distribution of Aedes albopictus (a mosquito 
found as far north as the Canadian border), sexual transmission, blood transfu-
sions and breast milk.
Two years later, however, the epidemic has largely faded from public view. 
Catastrophic predictions of skyrocketing rates of microcephaly around the region 
have not been realized, at least thus far. About half-a-million suspected cases 
of Zika, and nearly 4,000 cases of congenital Zika syndrome (CZS), have been 
officially reported to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).3 The rea-
sons for this discrepancy are now open to intense scientific debate and public 
health reflection. A more measured, incremental and endemic image of Zika has 
emerged.
Maps and models of disease, and their corresponding epidemiological predic-
tions, have important influences on the political conversation and public anxieties, 
and play an increasingly important role in emerging disease epidemics. In fact, 
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predictive models have come to define a central task of epidemic response, where 
epidemiologists and disease modelers (among others) interact, and through their 
scientific logics and techniques create our collective social knowledge of disease 
spread, reduction and containment (Morse et al., 2012). Demographic data, dis-
ease trends, the life cycles of insects and animals, geospatial analysis, sophis-
ticated mathematical algorithms and super-computers increasingly intermix to 
produce statistics, causal inferences and public policy.
Yet in tracking diseases epidemiologically, scientists exhibit fundamental 
assumptions about what counts and how it should be counted. In reality, “good 
numbers” – numbers that are representative of lived (microbial, animal and 
human) experience, and account for complexity, divergence and contingencies – 
are hard to find. Instead, these data are sometimes created, at least in part (Adams, 
2016). Imperfect numbers are seen through prisms of available assumptions, the-
oretical models, tools and methodologies. During epidemics of new emerging 
infectious pathogens, producing such epidemiological knowledge is also shaped 
by ideas about the ontological status of disease and socio-scientific ideas about 
how disease is experienced, detected and combatted. But as scientific data grows, 
our ideas about disease also change. With each new epidemic, assumptions can 
be made more visible. Crises and outbreaks generate opportunities to question 
accepted scientific norms and concepts. 
In this chapter, we are concerned with tracing the emerging science of Zika 
as it manifested itself, both in the scientific and political world, between 2016 (a 
time of “epidemic Zika”) and 2018 (a time of “endemic Zika”). To do so requires 
exploring some of the initial epidemiological predictions, scientific logics and 
modeling approaches that emerged during the early stages of the epidemic, and 
following how epidemiology assembled particular framings of “Zika” based on 
limited knowledge, various assumptions, best guesses, contingencies and the pull 
of public anxiety. Following scholars of science and technology studies (Adams, 
2016; Latour, 1987), we are concerned here with how scientists, in the context 
of uncertainty and partiality, make choices about how to treat their data, and the 
implications of these choices on unfolding policy and epidemic response.
Locating Zika: Tracking invisibilities 
and partialities in the world
One central task in tracking an emerging disease epidemic, like Zika, is to be 
able to reliably identify human cases. To do so, epidemiologists first need to 
decide what “counts” as a disease case. Here, the task is simplified when Rapid 
Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) are available. RDTs have done wonders for the epidemi-
ological surveillance of malaria, for example, but many emerging viral pathogens 
cannot be counted through a simple finger-prick or even standard microscopy. 
Rather, counting Zika depends on serological and molecular testing, often located 
only in sophisticated laboratories, found mostly in capital cities and regional hubs 
(Charrel et al. 2016). In the typical clinic, then, where testing is unavailable, Zika 
is counted by presumptive diagnosis, based both on potential exposure history and 
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clinical picture. In areas where Zika is known to be circulating, diagnosis revolves 
around presumption, based on clinical criteria and case definition.
Case definition is a standardization tool by which a complex clinical picture 
is transformed into epidemiological statistics. These case definitions are typically 
formulated by government agencies for the purpose of tracking disease, and, as 
mentioned earlier are used wherever possible in conjunction with exposure his-
tory and confirmatory testing. For example, Rabe et al.’s (2016) case definition for 
Zika includes the criteria summarized in Table 2.1.
As mentioned earlier, counting Zika has relied on a hierarchy of evidence and 
related terminology. In countries where exposure is presumed and laboratory testing 
is unavailable, case definition criteria suffice to count a “suspected” case. During 
the 2014–2016 epidemic, confirmatory testing was only available in a few coun-
tries, and even in these the logistics of transporting samples from the clinic to the 
lab further mediated the act of confirmation. For example, as of January 2018, the 
PAHO/WHO has reported only five confirmed cases of Zika in Haiti, not because 
the disease was through to be rare but due to the lack of availability of confirmatory 
testing.5 These difficulties were especially acute during the height of the epidemic in 
Brazil, for example, when LACEN (Laboratório Central de Saúde Pública) reported 
a wait time of at least nine months for laboratory confirmation (Faria et al., 2016). 
Even in the United States, delays with a median wait of 42 days were reported during 
the first month of local transmission in 2016 (Shiu et al., 2018). Instead of waiting 
for test results, epidemiologists relied on counting “suspected” or “probable” cases.
The use of the case definition, however, obscures as much as it reveals. First, 
the virus’ circulation in human bodies is predominantly invisible: up to 80% of 
Zika cases are thought to be asymptomatic. While some data suggests this number 
is an overestimate, it is likely that at least half of all patients are asymptomatic 
(Moghadas et al., 2017).
Even in cases where Zika shows symptoms, the use of a clinical profile has its 
own particular challenges. Symptoms are nonspecific and mild; they are easy to 
Table 2.1  Typical case definition for Zika Virus infection4
Zika is defined as:
A person with one or more of the following not explained by another etiology: 
 1. Clinically compatible illness that includes:
 • Acute onset of fever (measured or reported), OR
 • maculopapular rash, OR
 • arthralgia, OR
 • conjunctivitis
 2. Complication of pregnancy:
 • fetal loss; OR
 • fetus or neonate with congenital microcephaly, congenital intracranial 
calcifications, other structural brain or eye abnormalities, or other congenital 
central nervous system-related abnormalities including defects such as clubfoot 
or multiple joint contractures
 3. Guillain-Barré syndrome or other neurologic manifestations
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miss and ignore. This is particularly true in the context of poverty, where health 
resources are limited and reserved for cases of serious illness or emergency. In 
order for diseases to be counted through the use of a case definition, individual 
patients have to go to the doctor (and not elsewhere for their health care, such as 
a traditional healer or pharmacist) and this doctor has to be sufficiently connected 
to a surveillance system to make the case visible, which depends on physical and 
cognitive infrastructures to support epidemiological accounting.
These requirements mean that Zika counting as manifested in official disease 
reports are necessarily partial and incomplete. With a lack of health insurance, 
disposable income or confidence in health providers, impoverished individuals 
are much less likely to seek medical care in general (Peters et al., 2008) espe-
cially for mild illnesses that resolve spontaneously within a matter of days. Fevers 
reported by patients with Zika are rarely high; patients normally do not require 
hospitalization. Symptoms such as conjunctivitis (red eyes), arthralgia (muscle 
aches) and maculopapular (red bumpy) rash could further be due to many other 
causes. An agricultural laborer, for example, who comes home with a low fever, 
red, irritated eyes, a red bumpy rash and muscle aches could easily attribute these 
mild symptoms to working outside among plant and insect irritants, as well as 
to exposure to sun and pesticides. In any case, they may lack time or money to 
go to the doctor, and within a few days would recover and, generally speaking, 
be back to normal. Surely, many such cases of Zika did not make their way into 
epidemiological reports.
To further complicate things, consider a second example: a pregnant woman 
with the same symptoms, who is acutely aware of the details of Zika virus infec-
tion. Such a woman, more concerned about her symptoms and more likely to go 
to a doctor, would also be more likely to be “counted,” as reported by Lozier et al. 
(2017) in Puerto Rico. Furthermore, when cases of congenital fetal malformations 
are suspected or confirmed, Zika counting frequently depends on the mother’s 
memory. Mild symptoms manifested many months previously need to be disen-
tangled from other physiological changes during pregnancy, in the emotional con-
text of caring for a newborn baby with congenital malformations and the newly 
discovered reality of its life-long impact (Diniz, 2017). Similar to the maternal 
health statistics explored by Wendland (2016), these statistics are reflections of 
both visible and invisible disease temporalities that are dependent on expert inter-
pretation and acts of translation. These hidden realities are further complicated by 
the unpredictable behavior of infected mosquitoes and human bodies.
Although Zika, as depicted by its case definition, can look like many dif-
ferent things, it most closely resembles its viral cousins: Chikungunya and the 
four accepted Dengue serotypes. Both are carried by the same vector (Aedes 
aegypti) and are endemic in precisely the same geographical areas as Zika. All 
three viruses are positive, single-stranded RNA enveloped Arboviruses with an 
icosahedral shape. While Chikungunya is an Alphavirus, Dengue and Zika are 
both members of the genus Flavivirus (Lycke & Norrby, 2014; Faye et al., 2014) 
(Table 2.2).
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Where diseases look similar, the use of case definition to categorize them 
becomes even more problematic, and is increasingly reliant on prevailing pub-
lic health discourse. In a setting where everyone is looking for Zika, but there 
are simultaneously co-occurring epidemics of Dengue (DEN-1 to DEN-4) and 
Chikungunya (not to mention, other many other viruses),7 physicians are more 
likely to label these vague symptoms “Zika.” By worrying about Zika, we may 
become more likely to find it.
Interestingly, although statistics on the prevalence of Zika in most places 
rely almost exclusively on case definition, most governments have not tested the 
efficacy of this approach. In Brazil, Braga et al. (2017) evaluated several clini-
cal case definitions used to identify Zika in the context of simultaneous Dengue 
and Chikungunya circulation. They found that case definitions offered by WHO, 
ECDC, PAHO, and Brazilian Ministry of Health each had very low specificities, 
and that the case definitions used by the Brazilian Ministry of Health and PAHO 
misclassified 48% of Zika cases as Dengue (Braga et al., 2017).
In government reports, statistics published about the number of “suspected” 
cases are depicted on maps and in graphs in ways that, to the untrained eye, may 
hide these uncertainties and approximations. For example, country-level data from 
WHO/PAHO case reports are based on case definition criteria alone. In El Salvador, 
to take just one example, we find higher incidence rates for infants and young adults, 
which likely mirrors the issues discussed above regarding clinical care; parents are 
more likely to take children to the doctor than they are to go themselves. Looking 
at these authoritative representations, we may be easily forgiven for mistaking these 
numbers for exact counts, and conclude that Zika is more likely to occur in children.
Although “suspected” case numbers may be unreliable, it is likewise dan-
gerous for governments without access to diagnostic testing to rely only on 
Table 2.2  Case definitions of Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika6
Dengue (without 
warning signs)




 • Two of the following:
 • Nausea, vomiting
 • Rash
 • Aches and pains
 • Leukopenia
 • Fever (chills) as reported by 
the patient or a health-care 
provider, AND
 • Absence of neuroinvasive 
disease, AND
 • Absence of a more likely 
clinical explanation. 
 • Other clinically compatible 
symptoms of (arbovirus 
disease headache, myalgia, 
rash, arthralgia, vertigo, 
vomiting, paresis and/or 
nuchal rigidity)
 • Acute onset of 
fever (measured or 
reported), OR
 • maculopapular rash, 
OR
 • arthralgia, OR
 • conjunctivitis
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“confirmed” cases. Early risk communication efforts in Jamaica, for example, led 
by the Ministry of Health, only reported the few confirmed cases while simul-
taneously emphasizing to the public that Zika was a public health emergency 
and that communities needed to take action (Bardosh, personal communication, 
Jamaica, September 2016). This is a recipe for confusion, rumours and even social 
resistance (Briggs and Nichter, 2009). Choices about how to communicate Zika 
count to the public, then, and have practical consequences for interventions at 
community-level. These interventions have tended (after some initial emphasis on 
confirmed cases) to have evolved to focus on suspected cases, as well as incanta-
tions that everyone is at risk.
Unlike in most of the Americas, however, public pronouncements in the 
United States followed officially confirmed laboratory cases and test results. This 
presented a different set of ambiguities. Currently, the CDC recommends RNA 
NAT (Nucleic Acid Testing) or RT-PCR (Reverse Transcription Polymerase 
Chain Reaction) for symptomatic pregnant women who may have been exposed 
to Zika (CDC, 2018). Molecular and serological tests, such as Enzyme-Linked 
Immunoabsorbant Assays (ELISA) and plaque reduction neutralization tests 
(PRNT) locate antibodies; testing for these antibodies is a common and rela-
tively low-cost method of tracking infection. However, like clinical presentations 
and case definitions, recent studies have demonstrated that Zika virus antibod-
ies cross-react with other flaviviruses, especially Dengue but also Japanese 
Encephalitis, Saint Louis Encephalitis, West Nile and Yellow Fever (Vorou, 
2016). These closely related viruses co-circulate in many of the areas in which 
Zika was emerging, impacting the reliability of tests involving antibodies. While 
rates of sensitivity (true positive rate) and specificity (true negative rate) vary by 
commercial test, cross-reactivity means that Zika antibody tests will sometimes 
be falsely positive, particularly in the case of Dengue (Dejnirattisai et al., 2016). 
As antibodies persist in the body, cross-reactivity may not be time-specific; it 
can occur based on flavivirus infections decades earlier. In areas where Dengue 
infection rates are high, this creates a major problem for diagnostic confirmation. 
A retrospective study in Miami, where laboratory conditions are at their best, sug-
gested a false positive rate of 25% for women tested for IgM antibodies (Curry 
et al., 2017). 
Testing problems, and the challenges of disentangling multiple arboviruses at 
the molecular level, do not stop here. For example, although the Plaque Reduction 
Neutralization Test (PRNT) is the reference standard for the detection of neutral-
izing antibodies to flaviviruses, it requires live viral cultures, takes days to weeks 
to perform and is a more difficult and expensive test compared to immunoassay 
(Theel and Hata, 2018). As a result, this test was not widely available for clini-
cal care during the Zika epidemic (Granger et al., 2017). Cross-reactivity is also 
a problem with PRNT, at least in secondary infections, which works both ways 
– patients who really have Zika will test falsely positive for Dengue and vice 
versa (Felix et al., 2017; Granger et al., 2017). Due to the expense of PRNT and 
other factors, ELISA continues to be used due to its relative cheapness, speed and 
accessibility. But again, cross-reactivity complicates the work of epidemiology. 
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One study found that combining ZIKV-NS1 IgM and IgG ELISAs could detect 
Zika with a specificity of only ~67%; cross-reactivity from secondary Dengue 
infection ranged from 28% to 67% (Tsia et al., 2017).
These diagnostic difficulties were briefly made publically visible in 2016 when 
a whistle-blower at the CDC went public with the information that the agency-
recommended Tripolex RT-PCR test, which tested simultaneously for Zika, 
Chikungunya and Dengue, reduced the sensitivities of the individual tests to the 
point that up to 40% of Zika cases were missed (Sun, 2016).
Due to the problems of immunoassay, the only way to tell if a patient defini-
tively has Zika is to test their serum for viral RNA using RT-PCR. This gold stand-
ard runs into the hundreds of dollars per test. Even if national labs, like LACEN 
in Brazil, can carry out the test, many cannot manage high-test volumes during 
an actual epidemic. Samples for RT-PCR must be taken, packaged, shipped and 
stored carefully to prevent degradation of RNA samples and inaccurate test results 
(CDC, 2017); remote districts and bad roads stand in the way. Even in the United 
States (where RT-PCR is used to confirm ELISA positive tests), bottlenecks and 
long delays occurred during the epidemic.
But perhaps a bigger difficulty is that finding and counting Zika RNA is a 
precarious process. Once the active virus has been cleared from the patient’s 
blood (a maximum of 14 days after symptoms), viral RNA is untraceable. The 
virus has left. It is gone. This means that if a patient faces delays in testing or 
fails to go to the doctor while they have symptoms or has no symptoms at all, a 
positive RT-PCR test is impossible. Counting a “confirmed case” requires that 
an expensive and largely unavailable test be performed within a specific 14-day 
window.
In light of the multiple difficulties in testing for Zika, the CDC’s guide to Zika 
testing is convoluted and difficult to follow (see CDC, 2017). Definitive testing 
for Zika, even in the best laboratory conditions in the world, remains difficult and 
fraught with uncertainty. Poorly-defined symptoms, inadequate testing resources 
and imperfect tests are just some of the problems epidemiologists faced as they 
attempted to measure Zika’s presence in the world during the 2016 global health 
emergency.
Zika models: Imperfect predictions and the art of forecasting
The invisibilities and partialities inherent to counting Zika in the world, socially 
and scientifically, have also influenced the burgeoning field of Zika modeling, 
albeit in different ways and with different results. A quick PubMed search shows 
more than 500 papers published in 2017 with the word “Zika” in the title. Due to 
the nature of Zika transmission, ecological modeling approaches (that predict dis-
ease movement based on the environmental factors that determine mosquito pres-
ence and abundance) were central to early scientific efforts to predict the course 
of the epidemic. However, a review paper by Carlson et al. (2017), based on 
data from the United States, concluded that methodological conflicts hindered the 
development of appropriate predictions, and that most models had unacceptable 
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margins of uncertainty that “could misrepresent the risk faced by millions of peo-
ple in the United States within a single year.” Keegan et al.’s (2017) review of 
quantitative Zika models was not less critical:
In Europe and the United States, for example, areas predicted to have sea-
sonal or year-round transmission risk were extensive and varied across mod-
els. However, through March 2017 no vector-borne transmission had been 
documented in Europe and just over 200 locally acquired mosquito-transmit-
ted cases reported in the United States occurred in small regions of southern 
Florida and Texas.
While Zika science has blossomed, the predictions made by many models have 
failed to come to pass. Why is this? As Carlson et al. (2017) and Keegan et al. 
(2017) point out, both mechanistic and ecological models predicted radically dif-
ferent scenarios, and few seem to have been even remotely accurate. 
One major problem is that it is very challenging to compare the predictions 
of different types of modelers, who produce widely different-looking products. 
Ecological modelers often produce maps depicting the possibility of transmis-
sion in various regions, and at different scales taking into account a multitude 
of parameters such as host density, environmental conditions like temperature, 
elevation and humidity and geographical barriers (Escobar and Craft, 2016). 
Quantitative modelers, in turn, focus on understanding pathogen spread. This is 
focused on generation of an accurate “reproductive number,” R0, which represents 
the number of individuals infected by a single infected person in an immunologi-
cally naive population. After estimating R0 for a given disease, quantitative mod-
elers then plug these epidemiological parameters into mathematical equations and 
statistically depict the speed at which a disease will spread through a population. 
Within these modeling subfields, a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement 
exists. Both Keegan et al. (2017) and Carlson et al. (2017) attempt to compare the 
results of various predictive Zika models, and to graphically demonstrate the vari-
ability inherent in these predictions. They found that R0 has ranged from 1 to 10, 
a huge variability, leading to widely divergent forecasts of the epidemic’s size. R0 
is thought to be different for each disease and each epidemic. As a comparison, the 
R0 in the 2014–2016 West African Ebola epidemic has been estimated at between 
1.5 and 2.5 (Althaus, 2014).
Essentially, the challenges with counting clinical cases of Zika meant that mod-
elers were forced to estimate disease parameters at multiple levels, embedding 
uncertainties within these products. In order to justify these guesses, modelers 
frequently cite other models, entangling together different estimates, assumptions 
and shaky epidemiological data. There is a tendency to employ an “empiricist 
repertoire” that rhetorically portrays results as belonging to the realm of accepted, 
socially neutral scientific fact instead of adequately and fully communicating 
uncertainty (Mulkay and Gilbert, 1984). Furthermore, as different researchers and 
policy-makers use each other’s data, the amount of uncertainty increases while 
simultaneously becoming more obscured.
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One example of the problematic assumptions embedded in disease models 
involves the key variable of “attack rate,” which describes the speed by which a 
disease spreads. In order to model the spread of Zika, disease modelers were forced 
to construct an estimate of this important variable. Many of these estimates were 
based on the well-documented Zika outbreak on Yap Island in 2007. However, 
the attack rate in Brazil is generally thought to have been much lower than in 
Yap, where it was documented to be 14.6 infected individuals per 1,000 people. 
In Brazil, it was estimated to be 4.4/1,000 at the height of the epidemic in Bahia 
State, for example (MacDonald and Holden, 2018). If this rate is correct (and it 
may not be, for reasons discussed earlier), the Yap outbreak models would have 
wildly overestimated the extent of Zika infection and spread in Latin America 
and the Caribbean in 2016. Practically speaking, the models that informed early 
policy-orientated discussions about how Zika was spreading would, then, have 
been widely inaccurate.
This also demonstrates a problematic assumption at the heart of disease mod-
els: that there are fundamental aspects of disease that work the same ways in 
very different times and places. But, in reality, data drawn from different places 
yields different predictions and parameters. Examples of variables assumed to 
be the same across multiple sites include the transmissibility of Zika, the bite 
rate of mosquitoes, the period of infectivity and the rate of microcephaly caused 
by Zika. By discovering, or at least closely estimating, these disease parameters 
on the basis of known data, models attempt to extend these parameters to make 
predictions about how diseases will work in other times and places. While this 
assumption is taken for granted within disease modeling, in many ways it flies in 
the face of our knowledge about how viruses work. Even given equal exposure, 
everyone does not get sick equally. If I am exposed to a disease, the chances that I 
will get sick depend on the health of my immune system and my nutritional status, 
to name just a few factors. Furthermore, the rates at which individuals are exposed 
to disease are never equal. Disease models often assume a homogenously mixing 
population, in which every person is equally at risk, an assumption that is clearly 
not only incorrect but also obscures important social inequalities and sociocultural 
practices that remain at the heart of why certain people get sick and others do not.
Microcephaly: Vanishing consequences, 
unexplained biosocial puzzles
The long-term consequences of Zika infection are in many ways no less amor-
phous and difficult to track and scientifically explain than the virus and vector. 
Early in the Brazilian epidemic (mid-2015), cases of febrile rash were linked to a 
20-fold increase in neonatal microcephaly in northeastern Brazil (Oliveira Melo 
et al., 2016). However, the magnitude of risk posed during pregnancy remains elu-
sive. This link has also been expanded to include a range of other insidious neu-
rological and developmental disorders that may take months, or possibly years, 
to notice after birth (Kapogiannis et al., 2017): these include mental retardation, 
motor disabilities and visual and auditory impairments (Table 2.3). In effect, 
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microcephaly is now considered to be the tip of a much larger, more nuanced and 
chronic clinical iceberg, or spectrum, termed Congenital Zika Syndrome or CZS 
(Oliveira Melo et al., 2016).8 CZS is a complex and shifting set of symptoms that 
may occur together or apart, with varying degrees of severity.9
It is perhaps unsurprising that rates of CZS have been calculated differently at 
different times and places during the course of the epidemic, although most stud-
ies confirm a much higher risk when women are exposed during the first trimester 
and early second trimester of pregnancy (Moore et al., 2017). Coelho et al. (2017) 
summarized various studies that found rates from 1% to 17% of pregnancies in 
women with ZIKV infection, and in a systemic review and meta-analysis of eight 
cohort studies, Coelho and Crovella (2017) estimated the average rate of micro-
cephaly due to Zika infection in the first trimester to be 2.3%. Alternatively, a 
study of women testing positive and negative for Zika in Rio de Janeiro estimated 
the risk of microcephaly at 3.4% but noted a broad spectrum of neonatal con-
sequences beyond microcephaly. A study based on 442 completed pregnancies 
registered with the US Zika Pregnancy Registry found a 6% overall Zika-related 
birth defect rate and 11% rate when the women had been infected during the first 
trimester (Honein et al. 2017).
Clearly, understanding the full extent and occurrence of CZS will require lon-
gitudinal studies in different countries and population groups. A recent review in 
The Lancet Infectious Disease commented: 
Reports regarding the prevalence of microcephaly and adverse birth outcomes 
found that these ranged from 3–4% in Rio de Janeiro and 5–42% in the USA. 
Table 2.3  The clinical spectrum of congenital Zika syndrome10
Classic findings  • Severe microcephaly (often >3 SD below the mean for 
gestational age and sex)
 • Brain abnormalities (subcortical calcifications, ventriculomegaly, 
cortical thinning, gyral pattern anomalies, hypoplasia of the 
cerebellum, or corpus callosum anomalies)
 • Occular findings
 • Congenital contractures
 • Neurologic impairment
Other possible 
findings
 • Severe spinal cord injury
 • Facial dysmorphia
 • Clubfoot
 • Hearing loss
 • Congenital cardiac disease
 • Unilateral diaphragm paralysis
Chronic effects  • Seizures, tremors, posturing, hypertonia with spasticity, severe 
irritability, dysphagia, postnatal hydrocephalus
 • Motor and cognitive disabilities, impairment in vision and 
hearing
 • Postnatal microcephaly due to decreasing rate of head 
circumference growth
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A 2017 study in São Paulo, Brazil, found adverse outcomes in 15 (28%) of 
54 infants (95% CI 17–41) of pregnant women infected with Zika virus, but 
these outcomes appeared to be substantially milder than those observed in the 
Rio de Janeiro study, causing speculation of possible variation in risk across 
regions. However, case-control, prospective cohort, and enhanced surveil-
lance investigations have not yet yielded insights on why a small fraction of 
fetuses of infected mothers develop microcephaly and severe sequelae.
Before Zika moved into Brazil and invaded Recife and neighboring cities it was 
not documented to cause microcephaly. The potential for maternal-fetal transmis-
sion was suspected during the 2013–2014 epidemic in French Polynesia but not 
confirmed; subsequent retrospective studies suggest a strong association between 
microcephaly and Zika.11 Rather, Zika had a rather lackluster and low-profile his-
tory, since it was first “counted” in a rhesus monkey by Rockefeller Foundation 
program staff investigating the sylvatic cycle of Yellow Fever in the canopy of 
the Zika Forest in Uganda. There remains some controversy about when the first 
human cases were found, with a report from Nigeria in 1954 and others in Uganda 
in 1962–1963 competing for the title (Gubler et al. 2017). None of these early 
reports or subsequent identifications in Asia (1977 Central Java) and elsewhere 
suggested anything more than mild febrile illness. Epidemics of Zika were never 
recorded, and fewer than 20 human cases were reported, although the data sug-
gests silent infection was occurring between humans, animals and mosquitoes for 
over 70 years in Africa and Asia (Gubler et al. 2017). But, then again, perhaps this 
was because no one was looking, a question that some epidemiologists have been 
interested in, attempting to locate clusters of possible Zika-related microcephaly; 
Majumder et al. (2018) hypothesized that seasonal birth defects in a West African 
hospital may be explained by Zika. 
At the center of this story is genetic mutation – a deadly shift of viral RNA 
nucleotides, emerging from the sea of random transcription errors and/or selective 
pressures in host-cell machinery. There are three accepted phylogenetic lineages 
of Zika virus: the African, Asian and American lineage, with distinct character-
istics. Gubler et al. (2017) hypothesized that the Asian lineage may have adapted 
to generate higher viremia levels in humans, which would have facilitated more 
efficient mosquito spread and enhance transplacental transmission. But none of 
this is confirmed, and remains speculative.
What is not speculative is that Zika-related cases of microcephaly are not 
evenly distributed (see Figure 2.1). As noted earlier, it is impossible to tell the 
extent to which this skewed distribution reflects not only the distribution of cases 
but also the ability to count confirmed cases of the congenital effects of Zika 
infection. Researchers at the Latin American Collaborative Study of Congenital 
Malformations warned as early as 2016 that a surge in microcephaly diagno-
sis could be at least in part due to increased vigilance for Zika (Butler, 2016). 
Vigilance, in this sense, is mediated by public health surveillance systems and 
their methods of counting, crosschecking and confirming. However, many stud-
ies of CZS, particularly in low-resource countries and districts, have struggled 
in linking the congenital syndrome with the virus. In January 2016, for example, 
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the Brazilian government reported that of 4,180 suspected cases of microcephaly 
recorded since October, it had rejected 462 as false diagnosis and confirmed only 
270 (Butler, 2016). Cases are frequently classified based on the amount of infor-
mation available and reported per case, which is often incomplete and inadequate 
to distinguish CZS from other congenital syndromes (França et al., 2016), and 
the ranking of cases according to degrees of certainty reveals the extent to which 
congenital Zika syndrome is an uncertain, shifting category.
As of 2018, around 3,000 cases of Zika-related microcephaly have been 
reported from 29 countries since its initial appearance in Brazil. As shown in 
Figure 2.1, the vast majority of these cases (n = 2,366) have been reported from 
Brazil, and most (> 80%) only from the Northeastern region (de Araújo et al., 
2016). While Zika raised global health security alarm bells, it would appear that 
the virus’ most insidious effects (on neonates – we should not forget GBS)12 have 
been markedly localized to a particular corner of Brazil – what Diniz (2017) has 
called the “backlands” of northeastern Brazil. Why is this? A mutation does not 
account for why Zika should appear so profoundly important to microcephaly in 
northeastern Brazil, but not seem to have had the same effect elsewhere in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
First, it is important to acknowledge that measures of microcephaly are depend-
ent on clinician knowledge, situated within the state’s medical bureaucracy and 
accepted surveillance norms and protocols. As Quintó et al. (2017) describes, a 
diagnosis of microcephaly requires accurate knowledge of gestational age, or the 
estimated age of the pregnancy, a value used to calculate the baby’s maturity or 
prematurity at birth. Premature babies are small and thus have naturally smaller 
heads; microcephaly is often measured as an absolute value (head circumference) 
rather than as a ratio of body-to-head. An inaccurate estimate of gestational age 
would lead small, premature babies to be misclassified as having microcephaly, 
in this case clinically termed “relative microcephaly” (deSilva et al., 2017). 
















Figure 2.1  Confirmed cases of congenital syndrome associated with Zika infection 
through 2015–2018.
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Gestational age is particularly difficult to calculate in the context of poor mater-
nal health care, as it requires knowledge of the mother’s last menstrual period 
and is often correlated with ultrasound measurements. Without this knowledge, 
newborn gestational age exams are, like clinical case definitions, open to different 
degrees of interpretation. One frequently used estimate, the Ballard exam, was 
demonstrated to overestimate gestational age, misclassifying 80% of premature 
neonates as full term; this would lead researchers attempting to classify cases of 
microcephaly to believe that infants had unusually small heads when in fact they 
were simply small due to prematurity (Quintó et al., 2017). Among cohorts of 
infants in Mozambique, Guatemala, Brazil, and Colombia, Quintó et al. (2017) 
compared the calculated prevalence of microcephaly using different systems of 
rating gestational age. Using one set of guidelines, the rate of microcephaly was 
calculated to be 1.7%; using the other, it was calculated at 4.1%.
Notably, before February 2016, the Brazilian Ministry of Health adopted a 
30-cm head circumference limit, which was later increased to 33 cm. This value 
was a very sensitive measure (meaning that it potentially captured more cases of 
microcephaly) but was not necessarily scientifically validated (Osorio-de-Castro 
et al., 2017). In fact, in a recent clinical review of the case definition for micro-
cephaly, de Silva et al. (2017) described four different levels of diagnostic cer-
tainty with which one can diagnose a case of zika-related microcephaly. Each of 
these four levels requires different amounts, and kinds, of evidence.
For this reason, multiple studies since the Zika epidemic have pointed out that 
“background” rates of microcephaly prior to Zika, which were largely unknown 
across the region, presented a second problem. Estimates of pre-Zika micro-
cephaly prevalence rates have varied widely based on the definition used, region, 
methods and populations studied, and have been found to range from 0.6 to 9 per 
10,000 live births (Dufort & White, 2018), Furthermore, small head circumfer-
ences are not always the result of congenital infection with Zika but can be caused 
by a variety of other exposures (deSilva et al., 2017); for example, many terato-
gens, such as alcohol, radiation, tobacco, marijuana, cocaine and toluene place 
neonates at risk for microcephaly. Maternal health conditions, such as maternal 
hypothyroidism, folate deficiency and placental insufficiency, can also cause this 
effect. There are also a variety of infectious diseases, such as toxoplasma, rubella, 
measles, cytomegalovirus (CMV), herpes, HIV and syphilis. A 2016 retrospec-
tive review of microcephaly in northeastern Brazil, for example, showed previ-
ously undetected seasonal peaks of microcephaly dating back to at least 2012, and 
becoming more severe as time went on (de Araújo et al., 2016). Finally, a common 
cause of microcephaly appears to be related to a combination of stress, malnutri-
tion, socioeconomic status and intrauterine growth retardation (delayed growth in 
the womb) (Alvarado-Socarras et al., 2016). One study in Brazil noted that rates 
of microcephaly (prior to Zika) were correlated with maternal schooling, marital 
status, smoking during pregnancy, primiparity (first time birth), vaginal delivery 
and intrauterine growth restriction (Silva et al., 2018). De Souza et al. (2018) have 
shown that microcephaly in Recife, the epicenter of the Zika epidemic, were cor-
related with precarious living conditions and poverty. And in other impoverished 
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places in Latin America, such as rural Guatemala, Zika has forced the realization 
that so-called “background” rates of microcephaly are much higher than was pre-
viously thought (Rick et al., 2017).
Campos et al. (2018) note that in tracing out the causes of heightened rates of 
microcephaly in Northeast Brazil, it is important to simultaneously unpack sev-
eral co-occurring factors. They note that Northeast Brazil has the highest rate of 
poverty and the poorest environmental management, providing ideal conditions 
for Aedes mosquitoes. Furthermore, while Zika and Dengue were widespread 
throughout Brazil, Chikungunya rates were highest in the northeast, where peak 
rates of microcephaly occurred. It is difficult to disentangle these interlinked epi-
demiological, biological and social worlds and the multiple forces working in 
them. Microcephaly can be caused by multiple factors interacting simultaneously, 
or be caused by a single factor; thus, attempting to link microcephaly and Zika as 
if these two conditions could be tracked, measured and related in a vacuum risks 
both inaccurate measurement and erasure of the ways that microcephaly may be 
socially mediated.
Many of these biosocial factors, however, are not unique to Northeastern 
Brazil. Several possible explanations have been provided, then, for why rates 
of Zika were so much higher in the “backlands” of Northeastern Brazil (Diniz, 
2017). An earlier study, Parens et al. (2017), argued that it was possible that Zika 
itself was not responsible for these cases, but that microcephaly spikes could be 
caused by the pesticide pyriproxyfen, which was being used in drinking water to 
control Aedes mosquitoes. This generated significant media attention in the early 
stages of the epidemic. However, other studies have shown that the distribution 
of cases of microcephaly does not map on to the distribution of pyriproxyfen use 
(Albuqueque et al., 2016), and an influential case-control study in The Lancet 
Infectious Diseases concluded there was no association between pyriproxyfen 
exposure and cases of microcephaly, while these cases were strongly associated 
with Zika infection (de Araújo et al., 2018). Possibilities for alternative explana-
tions, however, become more attractive as rates of microcephaly comparable to 
Northern Brazil do not materialize elsewhere.
Other explanations for this gap exist. Some are located in co-circulating epi-
demics. For example, Northeastern Brazil has faced critical shortages of the anti-
biotic used to treat syphilis, and had recently suffered from both a Chikungunya 
and measles epidemic only a few years before (Garcia Serpa Osorio-de-
Castro, et al., 2017). The pathogenesis of Zika has been shown to be enhanced by 
preexisting infection to other flaviviruses, notably Dengue serotypes but also, so 
some postulate, Chikungunya (Bardina et al., 2017).
Additional explanations have to do with the virus itself and how the threat 
of Zika may have increased risk mitigation behaviors in high-risk areas outside 
of the epicenter. The most severe congenital effects of Zika, for example, are 
thought to result in pregnancy loss, particularly in the very early stages of preg-
nancy – something that would be even harder to track and account for around the 
world. Coelho et al. (2017) noted that there was a 15% drop in live births in Rio 
de Janeiro between September and December 2016, which may have been due to 
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early miscarriages due to ZIKV infection or delayed pregnancy due to fears about 
microcephaly. Marteleto et al. (2017) found a 10% drop in live births one year 
after the ZIKV epidemic began in Pernambuco, Brazil. A study using data from 
the 36 largest Brazilian cities (8.2 million births) found a live birth rate reduction 
of 8% in the second half of 2016, rising to 11% in cities with the highest micro-
cephaly rates (Diaz-Quijano et al. 2018).
On the other hand, it has been proposed that some infants who were exposed to 
Zika in utero had less profound effects, and may not have met criteria for micro-
cephaly (Oliveira Melo et al., 2016). These infants may still show developmental, 
emotional or behavioral problems, and may even regress to microcephaly if their 
heads fail to grow as they age (Kapogiannis et al., 2017). These consequences of 
Zika may only become visible after months or even years. A final possibility is 
related to abortion requests, which increased across some areas of Latin America 
during the epidemic (Aiken et al., 2016). However, while it is possible that this 
had some influence on reducing congenital malformation rates, the absence of 
ultrasound tests, required to confirm microcephaly, are not available equally to 
everyone.
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter has retraced the path of Zika’s emergence, the ways in which scien-
tific challenges and epidemiological uncertainty made it appear simultaneously 
visible and invisible, certain and uncertain, everywhere and nowhere. The cor-
responding partialities involved in the act of locating and counting Zika in the 
world operated at several levels. Zika is often asymptomatic, and when it is vis-
ible usually manifests as a mild illness with an often-undramatic clinical course, 
unlikely to be noticed outside of a context of epidemiological alarm. It is a virus 
co-circulating with a number of similar viruses carried by the same vector, with 
similar symptoms and similar distributions, that often cannot be told apart even by 
clinicians in the absence of good diagnostic testing. And even diagnostic testing 
may obscure as much as it clarifies: almost all tests embed profound problems, 
either in sensitivity, specificity, temporality or all three. And, in any case, access 
and availability to these tests remain very low.
These problems are not methodological flaws; they are problems inherent to the 
art of tracking disease, the limits of our measurement techniques and the delays 
inherent to generating new scientific knowledge. Some kinds of facts, like real 
Zika case numbers, simply remain fuzzy and insidiously unknowable – approach-
able only through approximations.
Yet epidemiologists are required to count disease; some quantification is neces-
sary in order to provide useful science to governments, policy-makers, clinicians 
and an often-anxious public. Numbers of suspected and confirmed cases emerge 
from this mire of shifting uncertainty and are depicted in graphs and charts. And 
from these, they guide resources and shape policy. Health statistics in part made 
Zika real: these numbers pointed to it, as a real thing, existing in patients in the 
world. Yet what were they pointing to? At least in part, to poverty, to low access 
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to health care and to a set of very similar endemic illnesses, co-circulating in ways 
that made them inextricable. And yet many within the sciences continued to treat 
Zika as if it was occurring in a vacuum, and treated the syndrome as a discrete bio-
logical entity rather than as a product of multiple interacting diseases and factors.
As Zika fears grew and clinicians became attuned to a public health discourse 
that cast Zika as an emerging critical public health threat, it is likely that this 
sense of needing to look for microcephaly all but guaranteed it would be found. 
Disease entities, like microcephaly, are often presumed to be discrete biological 
categories that are universal and self-evident, easily tracked and measured statis-
tically. At every level, however, these categories fall apart, and are instead held 
together by guidelines, socially created and socially mediated, which allow them 
to be counted. Microcephaly, like many other disease phenomenon, is more easily 
measured and counted in contexts where access to health resources are high. In 
places where resources are scarce, there is increased reliance on case definitions 
and clinical guidelines, which can under-estimate or over-estimate. Furthermore, 
microcephaly, like many other disease phenomena, exists in a biological, social 
and economic context; microcephaly may be caused by one thing, or by a multi-
tude of intersecting factors, such as poverty, lack of access to basic health care and 
other infectious diseases and environmental factors. By focusing on, and count-
ing, microcephaly as a direct consequence of Zika, we run the risk of making 
these other factors invisible.
In the context of fundamental uncertainty about how a new disease works, 
the norms of scientific publication are inadequate to make explicit the degree to 
which findings are certain, or simply best guesses. It is perhaps no surprise, then, 
that predictions based on the subjective choices of estimates and assumptions 
were in many cases inconsistent from each other, and often radically departed 
from the reality of the unfolding Zika epidemic. They were approximations and 
estimates of facts. But this does not make the scientific world of epidemiology and 
disease modeling benign! The imperfections of scientific models have important 
ramifications for the real world (Morgan, 2012). Even when scientists appreciate 
the complexities and partialities of their work, the medium of communicating sci-
ence (as Marshall McLuhan famously stated, the medium is the message) helps to 
generate illusions of certainty. Let us follow a particular example, and follow the 
social life of Zika modeling, to better illustrate our point.
In a 2016 article in the New England Journal of Medicine, Johansson et al. 
(2016) attempted to estimate a crucial unknown – the risk of microcephaly after 
first-trimester infection with Zika. Acknowledging that this value is extremely 
uncertain, the authors estimated the rate for Bahia, Brazil, an early epicenter 
of Zika and microcephaly. In attempting to model this risk, Johansson et al. 
(2016) first acknowledged the inherent uncertainty of tracking Zika prevalence, 
as described earlier, and noted that as infection rates in Bahia cannot be reli-
ably inferred, they would use a wide range – an infection rate of between 10% 
and 80% of the population. The authors also attempted to account for potential 
over-reporting, and the unknown baseline of microcephaly in the region. After a 
thorough acknowledgement and attempt to account for this uncertainty, the risk 
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of microcephaly was estimated at 0.88%, if the authors assumed an 80% Zika 
infection rate, and 13.2%, assuming a 10% infection rate. The authors compared 
their findings to data from the outbreak in French Polynesia, which estimated the 
risk of microcephaly in first-trimester infection to be 0.95%, based on 8 affected 
pregnancies in a population of 270,000. The authors noted that the lower end of 
their estimated range is consistent with both the numbers from French Polynesia 
and the absence of cases seen on Yap, which has a small enough population that 
at this low rate no cases would be expected.
The predictions of Johansson et al. (2016) were then mobilized, as data, by 
other Zika modelers. Ellington et al. (2016) attempted to estimate the number of 
pregnant women who may become infected with Zika virus in Puerto Rico, and 
to use this number to project the number of expected infants with microcephaly. 
In estimating the rate of microcephaly, they used the wide range produced by 
Johansson et al. (2016), assuming that rates of microcephaly in Puerto Rico would 
be similar to those in Brazil. While retaining the wide range of values projected 
by the uncertain predictions of Johansson et al. (2016), Ellington et al. (2016) 
offered no discussion of the source of these estimates, or the multiple sources of 
uncertainty inherent in the original paper. At the same time, new sources of uncer-
tainty are embedded; for example, the authors are once again forced to estimate 
the infection rate of Zika, this time in Puerto Rico, as well as to project the rate of 
pregnancy during this period. They also, notably, estimate the risk of birth defects 
caused by Zika infection during the second and third trimesters, despite the fact 
that neither of the two papers cited contain any attempt to measure this risk – these 
are pure estimates. Using Johansson et al. (2016) as well as these estimates, the 
authors predicted 110 to 290 microcephaly cases occurring between mid-2016 
and mid-2017.
In January, Li et al. (2017) used the predictions of Ellington et al. (2016) in 
another modeling paper, this time attempting to model the cost-effectiveness of 
increasing the availability of access to contraception during a Zika epidemic in 
Puerto Rico. Once again, in using Ellington et al.’s (2016) prediction for the num-
ber of microcephaly cases, the authors failed to convey the uncertainty inherent 
in this metric, and the potentially problematic nature of Johansson et al.’s (2016) 
original use of data from Brazil, which was, by this time, beginning to be rec-
ognized as having had anomalously high rates of microcephaly. Once again, the 
paper embeds its own uncertainty, including, notably, assumptions, unsupported 
by data, about the number of women who would utilize contraceptives if they 
were provided. In using these high projected numbers of microcephaly cases, and 
assuming, for example, that more than 50% of women would visit a doctor, and 
50% of these would switch contraceptive measures, Li et al. (2017) found that the 
estimated costs of an intervention to introduce additional contraceptive resources 
in Puerto Rico would be about half of the amount needed to care for the infants 
estimated to be born with congenital Zika syndrome. 
Other researchers used Li et al. (2017) to justify the need for US government 
interventions and investments (Ahrens et al, 2017; Darney et al., 2017; Fitzpatrick 
et al., 2017; Vermund, 2017). In particular, many of the authors of Li et al. 
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(2017) were researchers affiliated with the CDC, which in May 2016 launched 
Z-CAN, the Zika Contraception Action Network, through the CDC Foundation, 
which helps to provide women in Puerto Rico with contraceptive options (CDC 
Foundation, 2017). Notably, there was a significant overlap in authorship between 
Li et al. (2017), who published a cost justification for an intervention much like 
this program, and Lathrop et al. (2018), who published a description of the pro-
gram. The program functioned between March 2016 and August 2017, serving 
> 2,100 women. As of August 2017, the Puerto Rican Department of Health had 
confirmed only 29 cases in which a baby born, or a fetus lost, had Zika-related 
birth defects – in contrast to the 110 to 290 microcephaly cases that had been 
predicted by Ellington et al. (2016).
What are we to make of this example? Should we interpret this chain of events 
as a sign of positive, science-driven policy? Epidemiological data, while uncer-
tain (Johansson et al., 2016), was used to create predictive models (Ellington et 
al., 2016), which, while likewise uncertain, was used to create cost estimates (Li 
et al., 2017) that helped to justify and measure an intervention (Lathrop et al., 
2018). On the one hand, it is possible that Z-CAN (and other related programs) 
is at least in part responsible for the low rates of microcephaly reported in Puerto 
Rico; certainly, it helped in providing affordable access to contraceptives to a few 
thousand women. On the other hand, in each of these publications, the authors 
admit significant uncertainty, not only about the rate of microcephaly caused by 
Zika but also about rates of infection, rates of pregnancy, uptake of contracep-
tives and costs of care, to name just a few. While each article acknowledges its 
own significant uncertainties, each also reports the results of preceding papers 
without a discussion of where these results come from, and the uncertainties they 
contain. Uncertainties within these papers are not simply additive; they increase 
exponentially until predictions become a series of best guesses, easily influenced 
by the choice of model parameters. These can drive policy. In our example, cost 
justification was published in January 2017 for an intervention that had already 
been planned by the CDC Foundation since May 2016. In what direction does 
the arrow of causality go: was policy driving research, research driving policy, 
or both?
As almost any scientist attempting to influence policy will point out, getting 
governments to respond to science is easier said than done. Furthermore, while the 
uncertainty and inherent assumptions of epidemiological predictions may cause 
inaccuracies in predictive models, in the face of a new disease, epidemic uncer-
tainty is in many important ways unavoidable. In pointing out a lack of consensus 
between disease models, Carlson et al. (2017) worried that “the lack of a con-
sensus among different models renders the literature less credible to policymak-
ers.” We can ask, rather provocatively: is it better to bury, rather than highlight, 
uncertainty in order to fight against a policy climate that increasingly has no use 
for science (is even “anti-science”)? As Villa (2016) has pointed out, in the case 
of uncertainty surrounding Zika, public health agencies are in a lose-lose situa-
tion; either they are accused of raising alarm unnecessarily and wasting health 
resources, or of acting too slowly and remaining passive while a crisis unfolds.
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Conversely, epidemiologists and disease modelers are not always advocates for 
policy change; disease modeling papers, in particular, are frequently abstract and 
geared towards a scientific audience. In this way, they reflect the need for modelers 
to produce science, and the appearance of certainty, cohesion and sophistication, 
to maintain their research funding, prestige and position. Perhaps these publica-
tions were never intended to guide policy, but to produce approximations and fur-
ther develop the field? It is important to acknowledge, however, that whether they 
intend it or not, science is picked up by the policy world. Academic publications are 
frequently used and reused (even by other scientists) in ways that do not acknowl-
edge the serious uncertainties that were obvious to those who created them.
It is possible (but unlikely) that disease predictions of the rapid and wide-
spread transmission of Zika in LAC in 2015–2016 resulted in policies and pro-
grams that prevented the worst of predictions from fully coming to pass through 
public health interventions and population-level behavior change. However, it 
is also possible that these had negative, unintended consequences. As Carlson 
et al. (2017) noted, over-predictions of Zika spread almost certainly resulted in 
increased use of pesticides, which resulted in the killing of millions of honeybees 
in the United States alone. Policy could also have simply have resulted in wasted 
money. For example, while access to contraception in August 2017 was of benefit 
to preventing pregnancy, that funding could have been of greater use to physicians 
in Puerto Rico in September 2017 when the island was slammed by devastating 
hurricanes. Furthermore, we are now aware that predictions have overestimated 
the potential harm of Zika for pregnant women and babies across the Americas. 
However, the power of hindsight runs the risk of obscuring an even greater dan-
ger for epidemiology: underestimating and underpreparing for an epidemic that 













7 Such as Japanese Encephalitis, Saint Louis Encephalitis, West Nile and Yellow Fever, 
among others.
8 In a recent US-based study, CDC researchers identified n = 2,962 infants/fetuses with 
birth defects that they believed were likely due to Zika infection: 49% with microceph-
aly/brain abnormalities, 20% with early brain malformations, 9% with eye abnormali-
ties only and 22% with other CNS dysfunctions (Delany et al., 2018).
9 Some are under way; see the EU-funded project Zikaction: http://zikaction.org
10 See the work of Adachi and Nielsen (2018) and Moore et al. (2017).
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11 An estimated 66% of the population of French Polynesia (roughly 280,000) are thought 
to have been infected during 2013–2014, with over 30,000 suspected cases, some with 
neurological complications. With an estimated baseline prevalence of 2 microceph-
aly cases per 10,000 neonates, a retrospective study found that Zika virus infection 
increased this to 95 cases per 10,000 women infected with Zika in the first trimester 
(Cauchemez et al. 2016).
12 In this chapter, we focus predominately on microcephaly. However, Zika has also been 
demonstrated to cause Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), a rare autoimmune attack on 
the nervous system caused by viral infection. While estimates for the rate by which 
Zika causes microcephaly are uncertainty, due to its low frequency, the rates at which 
it causes GBS are even more difficult to estimate. Estimates range from between 1 and 
8 cases per 10,000 (see Keegan, Lessler, & Johansson, 2017).
References
Adachi, K., & Nielsen-Saines, K. 2018, ‘Zika clinical updates: implications for pediatrics’, 
Current Opinion in Pediatrics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 105–116.
Adams, V. 2016, Metrics: what counts in global health. Duke University Press.
Ahrens, K. A., Hutcheon, J. A., Gavin, L., & Moskosky, S. 2017, ‘Reducing unintended 
pregnancies as a strategy to avert zika-related microcephaly births in the United States: 
a simulation study’, Maternal and Child Health Journal, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 982–987.
Aiken, A. R., Scott, J. G., Gomperts, R., Trussell, J., Worrell, M., & Aiken, C. E. 2016, 
‘Requests for abortion in Latin America related to concern about Zika virus exposure’, 
New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 375, no. 4, pp. 396–398.
Albuquerque, M. D. F. P. M., de Souza, W. V., Mendes, A. D. C. G., Lyra, T. M., Ximenes, 
R. A., Araújo, T. V., et al. 2016, ‘Pyriproxyfen and the microcephaly epidemic in 
Brazil-an ecological approach to explore the hypothesis of their association’, Memórias 
do Instituto Oswaldo Cruz, vol. 111, no. 12, pp. 774–776.
Althaus, C. L. 2014, ‘Estimating the reproduction number of Ebola virus (EBOV) during 
the 2014 outbreak in West Africa’, PLoS Current, vol. 6. 
Alvarado-Socarras, J. L., Ocampo-González, M., Vargas-Soler, J. A., Rodriguez-Morales, 
A. J., & Franco-Paredes, C. 2016, ‘Congenital and neonatal chikungunya in Colombia’. 
Journal of the Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society, vol. 5. no. 3, pp. e17–e20.
Bardina, S. V., Bunduc, P., Tripathi, S., Duehr, J., Frere, J. J., Brown, J. A., et al. 2017, 
‘Enhancement of Zika virus pathogenesis by preexisting antiflavivirus immunity’, 
Science, vol. 356, no. 6334, pp. 175–180.
Braga, J. U., Bressan, C., Dalvi, A. P. R., Calvet, G. A., Daumas, R. P., Rodrigues, N., et 
al. 2017, ‘Accuracy of Zika virus disease case definition during simultaneous Dengue 
and Chikungunya epidemics’, PloS One, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. e0179725.
Briggs, C. L., & Nichter, M. 2009, ‘Biocommunicability and the biopolitics of pandemic 
threats’, Medical Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 189–198.
Butler, D. 2016, ‘Zika virus: Brazil’s surge in small-headed babies questioned by report’, 
Nature News, vol. 530, no. 7588, pp. 13–14.
Campos, M. C., Dombrowski, J. G., Phelan, J., Marinho, C. R.F., Hibberd, M., Clark, T. 
G., et al. 2018, ‘Zika might not be acting alone: using an ecological study approach to 
investigate potential co-acting risk factors for an unusual pattern of microcephaly in 
Brazil’, PloS One, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. e0201452.
Carlson, C. J., Dougherty, E., Boots, M., Getz, W., & Ryan, S. 2017, ‘Consensus and 
conflict among ecological forecasts of Zika Virus Outbreaks in the United States,’ 
Scientific Reports 8(1) 4921.
 Counting Zika 51
Cauchemez, S., Besnard, M., Bompard, P., Dub, T., Guillemette-Artur, P., Eyrolle-Guignot, 
D., et al. 2016, ‘Association between Zika virus and microcephaly in French Polynesia, 
2013–15: a retrospective study.’ The Lancet, vol. 387, no. 10033, pp. 2125–2132.
CDC Foundation 2017, ‘Zika contraception access network’, <https://www.cdcfoundation.
org/sites/default/files/upload/pdf/CDCFoundation-ZCAN-FactSheet.pdf>
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017, ‘Trioplex real-time RT-PCR Assay’, 
<https://www.cdc.gov/zika/pdfs/trioplex-real-time-rt-pcr-assay-instructions-
for-use.pdf>
Centers for Disease Control 2018, Types of Zika Tests. <https://www.cdc.gov/zika/
laboratories/types-of-tests.html>
Charrel, R. N., Leparc-Goffart, I., Pas, S., de Lamballerie, X., Koopmans, M., Reusken, 
C.. 2016, ‘Background review for diagnostic test development for Zika virus infection’, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 94, no. 8, pp. 574.
Coelho, A. V. C., & Crovella, S. 2017, ‘Microcephaly prevalence in infants born to Zika 
virus-infected women: a systematic review and meta-analysis’, International Journal of 
Molecular Sciences, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 1714.
Curry, C. L., Kwal, J., Bartlett, M., Crane, A., Greissman, S., Gunaratne, N., et al. 
2017, ‘Challenges in universal testing for zika in the setting of local mosquito-borne 
transmission’, American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 217, no. 6, pp. 726.
Darney, B. G., Aiken, A. R., & Küng, S. 2017, ‘Access to contraception in the context of 
zika: health system challenges and responses’, Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 129, 
no. 4, pp. 638–642.
de Araújo, J. S. S., Regis, C. T., Gomes, R. G. S., Tavares, T. R., dos Santos, C. R., 
Assunção, P.M., et al. 2016, ‘Microcephaly in north-east Brazil: a retrospective study 
on neonates born between 2012 and 2015’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 
vol. 94, no. 11, 835–840.
Dejnirattisai, W., Supasa, P., Wongwiwat, W., Rouvinski, A., Barba-Spaeth, G., 
Duangchinda, T., et al. 2016, ‘Dengue virus sero-cross-reactivity drives antibody-
dependent enhancement of infection with zika virus’, Nature Immunology, vol. 17, no. 
9, 1102.
de Silva, M., Munoz, F. M., Sell, E., Marshall, H., Kawai, A. T., Kachikis, A., et al. (2017). 
‘Congenital microcephaly: case definition & guidelines for data collection, analysis, 
and presentation of safety data after maternal immunisation’, Vaccine, vol. 35, no. 48, 
pp. 6472–6482.
Diaz-Quijano, F. A., Pelissari, D. M., & Chiavegatto Filho, A. D. P. 2018, ‘Zika- associated 
microcephaly epidemic and birth rate reduction in Brazilian cities’, American Journal 
of Public Health, vol. 108, no. 4, pp. 514–516.
Diniz, D. 2017, Zika: from the Brazilian backlands to global threat. Zed Books.
Dufort, E., & White, J. 2018, ‘Pre-Zika microcephaly in Brazil: closer to the elusive 
baseline and new questions raised’, Pediatrics 141(2): e20173811.
Ellington, S. R., Devine, O., Bertolli, J., Quiñones, A. M., Shapiro-Mendoza, C. K., Perez-
Padilla, J., et al. 2016, ‘Estimating the number of pregnant women infected with Zika 
virus and expected infants with microcephaly following the Zika virus outbreak in 
Puerto Rico, 2016’, JAMA Pediatrics, vol. 170, no. 10, pp. 940–945.
Escobar, L.E., & Craft, M.E., 2016. ‘Advances and limitations of disease biogeography 
using ecological niche modeling’, Frontiers in Microbiology,vol. 7, no. 1174.
Faria, N. R., Sabino, E. C., Nunes, M. R., Alcantara, L. C. J., Loman, N. J., & Pybus, O. G. 
2016, ‘Mobile real-time surveillance of Zika virus in Brazil’, Genome Medicine, vol. 
8, no. 1, pp. 97.
52 Rebecca Rose Henderson and Kevin Bardosh 
Fauci, A. S., & Morens, D. M. 2016, ‘Zika virus in the Americas—yet another arbovirus 
threat’, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 374, no. 7, pp. 601–604.
Faye, O., Freire, C. C., Iamarino, A., Faye, O., de Oliveira, J. V. C., Diallo, M., et al. 2014, 
‘Molecular evolution of Zika virus during its emergence in the 20th century’, PLoS 
Neglected Tropical Diseases, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. e2636.
Felix, A. C., Souza, N. C. S., Figueiredo, W. M., Costa, A. A., Inenami, M., da Silva, R. M., 
et al. 2017, ‘Cross reactivity of commercial anti-dengue immunoassays in patients with 
acute Zika virus infection’, Journal of medical virology, vol. 89, no. 8, pp. 1477–1479.
Fitzpatrick, M. C., Singer, B. H., Hotez, P. J., & Galvani, A. P. 2017, ‘Saving lives 
efficiently across sectors: the need for a Congressional cost-effectiveness committee’, 
The Lancet, vol. 390, no. 10110, pp. 2410–2412. 
França, G. V., Schuler-Faccini, L., Oliveira, W. K., Henriques, C. M., Carmo, E. H., Pedi, V. 
D., et al. 2016, ‘Congenital Zika virus syndrome in Brazil: a case series of the first 1501 
livebirths with complete investigation’, The Lancet, vol. 388, no. 10047, pp. 891–897. 
Granger, D., Hilgart, H., Misner, L., Christensen, J., Bistodeau, S., Palm, J., et al. 2017, 
‘Serologic testing for Zika virus: comparison of three Zika virus IgM-screening 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays and initial laboratory experiences’, Journal of 
Clinical Microbiology, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 2127–2136. 
Gubler, D. J., Vasilakis, N., & Musso, D. 2017, ‘History and emergence of Zika virus’, The 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 216, no. suppl_10, pp. S860–S867. 
Honein, M. A., Dawson, A. L., Petersen, E. E., Jones, A. M., Lee, E. H., Yazdy, M. M., 
et al. 2017, ‘Birth defects among fetuses and infants of US women with evidence of 
possible Zika virus infection during pregnancy’, Jama, vol. 317, no. 1, pp. 59–68.
Johansson, M. A., Mier-y-Teran-Romero, L., Reefhuis, J., Gilboa, S. M., & Hills, S. L. 
2016, ‘Zika and the risk of microcephaly’, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 375, 
no. 1, pp. 1–4.
Kapogiannis, B. G., Chakhtoura, N., Hazra, R., & Spong, C. Y. 2017, ‘Bridging knowledge 
gaps to understand how Zika virus exposure and infection affect child development’, 
JAMA Pediatrics, vol. 171, no. 5, vol. 478–485.
Keegan, L. T., Lessler, J., & Johansson, M. A. 2017, ‘Quantifying Zika: advancing the 
epidemiology of Zika with quantitative models’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 
vol. 216, no. suppl_10, pp. S884–S890.
Lathrop, E., Romero, L., Hurst, S., Bracero, N., Zapata, L. B., Frey, M. T., et al. 2018, 
‘The Zika contraception access network: a feasibility programme to increase access 
to contraception in Puerto Rico during the 2016–17 Zika virus outbreak’, The Lancet 
Public Health, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. e91–e99.
Latour, B. 1987, Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society. 
Harvard University Press.
Li, R., Simmons, K. B., Bertolli, J., Rivera-Garcia, B., Cox, S., Romero, L.,et al. 2017, 
‘Cost-effectiveness of increasing access to contraception during the Zika virus outbreak, 
Puerto Rico, 2016’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 74.
Lozier, M. J., Burke, R. M., Lopez, J., Acevedo, V., Amador, M., Read, J. S., et al. 2017, 
‘Differences in prevalence of symptomatic Zika virus infection by age and sex—Puerto 
Rico, 2016’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases 217(11) 1678–1689.
Lycke, E., & Norrby, E. (eds.) 2014, Textbook of medical virology. Butterworth-
Heinemann, London, UK.
MacDonald, P. D., & Holden, E. W. 2018, ‘Zika and Public Health: understanding the 
Epidemiology and Information Environment’, Pediatrics, vol. 141, no. Supplement 2, 
pp. S137–S145.
 Counting Zika 53
Majumder, M. S., Hess, R., Ross, R., & Piontkivska, H. 2018, ‘Seasonality of birth defects 
in West Africa: could congenital Zika syndrome be to blame?’ F1000Research, vol. 7, 
no. 1, pp. 159.
Marteleto, L. J., Weitzman, A., Coutinho, R. Z., & Valongueiro Alves, S. 2017, ‘Women’s 
reproductive intentions and behaviors during the Zika Epidemic in Brazil’,. Population 
and Development Review, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 199–227.
Moghadas, S. M., Shoukat, A., Espindola, A. L., Pereira, R. S., Abdirizak, F., Laskowski, 
M., et al. 2017, ‘Asymptomatic transmission and the dynamics of Zika infection’, 
Scientific Reports, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 5829.
Monaghan, A. J., Morin, C. W., Steinhoff, D. F., Wilhelmi, O., Hayden, M., Quattrochi, 
D. A., et al. 2016, ‘On the seasonal occurrence and abundance of the Zika virus vector 
mosquito Aedes aegypti in the contiguous United States’, PLoS Currents, vol. 8.
Moore, C. A., Staples, J. E., Dobyns, W. B., Pessoa, A., Ventura, C. V., Da Fonseca, E. B., 
et al. 2017, ‘Characterizing the pattern of anomalies in congenital Zika syndrome for 
pediatric clinicians’, JAMA Pediatrics, vol. 171, no. 3, pp. 288–295.
Morgan, M. S. 2012, The world in the model: how economists work and think. Cambridge 
University Press.
Morse, S. S., Mazet, J. A., Woolhouse, M., Parrish, C. R., Carroll, D., Karesh, W.B., et al. 
2012, ‘Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis’, The Lancet, vol. 380, 
no. 9857, pp. 1956–1965. 
Mulkay, M., & Gilbert, G. N. 1984, Opening Pandora’s box. Cambridge University, 
Cambridge.
Nishiura, H., Mizumoto, K., Rock, K. S., Yasuda, Y., Kinoshita, R., Miyamatsu, Y., et al. 
2016, ‘A theoretical estimate of the risk of microcephaly during pregnancy with Zika 
virus infection’, Epidemics, vol. 15, pp. 66–70.
Oliveira Melo, A. S., Malinger, G., Ximenes, R., Szejnfeld, P. O., Alves Sampaio, 
S., & Bispo de Filippis, A. M. 2016, ‘Zika virus intrauterine infection causes fetal 
brain abnormality and microcephaly: tip of the iceberg?’ Ultrasound in Obstetrics & 
Gynecology, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 6–7.
Osorio-de-Castro, C., Silva Miranda, E., Machado de Freitas, C., Rochel de Camargo Jr, K., & 
Cranmer, H. H. 2017, ‘The Zika virus outbreak in Brazil: knowledge gaps and challenges 
for risk reduction’, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 107, no. 6, pp. 960–965.
Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. (2017). Zika - 
epidemiological report El Salvador. PAHO/WHO, Washington, DC. 
Parens, R., Nijhout, H. F., Morales, A., Costa, F. X., & Bar-Yam, Y. 2017, ‘A possible link 
between pyriproxyfen and microcephaly’, PLoS Currents, 9.
Peters, D. H., Garg, A., Bloom, G., Walker, D. G., Brieger, W. R., Hafizur Rahman, M., 
2008, ‘Poverty and access to health care in developing countries’, Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, vol. 1136, no. 1, pp. 161–171.
Quintó, L., García-Basteiro, A. L., Bardají, A., González, R., Padilla, N., Martinez-
Espinosa, F. E., et al. 2017, ‘The challenge of assessing microcephaly in the context of 
the Zika virus epidemic’, Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 495–498.
Rabe, I.B., Staples, J.E., Villanueva, J., Hummel, K.B., Johnson, J.A., Rose, L., et al. 2016, 
‘Interim guidance for interpretation of Zika virus antibody test results’, Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 65(21). 
Rick, A. M., Domek, G., Cunningham, M., Olson, D., Lamb, M. M., Jimenez-Zambrano, 
A., et al. 2017, ‘High background congenital microcephaly in rural guatemala: 
implications for neonatal congenital Zika virus infection screening’, Global Health: 
Science and Practice, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 686–696.
54 Rebecca Rose Henderson and Kevin Bardosh 
Shiu, C., Starker, R., Kwal, J., Bartlett, M., Crane, A., Greissman, S., et al. 2018, ‘Zika 
virus testing and outcomes during pregnancy, Florida, USA, 2016’, Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1–8.
Silva, A. A., Barbieri, M. A., Alves, M. T., Carvalho, C. A., Batista, R. F., Ribeiro, M. R., 
et al. 2018, ‘Prevalence and risk factors for microcephaly at birth in Brazil in 2010’, 
Pediatrics 141(2) pp. e20170589.
Sun, L. 2016, ‘CDC whistleblower claims agency has been using wrong Zika test’, 
The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/
wp/2016/09/27/cdc-whistleblower-claims-agency-has-been-using- wrong-zika-
test/?utm_term=.45414c21c9d5
Theel, E. S., & Hata, D. J. 2018, ‘Diagnostic testing for Zika virus: a post-outbreak update’, 
Journal of Clinical Microbiology, 56(4) e01972-17.
Tsai, W. Y., Youn, H. H., Brites, C., Tsai, J. J., Tyson, J., Pedroso, C., et al. 2017, 
‘Distinguishing secondary dengue virus infection from Zika virus infection with 
previous dengue by a combination of 3 simple serological tests’, Clinical Infectious 
Diseases, vol. 65, no. 11, pp. 1829–1836.
Vermund, S. H. 2017, ‘The vital case for global health investments by the US government’, 
Clinical Infectious Diseases, vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 707–710.
Villa, R. 2016, ‘Zika, or the burden of uncertainty’, La Clinica terapeutica, vol. 167, no. 
1, pp. 7–9.
Vorou, R. 2016, ‘Letter to the editor: diagnostic challenges to be considered regarding 
Zika virus in the context of the presence of the vector Aedes albopictus in Europe’, 
Eurosurveillance, vol. 21, no. 10: 30161.
Wendland, C. 2016, ‘Estimating death: a close reading of maternal mortality metrics in 
Malawi’, in Adams, V., Biehl, J (ed.), Metrics: what counts in global health. Duke 
University Press, pp. 57–82. 
3
Introduction
In November 2015, the Brazilian Health Ministry declared a Public Health 
Emergency of National Concern (known as an ESPIN) because of a rapid increase 
in unexpected, and unexplained, cases of microcephaly in newborn babies in the 
northeastern region. The ESPIN announcement was issued by the Health Ministry 
and published as a portaria (an ordinance) (2015a). The Brazilian Health Ministry 
issued a series of such bureaucratic directives during the Zika epidemic, and these 
documents can shed light on state-directed form of governance by tracing what 
Veena Das (2006) has called the literacy of the state: the series of everyday per-
formances in documents and signatures that act as forms of governance, created 
by technologies of writing and their corresponding power.
Due to the outbreak in French Polynesia in 2013–2014, and just as Brazil 
was preparing to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, 
Zika was highlighted in a 2014 Epidemiological Bulletin by the Health Ministry 
(Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde) as a possible risk to the country. Two issues 
seemed to be highlighted in this early document: the government’s experience 
in organising mass events and on following the International Health Regulations 
(IHRs). The document also shows the official state concern with the economic 
importance of these two events. As Zika emerged, and became known to the 
global public, some health scholars, such as Attaran (2016), alluded to the poten-
tial global health threat that these mass events, especially the Olympic Summer 
Games, could create as tourists and athletes returned to their countries, many of 
which also have high Aedes agypti populations.
In this chapter,1 we follow Das’s (2006) example and explore the social lives 
of written documents and what these documents reflect, reveal and omit about 
the Brazilian government response to the outbreak. Government institutions and 
mechanisms played important convening roles during the Zika epidemic in Brazil. 
One central actor was the Centro de Operações de Emergências em Sáude Pública 
(Public Health Emergency Operation Centre or COES) which was formed in 2014 
in the aftermath of the West African Ebola epidemic. Thus, its existence as a 
mechanism of state literacy preceded Zika and is in line with growing interna-
tional bioinsecurity. A core document of the COES is the National Plan of Health 
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Emergencies Protocol, which divides events according to four levels of alert-
ness. COES provide technical guidance on resource allocation, such as increasing 
health staff and expanding infrastructure and services, and is also charged with 
providing information and communication to the public. COES becomes active 
when an ESPIN is declared, and during the ZIKV epidemic the institution oper-
ated on the highest level of alert, as it also did during the yellow fever outbreak 
in 2017. As an emergency operational unit, COES is connected to the Sanitary 
Vigilance Department and, during the Zika epidemic, worked alongside munici-
pal, state and federal agencies to strengthen surveillance, disease prevention, care 
and support to affected families.
On February 2016, following the Brazilian emergency declaration, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) announced a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC), given the suspected correlation between Zika 
infection and the rise of microcephaly cases in Brazil. This global alert lasted nine 
months, until November 2016, whereas it took the Brazilian state until July 2017 
to officially end the ESPIN and close the Centro de Operações de Emergências 
em Saúde Pública (COES).
Between this time, diverse actions and responses were set into motion by the 
Health Ministry apparatus. Both of these announcements (the global PHEIC and 
national ESPIN) directly affected the Brazilian state as it dealt with a series of 
scientific uncertainties and political and social challenges permeated by a sense 
of urgency, fear and the demand for rapid action, all with domestic and foreign 
pressures. Understanding how this process unfolded in 2015–2017 is especially 
important given the fact that support for the thousands of children and their fami-
lies affected by the virus, and preparedness planning for future arboviral epidem-
ics, hangs in a cloudy balance in 2018.
The epidemic in Brazil was framed as a war – a war of both people against 
mosquito and women against microcephaly. Ribeiro et al. (2018: 138) pointed 
out that the Brazilian state “played a fundamental role in defining the terms of the 
debate” through a “war frame” that was focused on individualised disease preven-
tion, particularly placed on women. This war spectacle masked social and gender 
inequalities, extending the negligence of poverty and regional inequality.2
The Health Ministry has been historically responsible for the creation of 
the country’s public health policies and scientific knowledge. In this sense, the 
state’s authority can be viewed, as proposed by the work of Veena Das (2006), 
as emanating from a set of temporal documents that inscribe policies and actions. 
Understanding the state, therefore, demands thinking in terms of literacy. This 
intensive production of documents and decrees, and the styles of reasoning and 
seeing that emerge from it, shapes the process of scientific knowledge and dis-
course stabilisation, both of which have consequences for the construing of official 
narratives. Such documents create temporalities, produce attention and silences, 
leave trails and inscribe some sense of official history. In this chapter, we explore 
these issues, using discourse and document analysis to investigate how the Health 
Ministry responded to the Zika epidemic. As a way to understand how official nar-
ratives are constructed, we selected a series of crucial government and scientific 
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documents in order to shed light on the complex relationships among policies, 
guidelines and actions during an unfolding health emergency. We approach this 
corpus of documents as a lens to inspect the relationships between, on the one 
hand, the Brazilian political response to Zika and, on the other, the scientific 
response to this emergent viral pathogen. In so doing, we aim to write a literary 
history of ZIKV in Brazil, one that pays special attention to how official docu-
ments navigated uncertainty, within the demands of expediency and the sphere 
of urgency.
In the first part of the chapter, we briefly describe some crucial details about 
Brazil’s public health landscape and the early history of the epidemic. We then 
turn our attention to how the state came to understand and frame the epidemic 
itself, as it responded to public anxieties and questions. We do so by exploring 
the literacy of the Brazilian state, and how its ordinances, protocols and manuals 
aimed at guiding health professionals produced temporalities.3 Lastly, we adjust 
our lens to explore the government response to children and families affected by 
the virus. By analysing official microcephaly epidemiological bulletins (MEB) 
and their corresponding epidemiological reports (ER), we question how visible 
these children became given the biomedical emphasis on performing formal tech-
nical solutions disconnected from embodied suffering and affliction.
The birth of Zika: From pathogen to Brazilian politics
In 1988, health as a human right was enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution, 
ensuring that the state takes appropriate responsibility and action in offering poli-
cies and services to all Brazilian citizens. The constitution was created at the end 
of a 20-year military dictatorship and, in this sense, was representative of newly 
felt democratic expectations. As stated in the 1988 Constitution:
Health is the right of everyone and the duty of the State, guaranteed through 
social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of disease and other 
diseases and universal and equal access to actions and services for their pro-
motion, protection and recovery. 
Before 1988, Brazil had a health system founded on meritocratic principles, offer-
ing health services for formal employees in a social security model. Other citizens 
should need to buy health delivery from the private sector, for things such as 
chronic diseases, child and maternal care and traffic accidents. The health system 
was centralized and fragmented, and it excluded most informal workers as well 
as much of the rural population. The authoritarian regime created an unequal, but 
also highly inefficient, system.
Things changed with the birth of democracy in 1988, when the Brazilian 
Health System, officially named Unified Health System (Sístema Único de Saúde, 
or SUS), was scripted into the constitution, with a few at the time radical prin-
ciples, that continue to structure health policies, services and actions across the 
country. This includes: (1) universality: that every Brazilian citizen has the right 
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Table 3.1  Brazilian economic and health statistics
Total population (2016) 207 million
Gross national income per capita (2016) $8,650
Life expectancy at birth, m/f (years, 2016) 71/79
Probability of dying under five (per 1,000 live births, 2008) 21
Total expenditure on health per capita (2014) $1,318
Total of expenditure on health (public and private ) as % of GDP (2014) 8.3%
Estimated population coverage of primary heath care (2017) 64.5%
Sources: WHO, Brazilian Ministry of Health and World Bank
to health services for free, guaranteed through state financing and policies; (2) 
comprehensive care: that the state should provide preventive, promotive and cura-
tive care, control policies on pharmaceuticals, biological inputs, the quality of 
food, water and other products for human consumption, and also epidemiological 
surveillance; (3) equity: that the state should pay attention to the health needs of 
diverse individuals and groups including the social, cultural and economic deter-
minants of health; (4) decentralization: that the health system should be man-
aged through a balance of federal, state and municipal control. According to the 
decentralised system, federal fundings concerning health care are destined to the 
state and municipal level. Each of the three federal levels are supposed to des-
tined a specific amount of their budget to health care system. Constitutionally, the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) is also responsible for supporting and funding states 
and municipalities in case of health emergencies and disasters; and (5) social 
participation: that institutional arrangements should be created and supported 
to guarantee social participation in health delivery and also the policy-making 
process. These principles have helped to facilitate many significant advances on 
health access, primary health care coverage, the involvement in local munici-
palities in health (including specialized services, such as AIDS treatment, organ 
transplants and oncological services) and the expansion of the health workforce, 
to name a few achievements.
In spite of these great efforts to develop the right to health in Brazil, SUS 
still has serious problems. As with many health systems, this includes inequita-
ble access, regulatory constraints among health care levels, the co-existence of 
public and private systems, challenges with social participation, federal govern-
ment centralization and financing, difficulties in organizing local regional man-
agement, unequal health worker distribution, intersectoral policies to reduce the 
social determinants of health and the unequal burden of disease. These challenges 
can also be seen through the lens of basic health statistics, shown in Table 3.1. 
Whereas the overarching aim of SUS is to ensure health access to all, in reality, 
four epidemiological situations put considerable strain on existing resources and 
capacities: an increasingly ageing population, greater chronic diseases, a contin-
ued (and newly emerging) infectious disease burden and violence, both physical 
and psychosocial.
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Infectious diseases are still relevant in contemporary Brazil. One of the most 
notorious is Dengue, an arbovirus responsible for an estimated one million cases 
and 500 deaths per year in Brazil (Fares et al., 2015). A concerted control pro-
gram nearly eliminated the Aedes aegypti mosquito between the 1950s and 1970s. 
After a few decades of relative silence, Dengue returned to the country during the 
1980s as successive waves of Dengue serotypes spread from Southeast Asia to 
the Americas, facilitated by modern transport networks and urbanisation. All four 
Dengue serotypes are now endemic in Brazil.
Dengue is not the only emerging mosquito-borne disease in the country. In 
2014, the American Chikungunya (CHIK) outbreak spread rapidly in Brazil. 
More than 250,000 cases have since been registered with the MoH surveillance 
system, including 159 reported deaths in 2016 alone (Ministério da Saúde, 2017a), 
although the virus has certainly infected many more people. To make matters 
worse, Brazil has been battling resurgent yellow fever epidemics since the end 
of 2017. The sylvatic (jungle) yellow fever (YF) transmission cycle is endemic 
in monkey populations. In response, massive vaccination campaigns have been 
organised in 2017 and 2018.
It was on the tail-end of CHIK, and resurgent Dengue and YF, that Zika 
emerged in 2015. Brazil has an excellent and well-distributed national health sur-
veillance system and at the very beginning of Zika circulating in the country, the 
Minister of Health, Arthur Chioro, made a statement to the nation:
It was confirmed 8 cases in Camaçari-Bahia. The Zika virus does not worry 
us. It is a benign disease that has a good prognostic. The fever is low, and the 
biggest annoyance is itching, red spots. It requires very little patient access 
to emergency room and medical services. All our concern is with dengue 
because dengue kills.4
Brazilian health authorities had identified Zika but dismissed it, believing it to be 
an insignificant pathogen, a “weak” Dengue-like disease of little consequence. 
Before the emergence of microcephaly clusters in and around Recife in late 2015, 
this was the standard scientific view. Before the 2007 epidemic on the isolated 
islands of Yap, Federated States of Micronesia, in the Western Pacific, there had 
been fewer than 20 human ZIKV infections reported over a 70-year period fol-
lowing its discovery in Uganda in the late 1940s (Gubler et al. 2017).5 The link 
between ZIKV and microcephaly was yet to be suspected: it took the Brazilian 
scientific establishment, and the world, by surprise.
From the beginning, Zika in Brazil was inseparable from two substantial politi-
cal events that shaped the discourse and actions of the state towards this new viral 
disease (see Figure 3.1). On the one hand, there was the embattled presidency of 
Dilma Rousseff, involved in a lengthy impeachment process, and the political insta-
bility related to this. On the other hand, there was the planned Olympic Games in 
Rio de Janeiro in 2016, which was to host national delegations from 208 countries.
Rousseff’s mandate was under attack in parliament. During the lefist Lula and 
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growth which helped support major investments in public social policies including 
support to the lower social classes in access to education, health, essential goods 
and living conditions. However, conservative undercurrents in politics and the 
higher classes disagreed with increasing state expenditures. Brazil had entered into 
a remarkable political and democratic crisis that stayed on throughout the entire 
Zika epidemic period.6 On October 2015, in one of several political strategies to 
maintain power and escape from the impeachment process, Rousseff reshuffled the 
Minister of Health, widely considered the best-resourced social ministry, removing 
a member of the Labour Party (PT) with a representative of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB). Marcelo Castro, a psychiatrist and congressman with no 
actual public health experience, became a crucial actor in the epidemic.
It was this new health minister who found himself having to declare a ESPIN 
after primary health care physicians in northeastern Brazil began raising the alarm 
about the rising cases of microcephaly (Diniz, 2017), which were confirmed in 
November 2015. Marcelo Castro supported his decision by relying on renowned 
scientific institutions, especially the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ), 
and on a technical body from the Ministry of Health, specifically the Health 
Surveillance Secretary.7 Although there was certainly a great deal of uncertainty 
at this early stage, Castro and many other key actors from the government as 
well as scientists were scared. To galvinize support and convey the scope of the 
potential threat, the focus quickly turned to an on old and traditional narrative: a 
“war” against the vector:
About 30 years ago the mosquito has been transmitting diseases to our popu-
lation and since then we have fought it, but we are losing the war against 
Aedes aegypti. We are living in a real epidemic. We need Brazilian society to 
be mobilized in the prevention of these diseases.
(O Globo newspaper, Rio de Janeiro, Jan, 2016)
Launching a National Public Health Emergency is both a political and bureacrac-
tic exercise. Through administrative mechanisms, it allows financial resources to 
be mobilized and targetted towards scientific studies, disease control interven-
tions and efforts to fast-track biomedical countermeasures, like new diagnostics 
and vaccines. A sense of urgency and purpose floated over the actions and debates 
of those involved. In Brazil, primary care physicians, pediatricians and local epi-
demiologists in the northeastern region played important roles in unraveling early 
epidemiological details and raising the alarm. An area known for its history of 
sugarcane plantations, slavery and poverty, ZIKV hit what Diniz (2017) has called 
“a forgotten, anonymous region.” This meant that physicians and scientists from 
the periphery of Brazilian science, most unknown figures, made many of the key 
discoveries. These actors built rapid response networks and knowledge sharing 
platforms on the go, working with scientists from other regions of the country, in 
what became known among them as the “Whatsapp Epidemic.” These networks 
were organized organically, and the use of modern technologies (Whatsapp mes-
sages, cellphone texting, Skype video and iPhone photos) meant that the epidemic 
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played out in real time, almost instantaneously, with important consequences for 
the organization of scientific research and political decision making. Of course, 
this also meant that rumors and misinformation about this mysterious new disease 
could spread just as quickly as facts and data. Images of microcephalic babies 
and concerned mothers intermixed with scientific hypothesis, fake news and the 
ongoing Brazilian political crisis, especially in social media and internet news.
President Dilma Rousseff understood the threat of ZIKV to population health 
but also to the significance and symbolism of the epidemic to public trust in her 
presidency and to the Brazilian state. Zika became a priority issue, discussed side-
by-side her political fight against the impeachment process taking shape in con-
gress. From October 2015 to April 2016, she had been talking daily with scientists 
and epidemiologists regarding the epidemic and solutions to control it. In 2015, 
after the declaration of the ESPIN, the Ministry of Health invested millions of 
dollars in case-control studies, vaccine and diagnostic tests, community education 
material and vector control innovation studies, which included genetically modi-
fied mosquitoes.
Following in the footsteps of Oswaldo Cruz’s sanitation campaigns of the 
early 20th century, the army went to the people to distribute information guides, 
to spread insecticides and to inspect houses and streets in search of mosquito 
breeding sites. In a patriotic show of hands and feet, more than 200,000 military 
troops and staff were called by the Ministry of Health to assist with vector control 
activities:
Armed forces, military police, firefighters, community agents, mayors, state 
secretaries, are all mobilized against Brazil’s number one enemy today, 
which is the mosquito Aedes aegypti, the famous dengue mosquito.
(Minister of Health – February 2016)
Through a public health historical perspective during the 20th century, we see that 
Rio de Janeiro’s landscape, for instance, seems to be a complex meshwork that 
involved mosquito combat through sanitization attempts, urban planning as well 
as violent state-induced dislocation of bodies and entire communities under the 
political discourse of “sanitation” (Hochman 1998; Nogueira 2016).
In April 2016, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff reached its finish line in 
the National Congress. Michel Temer, her vice president, assumed the presidency 
of Brazil and a conservative turn began as Temer cut funding to social services 
(including health), science and technology policies by more than 20% and deregu-
lated labour laws. The new Ministry of Health, under Ricardo Barros, proposed 
that new private health plans should be promoted for the lower social classes, 
threatening the National Health System and the right to health in Brazil. At that 
moment, Zika started to decrease. The new Ministry of Health chief declared that 
the mosquito was undisciplined:
‘If the mosquito committed to biting, only those who live in the house were 
easy, but unfortunately he is not disciplined,’ he said. The new minister 
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defended punishments for those who resist the entrance of public agents for 
house inspections. ‘This is the Brazilian culture. People have to be burdened.’
(Journal Bahia, 2016)
At the same time, President Temer and his government approved a constitu-
tional amendment to impose limits on federal, state and municipal funding for 
public services and policies. Health, education and science were more affected 
by this law.
As this quick, and cursory, introduction to Brazilian politics show, the Zika 
outbreak coincided with a very complex political moment in Brazil, one that is 
ongoing. Ordinances, policies and health responses to Zika were immersed in 
these scientific, political, economic and historic contexts. The biopolitics of Zika 
made visible and invisible selected actors, groups and phenomena.
Paper trails: Official documents and unofficial silences
The war frame – man against mosquito – reinforced what Krieger (2014), in her 
analysis of 21st-century epidemiology, called the normalization of biomedical 
reductionism and this perspective reigned in the Brazilian response. A broader 
social epidemiological approach to the epidemic, that would have brought greater 
attention to poverty, sanitation, life conditions, social inequalities, reproductive 
health, climate change, urban planning and local governance did not enter into 
the conversation of the state nor, really, the scientific agenda (Ribeiro et al. 2018). 
Aedes aegypti-related diseases are widely endemic in the north and northeast 
regions, as well as in the big cities of Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo 
and Recife. Oliveira et al. (2018) showed, for Ceará, over 190,000 reported cases 
of Dengue between 2001 and 2012, with higher peaks during the years of 2001, 
2006, 2008 and 2012, with different strains of DENV circulating at the same time. 
In the city of Rio de Janeiro, Coelho et al. (2016) showed that in 2002 there were 
over 140,000 reported cases and in 2015 over 55,000 cases of different strains of 
DENV.
In many ways, ZIKV is a vector-borne disease causing only mild symptoms, 
one of many infectious diseases that now compose the epidemiological landscape 
of Brazil, like Dengue, Chikungunya or the seasonal flu (H1N1). But this was not 
the way ZIKV was framed during the epidemic. The consequences of neurological 
impairments for newborn babies turned ZIKV into what Veena Das (2006) has 
called a “critical event.” This unprecedented event disrupted a previous narrative 
and set it apart from other vector-borne diseases. In some ways, this conjunction 
of a dangerous pathogen with the state response highlighted what seemed to be a 
threat to the nation and its future. During an interview with O Globo newspaper, 
on January 2016, the Health Ministry expressed its concern and fears regarding the 
possibility of an entire generation affected by microcephaly, and the implications 
of this on the social and economic fabric of the country.
Human bodies, in an unequal world, are not subjected to the same effects, 
access and resources (Lock and Nguyen, 2010). Different neighborhoods and 
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social groups are not provided with the same resources, capacities, interven-
tions and care from the state. People move along urban ecosystems in different 
ways, traveling along different axes and encountering mosquitoes differently. 
As Nading (2014) argued in reference to Dengue in urban Nicaragua, vector-
borne disease control is not only about mosquitoes and their breeding sites but 
also about the embedded and complex human-to-human relationships that also 
need to come under the microscope and into public surveillance. This includes 
the ways in which different actors invoke the language of “emergencies” 
and “crises,” with their corresponding emotions of fear and urgency. Nading 
(2014:178) argues that overlapping geographical and political event inform the 
urban city, often in a continual process of “emergency” and constitute a “politi-
cal trope”.
We want to explore this “political trope” in a slightly different way: instead 
of looking and thinking about the city, we want to think about the “documents 
of emergency” that evolved during the Zika epidemic itself, and how these paper 
trails produced the literacy of the state response.8 We are concerned with a set of 
official documents that were created and disseminated through institutionalized 
channels, such as ordinances, technical notes and protocols. There are two aspects 
of these documents: historical and institutional. The former create specific tempo-
ralities by declaring, in this case, start and end dates to the Public Health National 
Emergency in 2015 and 2017. The latter include the various ordinances created 
during the epidemic as well as operational instructions, protocols and epidemio-
logical bulletins. These documents produce guidelines and ordinances on how to 
do public health in times of epidemic emergency, documents with an institutional 
power, produced within the Ministry of Health, by technicians and experts, with 
the purpose of guiding and structuring a set of actions.
Over two years, the ministry issued over 17 ordinances, 6 technical notes, 4 
protocols on ZIKV and 4 on microcephaly, and 60 weekly reports monitoring, 
specifically, cases of microcephaly. These are the main bureaucratic forms that 
produced and communicated decisions and policies in the health ministry, the 
health secretaries at both state and municipality levels and to health care profes-
sionals. In our analysis of this corpus of documents we have found three broad 
categories: (1) surveillance protocols; (2) documents concerning non-vector Zika 
transmission; and (3) documents that outline institutional arrangements between 
different ministries.
Surveillance protocols
By the end of 2015, and all through 2016, national epidemiological bulletins were 
announcing the appearance and distribution of new microcephaly cases in differ-
ent states of the country. Alongside Pernambuco, Bahia and Recife in the north-
east, Rio de Janeiro also began showing substantial increases. As cases and public 
interest in the new emergency increased, important surveillance gaps needed to 
be quickly filled. In response, during the last month of 2015, two main documents 
were issued. The first, Protocol for Implementing Health Sentinel Sites, stressed 
the need to better understand viral spread, improve laboratory diagnostics and 
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coordinate the flow of surveillance information. This short and concise document 
(of only seven pages) settled, among other things, approaches for surveillance of 
the new virus including how to turn diagnostic laboratories into sentinel sites to 
trace Zika’s movement.
The health ministry, following tenets of decentralized policy-making, decided 
that every capital city, in each of the 26 federal states, should have at least 1 sen-
tinel laboratory and that some medium-sized cities should also have this capacity, 
in order to track cases from smaller cities located nearby. These labs, situated in 
the northeast, were supposed to send 10 samples per week to the federal referral 
laboratory Instituto Evandro Chagas (located at Pará state in the north of the coun-
try). This system only lasted a couple of months. By mid-2015, the referral lab 
was receiving far more than 10 samples per week, and the health ministry had to 
find other laboratory facilities to act as referral sites, such as Fiocruz-Pernambuco, 
in order to respond faster to the outbreak.
The second document, the National Plan to Combat Microcephaly, was the 
first protocol issued after the state officially confirmed the correlation between 
Zika virus and microcephaly. It is geared towards health professionals and 
administrators, and is a handy book detailing not only how to deal, medically, 
with ZIKV (such as on diagnostic issues) but also delves into planning and 
bureaucratic problems, including how the state should generate, share and store 
information. Along with providing parameters to classify suspected and con-
firmed ZIKV infection and microcephaly (in both pregnant women and new-
borns), it urges health professionals to inform suspected cases of the results of 
diagnostic tests and assessments as soon as possible. Information should also 
flow upwards, from the health professional (preferably a doctor) to the munici-
pality, the state and then the national federal entity, the health ministry – a fairly 
standard notification process. However, it took until early February 2016 for 
ZIKV virus and ZIKV virus infection among pregnant women to be classified 
as a reportable disease, to be notified to local health authorities within 24 hours, 
which meant that passive surveillance was no longer to be solely based on eli-
gible sentinel sites.
This document enunciates some certainties: the geographical dispersation of 
Zika cases and the fact that the virus can be found in the amniotic fluid of pregnant 
women whose babies were born with congenital malformation, such as micro-
cephaly. Nevertheless, the document points out some scientific uncertainties: 
available data could not ascertain the risk to women of having a fetus with con-
genital malformations if they were infected when pregnant. The document clearly 
states the necessity of further studies. Other possible forms of virus transmission 
seemed less important, as the document only mentions the possible presence of 
the virus in breastmilk, semen, urine and saliva but discards its potential transmis-
sibility, focusing on human-animal relations (mosquitoes).
Negotiating transmission uncertainties
In late December 2015, just three days before Christmas, a technical note was 
produced by the National Coordination Body on Blood and Blood Products 
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(Ministério da Saúde, Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, 2015), which 
stated:
The main mode of Zika virus transmission is through mosquitos bites such as 
A. aegypti. However some evidences suggest that the virus can also be sexu-
ally transmitted among humans, as well as by blood transfusion.
In light of the other official pronouncements cited earlier, such a declaration 
reveals the fragmentation within the corpus of “documents of emergency” and 
inside the Health Ministry. The document addressed blood transfusions proto-
cols, alerting health professionals to be more careful in screening for possible 
ZIKV-infected blood donors. This work followed a history of monitoring hospital 
and public blood banks, going back to the 1970s and 1980s, when contamination 
cases, mainly from Chagas disease and Hepatitis B, were widely known and prob-
lematic. Once HIV/AIDS became a global threat, the Brazilian social movement 
was highly effective at demanding changes on blood transfusion policies, through 
federal surveillance and reinforced screening policies. While more scientific stud-
ies are needed on the risks that blood transfussions pose for the spread of Zika, 
the coordinating body followed other international institutions (like the US CDC) 
and altered blood transfusion protocols. A decision had to be made, and scientific 
uncertainties, as Callon et al. (2009) put it, constitute the everyday lives of policy-
makers and political institutions.9
Another technical note was issued in March 2016 concerning semen dona-
tion. This forbade the donation of sperm in the case of positive or inconclusive 
blood tests for Zika virus infection. By March 2016, the National Epidemiological 
Vigilance Agency (ANVISA) issued a technical note altering the protocol for the 
utilization of both national and imported semen or oocytes for reproductive uses. 
It is important to highlight that these technical notes were not ordinances, and so 
did not exert much tangible bureaucratic power, although at the time some inside 
the MoH were emphasizing the possibility that Zika could be sexually transmit-
ted, although there were no warnings to the general public.
In a recent interview conducted by our research group, a technical member of 
the health ministry involved in the epidemic outbreak response affirmed that given 
the amount of vector-borne transmission cases and the uncertainties surrounding 
sexual transmission, such as the duration of the virus’ incubation and its viremia, 
the health ministry decided to focus on vector control alerts and campaigns. This 
official statement seems to be in agreement with the epidemiological bulletin (no. 
46, published on 2015), affirming the existence of other forms of transmissibility 
but also downplaying it.
Institutionals arrangements
A little over a month after the ESPIN declaration, a presidential decree was signed 
by Dilma Rousseff, Marcelo Castro, from the health ministry and Gilberto Ochi, 
from the national integration ministry. This latter ministry is involved in many 
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national development programs, such as irrigation and drought prevention, but 
it also has a role in protection and civil defence. This decree combined efforts 
from these ministries to create the Sala Nacional de Coordenação e Controle 
para o Enfrentamento da Dengue, do vírus Chikungunya e Zika vírus (National 
Unit of Coordination and Control for Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika viruses). 
This centralized unit’s role was to coordinate and integrate efforts from both the 
Health Ministry and the Ministry of Social Development, putting together both 
ministries’ efforts into the National Integration Ministry’s administrative units.
This decree did not invalidate the ESPIN declaration; rather, it reinforced 
national concerns by creating a specific institutional device that not only com-
bined forces from different ministries but also transformed, what at first glance 
could seem like a more regionally localized microcephaly outbreak into a national 
one, deploying a set of combined institutional efforts. During the ESPIN, the flow 
of surveillance data becomes particularly important, and is watched very closely 
and COES issued weekly reports to inform decision makers.
Until this moment, the Health Ministry was the main state institution involved 
in producing “documents of emergency” – protocols, ordinance, guides and 
general public communications. One of the presidential decree’s effects was to 
create better coordinated actions between the ministry of health and ministry of 
social development. Here, there seems to be another governmental entry point 
into Zika’s timeline as the ministry of social development is brought to the politi-
cal stage to socially and financially address the needs of children and families 
touched by congenital malformation. Three interministerial ordinances were then 
issued, in addition to two “combined operational instructions.” These five docu-
ments dated from early February until late October 2016, and they are analyzed 
here together as a way to perceive subtle changes and some continutities.
Throughout these documents, there is a sense of emergency regarding the diag-
nostic accuracy and confirmation of microcephaly. In the first document produced 
by this interministerial group, there are still doubts concerning the correlation 
between the high rates of microcephaly and the Zika epidemic. The document 
points to “unexpected situations” and “possibly associated with Zika virus.” 
Nevertheless, the health ministry and social development ministry created actions 
aimed to strenghten prevention and care and social protection to pregnant women 
and women of reproductive age.
As far as prevention activities go, there is a clear focus on individual care 
and responsibility, as well as vigilance and control at the household level. As 
Nading (2014) shows in Nicaragua, Dengue and vector control are often seen 
through the prism of individual vigilance and action, where motivational social 
and educational programs and campaigns are the main vehicle for state interven-
tion. Engaging the community to fight the mosquito, to create a housing environ-
ment that is unfit for the mosquito, as well as being vigilant about the hygiene 
and personal attitudes of your neighbours, are the main tasks. What is missing 
from this rhetoric, however, are state actions concerned with public goods and 
public spaces, such as sewer systems, garbage disposal and better housing – all 
of which remained largely absent from state documents and campaigns during 
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the Zika crisis. Infrastructural efforts that would indeed make concrete changes 
in people’s lives are, and have been for many years, a political and economic 
issue that remain, time and again, unaddressed by local and federal policymakers. 
As scholars of Brazilian anthropology have shown, these infrastructural issues 
become, at each election, merely a rhetoric slogan for political campaigns, with 
very little progress made in-between the ballot box (Heredia and Palmeira, 2006; 
Kuschnir, 2000).
The next three documents, issued between March and October 2016, no longer 
had any doubts concerning the correlation between high rates of microcephaly 
and ZIKV. In a detailed epidemiological survey at the time, every state of the 
country, expect Amapá, had suspected or confirmed cases of microcephaly. Rio 
de Janeiro was ranked 6th among 26 states; the first 5 were all located in the north-
east of the county and each of those 26 states received additional national fund-
ing. The amount of the funding was calculated based on the number of confirmed 
cases of microcephaly, as established by these ordinances.
Another point that is not addressed in any of the documents is the possibility of 
pregnancy terminations. Abortion in Brazil is only legal when a woman’s life is at 
risk or in rape cases. Sexual and reproductive rights in these five documents con-
cerned only a social and educational approach about contraceptive methods (and 
its dispensation) and “medical counseling to inform and better evaluate women’s 
decisions on wanting to get pregnant.” In a touching documentary film, produced 
by Debora Diniz, terms as “we will see”; “we will wait and see”; and “it is hard, I 
know, but have faith, you are strong” are deployed by medical staff when attend-
ing to pregnant women whose fetuses had been diagnosed, via ultrasound, with 
microcephaly. In a country where abortion in those cases is illegal, and when 
pregnant women are faced with a new challenging reality, it begs the question: 
what else is there to be said?
In an epidemiological bulletin issued in 2017, the health ministry described the 
women most touched by Zika’s terrible effects. It depicts mostly Afro-Brazilian 
women, poor and living in neglected urban areas or in the poor countryside. 
These are the women making routine use of the Unified Health System (SUS), 
who have no financial resources at their disposal to use private health care. For 
these women, abortion is not only illegal but also completedly inaccessible.10 It 
becomes apparent, through this depictions and many others like it, that Zika’s 
worst and most devastating effects were not only gendered but also embodied in 
racial and class differences.11
Throughout the epidemic, a national campaign slogan could be seen spread 
across the country: “Um mosquito não é mais forte do que uma nação inteira” (a 
mosquito is not stronger that a whole nation). Obviously, this is a piece of propa-
ganda designed to reinforce a sense of community in a collective effort to com-
bat the mosquito threat. It was used to focus the collective psyche on individual 
responsibility, on the need to follow environmental sanitation procedures at the 
household level, and to accept government fumigation and house-to-house vigi-
lance by municipal staff called agentes de combate de endemias (combat agents 
of endemic disease).
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However, this slogan did more than this. It reinforced the military idiom that 
pervaded these campaigns throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Hochman, 
1998), which viewed the mosquito as the enemy and created an impossible battle 
to be fought in a deeply unequal society. What “nation” is being addressed by 
this campaign slogan? What “nation” will have its houses inspected on a daily 
basis by state agents? And on whose shoulders does the weight of this campaign 
fall? By July 2017, the health ministry published a norm declaring the end to the 
national emergency, leading each state, in its own way, to continue with the medi-
cal and epidemiological follow-up.
Brazilian responses to microcephaly: Caring 
and forgetting children affected by Zika
Babies affected by ZIKV started to appear in the Brazilian and international press 
in 2015 in ways that revealed certain things and kept others hidden. Indeed, ZIKV 
has become a political event in Brazil and a global health problem through the fear 
and uncertainty surrounding microcephaly, and its related health risks, bodily dam-
age and burden. The disease has a temporal dimension, with its impact dragged 
from an infected present to a chronically burdened future for those families that 
are, unfortunately, affected. Nevertheless, it is worth asking: have affected chil-
dren and families become as perceptible as the virus itself? How has the Brazilian 
government responded to their plight and suffering, and long-term care needs?
Microcephalic infants were visual centerpieces of the epidemic, but addressing 
their caregiving needs, and the psychosocial realities of their mothers and families, 
were not the first priorities of the Brazilian government when they declared the 
ESPIN in November 2015. Rather, the aim was to obtain continuous and timely 
knowledge about the disease by strengthening epidemiological surveillance and 
to prevent more cases by mobilizing long-known strategies to combat the Aedes 
aegypti mosquito (Ministério da Saúde, 2015b).
The fact that ZIKV was already known to science complicated things. A 
known disease suddenly became unknown, and epidemiologists and public health 
experts needed to quickly map and evaluate the available data. The unprecedented 
nature of ZIKV consequences and the rapid increase in the number of cases posed 
difficulties in reorganizing the Brazilian health system to respond promptly and 
adequately to these new demands.
The corpus of microcephaly epidemiological bulletins (MEB) (Boletins 
Epidemiológicos de monitoramento de microcefalia) and their correspond-
ing epidemiological reports (ER), produced by the Health Ministry as tools of 
monitoring ZIKV and affected children, were important parts of the repertoire 
of “documents of emergency.” The epidemiological bulletin (EB) and the epide-
miological report, published online, provided the Sanitary Vigilance Department 
with a platform to rapidly disseminate results on disease-specific information and 
investigations, and to orientate public health action.
At the end of 2015, when there were many scientific uncertainties and no guar-
antees of significant and immediate health system support, mostly because of the 
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troubled political landscape, the official discussions centered on knowing and 
controlling the disease right away. Regrettably, Dengue has shown us that simply 
knowing about a disease is not enough to control it.
If the Brazilian state provided medical care in full accordance with its consti-
tutional laws, focused on comprehensive care for example, then all babies with 
Congenital Zika Syndrome (CZS) ought to get specific pediatric primary care, 
professional early stimulation and follow up by different specialists, according 
to the national “Protocol for Surveillance and Response” published in 2015 by 
the Brazilian Health Ministry (Ministério da Saúde, 2015b). As reported by the 
Sanitary Vigilance Department (Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde, 2017), among 
the 2,681 confirmed CZS cases that remained alive from November 2015 to 
February 2018, 72% had some kind of care, 31% had all three kinds and 23% had 
both pediatric and specialist care. According to same document, there were 3,087 
confirmed cases of CZS by February 2018. Although life expectancy for these 
children is considered exceptionally low, 2,681 of them were still alive in 2018. In 
addition, 12,393 notified cases were still under investigation, or were considered 
probable, discarded, excluded or inconclusive, for various reasons (Secretaria de 
Vigilância em Saúde, 2017).
In our analysis, we found three significant moments that shifted the manage-
ment of the epidemic in Brazil. The first included the government’s integrated 
approach between the Ministries of Health and Social Development, in early 
2016, to combat the sanitary emergency (Ministério da Saúde, Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Social do Brasil, 2016a,b,c). The second included, in early 
2017, the effort to better integrate epidemiological data into the management of 
the epidemic through surveillance and healthcare data, protocols and guidelines 
(Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde, 2017). The final and third shift was seen 
in the second half of 2017, when the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) entered the scene. Although prevention and care of 
children and families affected by Zika were discussed in official documents, until 
mid-2017 most actions focused on risk communication in vector control and on 
individual microcephaly diagnosis.
In the Brazilian health system, diagnostic practices are important, even 
necessary, vehicles for accessing social service provisions. For children 
with CZS, a medical report was needed to plan individual care routines and 
to access the Benefício de Provisão Continuada (BPC), a financial security 
program for low-income families with a victim of Zika-related microcephaly 
(Congresso Nacional do Brasil, 2016). Benefits in this program, however, 
seem calculated to an early death; the maximum benefit period is only three 
years. The BPC has political implications. Social support tied to microcephaly 
babies is set apart from the greater disability advocacy community and may 
compromise efforts in strengthening the general health care and social pro-
tection of other children and families. In addition, the arrangement between 
the ministries, affecting health system and social assistance, focused on pro-
moting early stimulation interventions through family involvement, instead 
of creating conditions to provide pediatric primary care, professional early 
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stimulation and follow up by different specialists, such as neurologists, oph-
thalmologists and orthopedists.
The aim to better integrate epidemiological data into practices of caring for 
mothers and children affected by Zika, stated in the 2017 MEBs, promoted the 
integrated monitoring of changes in growth and development. Nevertheless, in 
everyday practices the discourse on microcephaly continued to frame biomedi-
cal surveillance and health interventions. This situation conflicted with what we 
know about CZS, or came to know in 2016, that CZS constitutes a range or spec-
trum of disorders and can occur without microcephaly and can appear after birth 
(Mota et al., 2016).
The term “CZS,” therefore, implies that children exposed to Zika during preg-
nancy may have multiple development disorders, even though they are considered 
“normal” at birth. Lowe et al. (2018:9) called these babies the “Zika generation.” 
The microcephaly spectacle blurs their visibility, also because there remain sub-
stantial diagnostic difficulties that complicate tracking these more insidious and 
hidden affects. This threatens a large segment of children born during the Zika 
epidemic, the “Zika generation,” with unknown health, social and economic 
implications as well as social and state neglect and disregard, which is well known 
to the wider Brazilian handicapped population (Nações Unidas no Brazil, 2018). 
The existence of a large segment of “Zika generation,” their life conditions and 
requirements are, therefore, in dispute and remain unaccounted for.
The health apparatus, in the second half of 2017 and in cooperation with 
UNICEF, created three documents to better address the needs of children affected 
by Zika (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2017a,b,c): (1) guidelines for families 
and caregivers of children with developmental disorders (Orientações às famílias 
e aos cuidadores de crianças com alterações no desenvolvimento); (2) school and 
home stimulation of children with developmental disorders: qualification course 
for health, education and social assistance professionals (Metodologia para 
Multiplicadores. Estimulação de crianças com alterações no desenvolvimento no 
ambiente domiciliar e escolar: Curso para qualificação de profissionais de saúde, 
educação e assistência social); and (3) ensuring the rights of families and children 
with CZS and other disabilities (Projeto Redes de Inclusão. Garantindo direitos 
das famílias e das crianças com Síndrome Congênita do Zika vírus e outras defi-
ciências). These documents drew heavily on the “early childhood development” 
(ECD) concept that has guided UNICEF’s strategies since the 2000s (UNICEF, 
2001). Practices established from the ECD approach place strong emphasis on 
brain enhancement and optimal brain development, as well as the promotion of 
a child’s cognitive, physical, emotional and social potential (UNICEF, 2001). In 
reality, however, the majority of efforts under the ECD umbrella tend to focus 
most on cognitive and physical issues, and less so for emotional and social ones 
(Silva, 2016).
In an atmosphere of limited resources and the need to optimize investments, 
the collaboration between the Ministry of Health and UNICEF focused on the 
first three years of life, regarded as the most significant period for structural brain 
development, although according to the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
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of the Child (2005), early childhood may last up to eight years of age. They 
also focused largely on early non-professional stimulation, often to be carried 
out by the families of the affected children. Like mosquito control, the onus of 
responsibility is on the individual and the household, charged with conducting 
and maintaining most child development interventions (Silva, 2016). This may 
sideline the demands of poor families for comprehensive professional care and 
state intervention.
Discussion and conclusions
This work highlighted some critical nodes in Brazilian health policies in rela-
tion to the ZIKV outbreak. Political contexts, scientific uncertainties and state 
trajectories enact complexities and produce different meanings and actions on 
Zika. The rapid response of the Brazilian Ministry of Health helped to increase 
epidemiological surveillance, diagnostic resources, improve financing to research 
and implement vector control initiatives. This was efficient in some ways and 
less so in other, but overall followed well-established historical patterns of other 
medical emergencies, such as outbreaks of H1N1 influenza, Dengue and measles. 
In a climate of unstable national politics, the Brazilian state response to Zika 
was predominately biomedical and reactionary, with limited regard for the deep-
seated structural issues in the public health system and the social inequities that, 
in many ways, explain the virus’ particular epidemiology. The “war framing” of 
Zika (Ribeiro et al. 2018), and with it the large, periodic campaigns on vector 
control, remain the main course of action, regardless of the social determinants of 
health, structural problems in the health system and other forms of transmission, 
such as through sex.
The “documents of emergency” we have reviewed and analyzed in this chap-
ter reveal, first and foremost, a policy approach that repeats time-restricted and 
epidemiological monitoring patterns of previous responses. In the beginning of 
2017, the Brazilian government announced the development of a “process of inte-
grated surveillance and health care monitoring in cases of changes in the growth 
and development of Zika virus infections and other infectious etiologies,” but, in 
February 2018, this processes was still unfinished. If, on the one hand, science 
learned to know Zika better, then, on the other hand, data from the improvement 
of epidemiological surveillance did not result in enhanced integration between the 
surveillance system and health care network planning, much less in guaranteeing 
access to much needed expanded health care assistance to all babies effected by 
ZIKV.
In January 2016, a former health minister, Marcelo Castro, declared that 
women should postpone their pregnancies and that he “hoped” women would get 
infected early in their lives, before they reached their fertile period.12 The minis-
ter’s underlying assumption seems to have revolved around a sort of “permanent 
immunization” established by a one-time infection with the virus. However, there 
seems to be no scientific evidence confirming this statement, just as there is no 
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certainty about how the immune system responds to ZIKV and its transmissi-
bility. Individual responsibility here appears entangled in a complex meshwork 
evolving gender biases, ideas of nation building and an assumption that herd 
immunity would “naturally” resolve an epidemic that, in many ways, was driven 
by dominant social, economic and political phenomena.
In this chapter, we situated Zika within a broader landscape of Brazilian politics 
and health systems. By exploring the literacy of the Brazilian state, and its ordi-
nances, protocols and manuals aimed at guiding health professionals, we provided 
some reflects on how the state came to understand and frame the epidemic itself. 
With regard to the official responses to microcephaly, we found three significant 
moments that shifted the management of the epidemic in Brazil: the government’s 
integrated approach between the Ministries of Health and Social Development, in 
early 2016, to combat the sanitary emergency; the attempt to integrate epidemio-
logical surveillance data with health care planning; and the shift (in the second 
half of 2017) in care and support to affected families, where UNICEF played an 
important convening role.
From a local epidemic to a global threat, from the state’s response seen through 
what we called “documents of emergency” to children and family care, we have 
attempted to explore, following Nunes and Nacif (2016), how and why certain 
subjects, issues and groups became visible during the epidemic and its aftermath, 
while others largely remained hidden and invisible. Through each set of docu-
ments analyzed here, such as ordinances, protocols, technical notes and micro-
cephaly epidemiological bulletins, not only do we see differences among the 
Health Ministry’s departments and hierarchies but, most importantly, in each of 
these set of documents a slightly different ZIKV is put forward, and “enacted” 
(Mol, 2002).
A Zika construed solely by mosquitoes and their human-animal relations 
leaves absent other forms of transmission, including sexual transmission, and 
constitutes a series of silences and erasures of scientific data; a Zika construed 
by its correlation only to microcephaly constitutes another series of silences, this 
time concerning an entire “Zika generation” that falls outside the more visible 
effects of microcephaly; and a Zika with which a considerable number of fami-
lies, especially women and mothers, are expected to provide early life stimulation 
hides the need for professional state services and access to specialists.
Scientists now affirm that Zika is here to stay and, just as Dengue and 
Chikungunya, has become endemic to Brazil and most other countries in the 
Americas. It will in time reappear in epidemic form once herd immunity wanes. 
But Zika’s transmission, effects and repercussions are embedded in a set of uncer-
tainties. Zika is not the same as other arbovirus diseases. In January 2016, the 
former health minister (cited earlier) also declared that the fight against Zika was 
a fight against the need to avoid a “damaged generation” for Brazil. Nowadays, in 
the aftermath, it is possible to see that the children affected by the Zika virus have 
been framed and treated, to a large degree, as yet another segment of a neglected 
population group, inscribing further iniquities in Brazil’s genealogy. Some aspects 
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are highly visible, just as microcephaly is highly visible, and yet many aspects 
are equally silenced and unseen, just as many of Zika’s biological effects are also 
unseen and invisible.
Notes
1 This work was partially supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and 
Innovation Program under ZIKAlliance Grant Agreement no. 734548. We would also 
like to acknowledge the Newton Fund Institute and the British Council for their support. 
Special thanks to our colleagues at the Zika Social Science Network and at FIOCRUZ.
2 As Hochman suggested (1998), the emphasis on large environmental sanitation cam-
paigns in Brazil reflects a certain history of how the state has dealt with vector control 
over the years, in fragmented actions carried out for some months during peak epidem-
ics and mainly concerned with individual and household responsibility and the use of 
chemical fumigation. In this approach, none of the infrastructural issues that surround 
mosquito breeding are addressed.
3 We use the term “temporalities” here in the terms used by Veena Das (2007) and Alex 
Nading (2014). Both authors, in different contexts, speak about a state that makes itself 
present only sporadically in the lives of its citizens, in lacunar actions.
4 See http://www.jb.com.br/ciencia-e-tecnologia/noticias/2015/05/15/especialista-mini-
miza-riscos-de-zika-no-pais/
5 It is now believed that Zika was likely introduced into Brazil from various soccer and 
canoe race competitions, between 2013 and 2014, that brought athletes from the South 
Pacific, as the virus was circulating there (see Gubler et al. 2017).
6 After the Brazilian presidental electrions in 2014, an economic crisis started which 
supported the political crisis against President Dilma Rousseff and the Labour Party. 
A conservative wave grew all over the country among high and middle social classes. 
From 2015 until the time of writing (mid-2018), Brazil was immersed in a polarized 
battle between democratic and conservative politics.
7 FIOCRUZ is a major public health research institution in Brazil, established in 1900, 
when it originally worked on sanitation campaigns for smallpox, yellow fever and plague. 
It has a current workforce of over 7,500 people, with a main office in Rio de Janeiro.
8 In a classic paper on bureaucracy, Weber (2006:50) establishes an articulation between 
written papers (the archives) and the professionals who work in the administration, 
and suggests that it is not possible to analyze bureaucratic practices without paying 
due attention to these papers and their role in structuring and ordering the adminis-
trative apparatus. Bourdieu (2014: 113), in a similar sense, emphasizes the “situation 
of authority” that produces the legitimacy of an “appointment or attestation,” making 
them official acts, endowed with bureaucratic meanings and, in a certain way, creative 
powers, orders and realities.
9 Such a decision, at least the way it was implemented, has since been questioned in the 
United States. Saá et al. (2018) showed the high cost of screening each individual donor 
(which cost over $42 million over a period of 15 months) was likely an unnecessarily 
sensitive (and expensive) process given the risks involved.
10 It is important to note here that the argument that abortion is a public health issue had been 
strengthened in 2007 when a former health minister, Mr. Temporão, openly defended 
revisions to the country’s abortion laws, supported by former president Lula. However 
the two following elections changed this legislative effort (Nogueira and Baptists, 2007).
11 For an ethnographic study on the entanglements produced by official documents con-
struing everyday life in primary health care facilities in Rio de Janeiro, especially con-
cerning prenatal care and HPV screening prevention, see Nogueira (2016).
12 See: http://g1.globo.com/bom-dia-brasil/noticia/2016/01/ministro-da-saude-come-
tegafe-ao-falar-sobre-vacina-contra-zika-virus.html.
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4
This chapter explores a set of critical questions in the intersection between 
Zika virus and wider issues of motherhood, gender, disability and reproductive 
rights in Brazil. We draw extensively from our participation at public hearings 
and meetings (as well as a workshop we organized on the social and economic 
impact of Zika) in the “epicenter” of the 2015–2016 Brazilian epidemic – the city 
of Recife in Pernambuco State, northeast Brazil.1 The workshop itself, held in 
Recife in the beginning of 2017, brought together about a hundred people with 
very diverse backgrounds, interests and perspectives on how to manage the policy 
implications, emerging science and bodily impacts of the virus. This included, for 
example, different academic researchers (health, environmental studies, anthro-
pology/sociology and epidemiology), representatives of international organiza-
tions (like UN Women and UNFPA) and public authorities (representatives of 
the Department of Health of Pernambuco State and Recife City); however, it also 
included representatives of emerging social movements that have been, in various 
ways and at different times, at the center of the global Zika response: the Brazilian 
feminist movement and a coalition of Congenital Zika Syndrome (CZS) affected 
mothers and their children.2
In order to explore the variety of perspectives and discussions we encountered 
during our workshop, we will discuss three issues: (1) how the social determi-
nants of health (particularly sanitation and social inequalities) have played a role 
in the surge of Zika-related microcephaly cases since 2015 in Pernambuco State; 
(2) how the mothers with children affected by Zika have drawn upon sociocultural 
norms that reify motherhood in Brazil as they advocate for specialized health 
services and social policies to advance their interests and needs; and (3) how the 
feminist movement has responded to the Zika epidemic, specifically in terms of 
their own advocacy of reproductive rights and the social impact of arboviruses 
in the everyday life of women. In so doing, we draw on a number of interrelated 
social theories and social realities, as manifest in Pernambuco, to advance a theo-
rization of caring in the age of Zika, from the standpoint of individuals, families, 
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social groups and the state. Ultimately we believe our feminist critique of the 
Zika response in Brazil, in a context of state inefficiencies and rampant structural 
inequalities, has much to offer, specifically in how it calls attention to the need 
to reimagine theories of care and human rights engagement, and their moral con-
sequences, in light of persistent gender and socio-economic marginalization that 
is endemic to Northeast Brazil and, arguably, remain the most important “risk 
factors” for Zika.
The emergence of a new disease: Congenital 
Zika Syndrome in Brazil
In 2015, Brazil became famous around the world – this time not because of soccer 
or carnival but because of the large number of unexpected cases of microcephaly 
of unknown origin in newborns. Pernambuco, a state in the Northeast region of 
the country, was considered the epicenter of the 2015–2016 epidemic.
Surprised by the sudden increase of babies with microcephaly that they 
began seeing in April 2015, the first cases were registered by local neurologists 
and medical doctors (Diniz, 2016b). These were reported to the State Health 
Department which, in turn, introduced a mandatory reporting protocol for new 
cases with immediate effect as an epidemiological surveillance tool. In little 
over a month, the number of microcephaly cases exceeded the number of cases 
in previous years,3 accompanied by unusual patterns of brain calcification and 
arthrogryposis (Miranda-Filho, 2016). Task forces went into action on various 
fronts (epidemiological surveillance, health care delivery, public health outreach 
and scientific research) to find answers and investigate the risk factors associated 
with these new microcephaly clusters.4 Reports of rash disorders in pregnancy 
among mothers of these newborns led health workers to suspect that it was asso-
ciated with the Zika virus, a suspicion that subsequent studies confirmed (Araújo 
et al., 2016, 2017; Brito, 2015; Chan, 2016; Costa et al., 2017). The Brazilian 
Ministry of Health ordered compulsory reporting of cases throughout the country 
and declared a state of National Public Health Emergency in November 2015. By 
the end of the year, the Brazilian Bulletin of Epidemiology5 reported a total of 399 
suspected cases of microcephaly, across seven northeastern states, with most (268 
cases, or 67.2%) from Pernambuco, as shown in Figure 4.1. Cases were reported 
throughout Brazil and by the end of 2017, 3,037 were confirmed, 65% of them 
in the Northeast region. As shown in Figure 4.2, these were spread throughout 
Pernambuco State.
The surge in microcephaly in Pernambuco sparked widespread concern in 
the scientific community and required government responses to what would 
subsequently be confirmed to be a new congenital syndrome characterized 
by a broad range of corporal and neurological alterations. Congenital Zika 
Syndrome (CZS) related to infection by the Zika virus in pregnancy, a condi-
tion that may also occur without microcephaly due to the wide range of clinical 
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microcephaly in the early stages of the epidemic, illustrates this complex clini-
cal spectrum:
My son is a Zika victim. He was born with microcephaly, ventriculomegaly, 
myopia and chronic encephalopathy. My pregnancy passed without incident, 
but in the third month, I woke up with an itch. I went to [the] emergency room 
and they told me that I had Zika, because itching is typical of Zika. They pre-
scribed anti-allergy medication and did some ultrasound exams. Everything 
was normal and I continued my pregnancy. I took every test imaginable and 
nothing showed up. I only found out my son was sick when he was born and 
this was confirmed nine days later.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
By early 2016, images of “strange” babies with small heads were appearing regu-
larly in the international and national news. Uncertainties about the scale of this 
new congenital infection, its cause(s) and the prognosis for this new class of new-
borns created national panic, adding to an already complex political situation in 
Brazil at the time, including the impeachment of President Dilma and austerity 
policies (including for health). Several hypotheses were put forward at the time as 
to the “real” cause of the spike in microcephaly: alleged side effects of vaccines 
given in pregnancy, use of larvicides used against mosquitoes, malnutrition and a 
number of conspiracy theories. These spread quickly on social networks without 
any substantial proof. To add another layer of complexity to the epidemic, Zika in 
2017 was no longer an epidemic and cases of CZS had reduced to 15 confirmed 
cases.6 This was despite the fact that cases were registered in almost all parts of 
the state between 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 4.2).
The need for an immediate response to an ongoing epidemic of a serious com-
municable disease about which little was (or still is) known led researchers, pub-
lic authorities and funding bodies to focus their attention on the risk factors, the 
description of symptoms, characterization of the new syndrome, the creation of new 
laboratory tests, the accuracy of imaging exams to confirm cases, the testing of med-
ication and vaccines and the need to prepare the health system to attend cases and to 
develop early childhood stimulation strategies for affected newborns. Such studies, 
based on the biomedical model, have shed much light on the pathogenesis of the 
new disease and possible clinical interventions and laboratory responses. As is so 
often the case with emerging infectious diseases, medical humanitarian response 
and biomedical research, relatively few studies have explored the sociocultural 
aspects of the disease and the context and discourses of those families – women, 
children and men in Brazil – who have been so significantly and severely affected.
Some researchers have raised the important question of the relationship 
between social inequalities and the epidemic of not only CZS but also other arbo-
viruses such as Chikungunya and Dengue (Nunes & Pimenta, 2016; Castro, 2016). 
Dengue, for example, is endemic throughout Brazil, where it emerges in periodic 
epidemics that have been increasingly related to climate change (Ferreira, 2016); 
but, really, above all, Dengue in Brazil, and indeed throughout Latin America, is 
related more to the lack of social investment in basic sanitation and water supply, 
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noxious and unequal living conditions and the disordered urban development of 
favelas and urban sprawl that are responsible for vector transmission (Associação 
Brasileira de Saúde Coletiva, 2015).
This is especially evident in Pernambuco, the epicenter of the CZS epidemic. 
As shown by the media images and journalistic tales of poverty, and clearly shown 
in regional statistics, families living in poverty were the group most affected by 
the disease (Souza et al, 2018; Lesser & Kitron, 2016). Pernambuco is a state 
in Brazil where 77% of the population lives below the poverty line and 54% of 
them are enrolled in government assistance programs for families whose income 
is half a minimum wage per person per month (about US $150/month). In the city 
of Recife, the state capital, 30% of people are subject to water rationing and do 
not receive water on a regular basis. In some neighborhoods, it is common for 
the service to be interrupted for a week at the time; in rural areas of Pernambuco, 
people can go for 30 days without running water. Approximately 97% of chil-
dren diagnosed with the new “small head” syndrome (as it was sometimes called) 
were born in public hospitals. Although Brazil has a universal health system, the 
wealthy and middle class increasingly seek out private care; public services are 
mostly used by the poor (Paim, 2013).
It is also no surprise that women are most affected by arboviruses – data from 
the Ministry of Health show that about 56% of the reported cases of arboviruses 
occur in females. In Brazil, these are mostly poor Afro-Brazilian women of repro-
ductive age, who are usually more exposed to mosquitoes by their (productive and 
reproductive) work and poor housing, often on the periphery of urban geographies 
(Scheper-Hughes, 1992). In the context of Zika, these women have also become 
the social group most affected by feelings of panic, fear and guilt as they struggle 
to cope with the possibility of transmitting the virus to their children. Lastly, any 
discussion about inequality and Zika needs to be situated within a broader appre-
ciation of how the epidemic intersects with other challenges of motherhood in 
places like Pernambuco. Women are, historically, responsible for being caregiv-
ers on top of their professional and other livelihood work. Motherhood imposes 
responsibilities and identities that are socially imposed and constructed, and it is 
important to appreciate how these embedded realities influence everyday life for 
those personally affected by Zika.
By exploring these issues, therefore, this chapter seeks to raise a number of 
central questions regarding the social impact of Zika on the lives of women and 
divergent concepts of “motherhood” in Pernambuco, Northeastern Brazil. We do 
this by exploring two very different socially-embedded points of view: women 
with children affected by Zika and the Brazilian feminist movement. 
Microcephaly, support groups and mother 
associations in Pernambuco
In order to understand how the Zika epidemic has affected women in Brazil, let 
us first start by exploring the perspectives of two associations of mothers of chil-
dren with microcephaly that are active in Pernambuco and who participated in the 
workshop we organized in 2017. One of these associations – AMAR (an acronym 
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that means “Alliance of Rare Mothers and Families” in Portuguese) – has been a 
point of reference for around four years for mothers of children with disabilities, 
especially those related to rare diseases. After the emergence of the CZS epi-
demic, this association was the first organization that the mothers of these children 
turned to for support and self-organization. In 2017, this association had around 
420 members, about 150 of them mothers of children with CZS. The organization 
has extensive knowledge of Brazilian legislation and advocates for the rights of 
people with disabilities. Although it was already active prior to the emergence of 
Zika, it has since acquired greater visibility due to the increased media coverage.
The other association – UMA (“Union of Mothers of Angel,” in Portuguese) – 
was founded in 2016 by two mothers of children with Zika-related microcephaly, 
who regularly met when visiting the doctor with their children and decided to set 
up a WhatsApp group, initially to exchange experiences, as a way of “reducing 
the sense of loneliness and isolation” (as they said) that they were experiencing. 
These women first allied themselves with the association mentioned earlier but 
then split from it, feeling the need for an organization specifically dedicated to the 
mothers (and families) of children with Zika-acquired microcephaly. This asso-
ciation currently (as of mid-2018) has around 400 mothers of children with CZS 
registered as members in various parts of Pernambuco State.
Both associations have their own headquarters, located in Recife: one (AMAR) 
was donated by the state government, while the other (UMA) was purchased with 
resources from an anonymous donor. The activities promoted by these organiza-
tions are diverse and include welcoming families, meetings with affiliates, partici-
pating in public hearings, conducting campaigns and marches, donating supplies 
(i.e. special milk, medicines, stimulus and rehabilitation equipment), as well as 
assisting with projects developed in partnership with universities, researchers, 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donor organizations. The 
experience of the Recife associations has become a point of reference for other 
parts of the country. Representatives of these associations have been invited to 
participate in events and share experiences, thereby helping women to organize in 
other states, such as Alagoas, Ceará and Bahia. These connections have helped to 
build up a national network and strengthen advocacy regarding the needs of these 
children and their families.
While advances in research since 2015 have shifted our understanding of Zika 
to account for a range of CZS manifestations, “microcephaly” and its medical and 
social impacts continues to dominate – in some senses symbolically – our perspec-
tive and understanding of this “strange” congenital malformation. As researchers, 
then, we see “microcephaly” as a social fact, in the sense proposed by Émile 
Durkheim (2007). In other words, it is something external – a social category, 
a label, a method of “otherness” – that is imposed on individuals in a coercive 
manner and performs a social function, conforming subjectivities, identities and, 
in some cases, stigma. In this sense, we also recognize as a social fact the way the 
epidemic was portrayed in the media, elaborating on specific symbolic meanings 
about affected children and their parents. The very term microcephaly occurs as 
an emic category, used by the mothers’ movement (the association of mothers and 
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affected families) as a discursive strategy, but also as a way of explaining the dis-
ease and building up appropriate meanings shared by group members. It is impos-
sible to ignore how this infant disability has affected society in Pernambuco – not 
only because of its high occurrence but also because of the original “strangeness” 
of how “Zika’s children”7 came to be known. Families faced doubts about the 
disease and the meanings that came to be associated with it.
When looking at the political organization of these “activist mothers” (Pinheiro & 
Longhi, 2017) (most of them are mothers), we need to take into account the con-
text of social turmoil associated with the epidemic and the way this sparked unex-
pected reactions, even among those working in the field of childhood disabilities. 
This can clearly be seen from the words of a representative of AMAR on this 
topic:
In January 2016, we met various mothers seeking out our association as a ‘cry 
for help.’ They wanted to know what caused microcephaly. It was still not 
known that the cause was Zika. The look of desperation in these mothers was 
palpable. … We held a meeting with 158 women affected by Zika-related 
congenital syndrome. I had never seen so many babies with the same disease, 
even though I work with disabilities. This made a deep impression on me.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
It should be noted that these organizations were established by mothers who 
shared the same experiences and anxieties regarding the care of their children. 
Generally, in both, we find a reification of the social role of motherhood, a sacrali-
zation of children and the valorization of “overload” (multiple responsibilities) 
intrinsic to the position of the mother in Brazilian society (Pinheiro et al, 2009). 
These are expressed in a discourse that demands not only social belonging and 
acceptance but also government action through rights-based discourse. In this 
context, reification of motherhood seems to seek a re-recognition and validation 
of the role of the mother, a “super mother,” who needs to redouble her efforts to 
address the care needs of a Zika-affected child. At the same time, in explaining 
their efforts, they also stress that they need care themselves. As stated by the vice 
coordinator of one of the associations during our workshop: 
We agreed to take these people on. It involves taking care of [those] who 
take care [of the affected children] and helping families feel they are part of a 
struggle for rights… caring for the caregiver is an important part of care. It is 
a cycle…We strive for social belonging. This is what a mother wants for her 
future life and principally for the quality of life of her child.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
At the heart of the ideology, in some senses, of CZS mother associations, mother-
hood is given a new meaning by, first and foremost, the experience of having a 
child with a disability that does not fit the image of a “normal” child generated, 
psychological and socially, during the months prior to birth. The public health 
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emergency produced in these mothers an urgent need to redefine motherhood, 
seen now as having been transformed by the “gift” of a child with microcephaly. 
There was no time to mourn the imagined child; motherhood is viewed here as 
propitiation for this “gift of God.” The children are sanctified as “angels” bringing 
special insights into life and all those who help are seen likewise:8
When my son was born, my life changed, and not for the worse. It was a 
watershed in my life. Through him I met wonderful people and I was able to 
help many others and that is how the association began.
(representative of UMA; Fieldnotes, 2017)
Marcel Mauss (2003), in his essay The Gift, argues that the exchange of gifts 
has a political dimension. We can see this in the sense of mission found in those 
who set up an association or political organization; with Zika, we also see this in 
the relationship established with other mothers and collaborators who participate 
in events and projects and provide donations and services. These partners are 
referred to as “guardian angels” and their “offerings” are also a way of symboli-
cally forming a connection with the affected families.
The reification of motherhood evoked by the mothers associations involves a 
simultaneous rejection of negative feelings and burdensome life changes as well 
as a mechanism for social belonging; in so far that these associations support 
socially expected behaviors and discourse. The initial solitude of the victim of a 
“tragedy” is transformed by mutual recognition and the identity forged is that of 
mothers, real mothers, who now have a mission, a God-given opportunity to show 
what they are capable of “in spite of this”:
We decided to come out of isolation to fight for the lives of our children. We 
accepted God’s challenge.
(representative of UMA; Fieldnotes, 2017)
Our children [are] the mission God has given us and we are in this to the end. 
If our children can’t walk, we will walk for them. If they can’t hear, we will be 
their ears. If they can’t interact, we will fight for them. If they can’t speak, we 
will be the only voice declaring that microcephaly is not the end of the world.
(excerpt from a video presented by UMA during 
the workshop; Fieldnotes, 2017)
These associations play an important role as a network of social support, helping 
people deal with loneliness and social exclusion, poverty and despair. It is here 
that people fight together for their rights and those of their children, for better 
health services, social benefits, tolerance and so forth. Through these activities, 
they are also creating meanings of this very novel, very powerful experience:
We found that, after the Whatsapp group, we became stronger. Because, when 
you meet someone else who is in the same situation, you feel strengthened 
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to confront the situation. The group has given me strength. It has made me 
become a special mother and that’s where the true God-given mission came 
from. After that I told my family and friends about his illness, when he was 
three months old. I vowed that I would make the association my life. I seized 
the opportunity to seek out other mothers and relieve them of the isolation, 
sadness and anxiety that I once felt.
(representative of UMA. Fieldnotes, 2017)
A change of routine, making new friends, new ways of relating to health profes-
sionals and the continuous exchange of new information, contribute to integration 
among these activist mothers. During their visits and interactions with the health 
system as part of their caregiving, they have sparked a phenomenon that Diniz 
(2016a, b) has called “domestic science” – the informal comparison of symptoms, 
stages of development, medication, therapies and therapeutic progress that serve 
as sources of information and knowledge created by the women themselves. This 
strategy also feeds into the work of health professionals who are dealing with a 
syndrome still not well understood by the scientific literature, especially when 
they end up producing prognoses that contradict the true development of children 
as witnessed, day-in and day-out, by the mothers themselves.
We can see the role played by the mothers associations in providing a sense of 
shared identity, through confronting similar problems and sharing ideas regarding 
how to deal, socially, with their difficulties. Macro-sociologists, such as Goffman 
(1988; 2001) and Becker (2008), key thinkers from symbolic interactionism,9 
developed theories of deviance that are relevant here. From this perspective, 
the children with microcephaly are considered deviant according to biomedical 
norms. Because they are infants who cannot speak for themselves; however, it is 
the mothers who take on this role for them. They present them as “socially dif-
ferent” subjects undergoing a peculiar life experience that affects their subjective 
processes and interferes with the normal course of their lives. This leads the moth-
ers to organize politically to provide visibility for their children, change social 
conceptions and campaign for access to health services and social policies that, 
so they hope, can meet their needs in the fragile and brittle context of health and 
living in Brazil. 
For example, mothers present at our research workshop in Recife, early 2017, 
called attention to the impoverishment and lack of socio-economic security 
among women with children with microcephaly. This is a major concern in the 
lives of many women in Brazil. Most of these mothers have given up paid work to 
care for their children 24 hours a day. Some had their partners and the husbands 
abandoned them; one of the leaders of the associations has mentioned in public 
statements that about 70% of mothers of children with disabilities and rare dis-
eases do not have husbands. However, it is important to note that being a “single 
mother” is a common situation in the daily lives of poor women in Brazil (PNAD/
IBGE, 2016). A participant at the 2017 workshop underlined the need for policies 
that help these women get back to work. Women are fighting for places for their 
children in crèches with specialized facilities, and stressing the need to receive 
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technical training in a profession that is compatible with their daily lives. As one 
stated:
I hope my son lives a long life. But if, God forbid, 15 or 20 years from now, 
he passes away, who will give me a job after being unemployed for such a 
long time?
(Mother of children affected with CZS; 
Fieldnotes, 2017)
From this view, disability, and the role the state can play in managing it, is not 
conceptualized narrowly as a “pathology” or “congenital defect” that merely 
needs to be fixed but extends to, as another mother told us, “the right to quality of 
life for our babies,” which involves access to treatment but also social inclusion. 
This approach to disability contrasts with the traditional biomedical model, which 
views disability as an individual biological disadvantage requiring intervention to 
enable the “dis-abled” to fit into society. Members of these mother associations, 
however, suggested a more social approach to disability (Diniz, 2007; Gesser et 
al., 2012). This social experience of disability has often been discussed as a result 
of a system of “social oppression” that brands disabled people as generally “dif-
ferent” from others. But when these mothers concentrate their political campaign 
on public policy, inclusion and quality of life, they are breaking with the central 
focus of biomedicine (of intervening on/in the body) and enhancing the mental and 
physical capacities of individuals, by including other dimensions, such as remov-
ing barriers to social interaction and improving access to care (see Figure 4.3). 
Now that the epidemic has passed its peak (in 2017) and the national and 
international public health emergency has subsided, the representatives of these 
associations have stated in interviews, public hearings and forums that they feel 
abandoned by the public authorities, who are providing less and less support as 
media interest in the plight of such families declines. As Diniz (2016b) vividly 
describes in neighboring Alagoas State, for these families Zika is an epidemic 
without an end: while the “emergency” and political panic may have subsided, the 
consequences of Zika have not. There is still a need for various therapies to enable 
children to interact, respond to stimuli and acquire enhanced neuro-psychomotor 
capacities. As the children grow, new requirements also emerge: such as the pro-
vision of adequately equipped schools and daycare centers to meet the specific 
needs of children, or social protection measures that minimize the vulnerability 
associated with poverty and poor living conditions, which are only exacerbated by 
the experience of living with a child with CZS.10
All of this shows that, in the case of these mothers and their children, the poli-
tics of care, which recognizes interdependence and autonomy, are central to social 
change and action. In the words of the director of the association that advocates 
for the rights of individuals with rare diseases (AMAR), whose disabled son is 
now 18 years old:
It is as if you had a newborn child for the rest of your life. It reaches the point 
where you start taking more time to have a shower, simply to have some time 
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alone. You want to go to the shops, just to get out of the house. Caregivers 
also need to be cared for.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
Interdependence, here, means being dependent on another person at some point in 
one’s life. It is a condition that affects not only people with disabilities, but also 
their caregivers. This is an often-neglected aspect of the Zika epidemic: What 
about the psychosocial wellbeing of the caregivers? Who will care for the caregiv-
ers? Women (especially mothers) have, historically, assumed the role of caregiv-
ers and been required to meet the needs of others. This gendered conditioning 
has been accepted by public policy to the extent to which public authorities only 
deem themselves responsible when a female figure is absent (Guimarães, 2008). 
There is a need to show that interdependence is a condition intrinsic to human 























Figure 4.3  The demands of Zika-affected mothers, as discussed by mother associations, to 
address the burden of Zika in Pernambuco State, Brazil.
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need to be free to live their own lives. Recognition of this does not undermine 
the bond between mother and child. Quite the reverse! Figure 4.3 sums up the 
demands identified by the mothers associations in Pernambuco to address the bur-
den of Zika.
The view of the Brazilian feminist movement
Grounded in the disability movement, the work of mother organizations to sup-
port children affected by CZS, physically, psychologically and legally, has been 
an important social response to the emerging tragedy of this new epidemic, and 
the social suffering brought by its devastation. However, it is not the only social 
movement that has formed around Zika. The feminist movement, which has his-
torically been organized around a women and minority rights agenda, has also 
found a vehicle for ideological expression and practical socio-political action that 
continues to shape Brazilian perceptions of Zika, including how the virus has 
affected the lives of women.
In our workshop, we not only heard from mother associations; we also invited 
six NGOs aligned to the feminist movement, who were, at that time, working on 
different projects related specifically to the Zika epidemic and with arboviruses 
more generally. These organizations were invited because they have previously 
worked with some of the researchers in what became known as the “Zika Situation 
Room.”11 The Situation, Action and Articulation Room on Women’s Rights was 
established in March 2016 by the UN system (UN Women and UNFPA) and civil 
society, in response to the Zika health crisis. It started with 25 entities, and (until 
the end of 2017) there were 40 institutions involved. Motivated by the epidemic, 
this collaboration allowed stakeholders to advocate for the improvement of basic 
sanitation with local authorities and to dialogue on sexual and reproductive rights. 
Programs emerged for these discussions, for the improvement of reproductive 
health services and greater access to information and contraceptives/reproductive 
planning and protection against the risk of sexual transmission of the Zika virus. 
This experience made it clear that the debate needed to be extended beyond aca-
demic circles to actors from organized civil society who were already in contact 
with vulnerable populations.
In the context of the Zika emergency, the representatives of the feminist move-
ment pointed to the need to publicly reinforce debates on reproductive rights, 
specifically those related to the (non-)autonomy of women in family planning and 
the importance of issues of class, gender, race and age. According to them, those 
aspects are fundamental to elaborate a broader understanding about the conse-
quences of the epidemic, as gender inequality is so much a part of the Brazilian 
reality. To highlight this perspective, we brought six Pernambuco feminist move-
ment organizations to our workshop: SOS Corpo, Grupo Curumim, Gestos, Uiala 
Mukaj, Coletivo Mangueiras and Mirim Brasil. These organizations develop 
a variety of interventions at the community level and with public policies and 
advocacy. Some focus on Afro-Brazilian women, adolescents and/or young 
women. They work in reproductive health, sexuality, HIV/AIDS and/or gender 
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inequality. Some focus on strengthening local women’s social and economic sup-
port networks.
These organizations have been working for some time in the state (the oldest, 
for more than 30 years) and they had been meeting since March 2016 (face-to-
face and online) to discuss the national response to the Zika virus epidemic. Since 
the formalization of the “Zika Situation Room,” six meetings took place in dif-
ferent Brazilian states (until the end of 2017), including the last one, in Salvador, 
Bahia, in collaboration with Fiocruz.
The work of these organizations on the Zika epidemic continues a tradition 
of political action to defend rights and a general concern with health and sexual 
and reproductive rights in Brazil. A good example is the Program for Integrated 
Women’s Health Care (PAISM in Portuguese) launched in 1983 as a result of 
dialogue with social movements, not only, linked to feminist perspectives. 
Assuming an integrated perspective on women’s health, rather than isolated ini-
tiatives focused only on maternal-child issues, this program is still a challenge to 
the public authorities that failed to effectively (or holistically) implement it (Osis, 
1998). In 2004, the program became national policy. In spite of this progressive 
move, many advances in the area of women’s health – like control of fertility and 
increase in prenatal coverage – has remained difficult to address and programs 
have remained fragmented. In this sense, PAISM has had mixed results so far. 
Part of the reason for this has to do with the lack of educational efforts directed 
to health workers as well as the continued dominance of maternal-child health 
programming in the broader health and political agenda (Rattner, 2014).
Our workshop occurred shortly after the then director of the Brazilian Ministry 
of Health’s Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance had publicly sug-
gested that women should put off getting pregnant until the Zika epidemic was 
over, as a way of avoiding babies being born with microcephaly. This was also 
done in neighboring countries such as El Salvador and Jamaica during the peak 
of the epidemic in late 2015/early 2016. This pronouncement was widely criti-
cized by the women’s movement, which drew attention to a number of problems 
regarding the government’s approach and created new and interesting dynamics 
for sexual and reproductive rights in Brazil.
A number of important, and yet controversial, points were raised by these 
organizations, which can be divided into three broad categories. First, they 
stressed that more focus should be placed on the empowerment of women in order 
to improve sexual and reproductive rights (SRRs). This includes women being 
able to negotiate conjugal sexual relations; address the lack or scarcity of contra-
ceptive devices; strengthen access to family planning; and broaden the right to 
abortion. The second focus of these organizations involved an ideological com-
mitment to social and environmental justice for the poor, often Afro-Brazilians, 
to access better sanitation, regular water supply, the right to dignified housing 
and access to the benefits and other welfare services allocated, at least in writ-
ing, by the state. Lastly, the feminist movement focused on improving health 
services. This included things like access to diagnosis (sometimes people access 
medical tests but do not have access to the results), compatibility of services with 
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the needs of the population, health education and communication – including for 
mental health – in the age of Zika.
In our workshop, these feminist organizations continually noted the shortcom-
ings of actions and campaigns developed by the public authorities, specifically to 
improve environmental sanitation. These interventions had become the main dis-
course of the state, framing the problem of Zika and its solution. In this narrative, 
what was needed was more of the same – to repeat interventions, attempted dec-
ades earlier, centered on eradicating the mosquito vector, principally through the 
efforts of private individuals (households) to exterminate stagnant water sources. 
Such elements, framed with symbolism that highlighted the need for greater indi-
vidual responsibility and “behavior change,” can be seen in much of the anti–
Aedes aegypti campaign literature distributed in Brazil at the time. 
As discussed by critical scholars, such as Marcos Cueto (2007) in his historical 
analysis of malaria eradication in Mexico, such campaigns, focused on eradication 
of the mosquito, tend to overlook the structural problems that persist in Brazilian 
society. The work of social movements, that draw on feminist perspectives, seek 
to underline the inequalities perpetuated by such strategies and how they can have 
a disproportionate impact on the lives of women. For example, some of the femi-
nist NGOs present at the workshop believed that the feminization of responsibil-
ity for combating arboviruses was tied to campaigns focused on private domestic 
spaces as the principal locale for control of Aedes. However, unequal gender dis-
tribution of domestic work is a reality. For the political scientist and women’s 
studies professor Joan Tronto (1997), it is especially important to bear this in 
mind when framing public policy and health promotion strategies because, as she 
put it, “caring is an activity governed by gender, both in the employment market 
and in private life. Women’s occupations generally involve caring and women are 
responsible to a disproportionate degree for household care” (Tronto, 1997:189). 
This is even more striking in Brazil in the case of childcare, as the lack of public 
crèches means that caring for children often entails giving up productive work or 
resorting to care networks that involve, unsurprisingly, other women.
Care and the feminization of poverty
For a long time, and still today, care has been seen as an activity of lesser social 
importance and is typically considered to be the responsibility of women. This is 
why Joan Tronto (1997) argues that there is a need to view care from a feminist 
angle, as a way of revealing the social (and moral) inequalities between genders in 
this field of social life. This raises the question of the extent to which government 
action and health campaigns that focus on the mosquito and domestic hygiene are 
putting an extra burden on women, who are already overloaded with activities that 
are considered typically female.
Campaigns that focus on care of the home as the main strategy for vector 
control presuppose that there is someone available (and interested) to perform 
these activities. This was one of the main lines of argument of the feminist NGO 
participants:
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There is no public policy for confronting the epidemic. What we have is a 
transfer of responsibility from the state to the individual and this individual 
is a woman.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
Brazil’s legacy of patriarchy and powerful culture of structural chauvinism 
(Saffioti, 2011; Aguiar, 2000) consistently reproduces, in the media, stereotyp-
ical gender roles that reinforce the feminization of household duties. Despite 
calls to address this through, for example, changing how women are presented 
in the media and advertising (Gill, 2008), women continue to be perceived as 
social actors who need to devote their time to care for the family and wider soci-
ety, making it difficult for them to engage in paid work and, often, completely 
preventing them from working outside the home. This entails a problem in the 
development of democracy itself (Tronto, 2013), and leads us to reflect on the 
very notion of care: what it entails and the implications of the various ways of 
understanding it.
Care has traditionally been seen as a voluntary activity involving self-denial 
related to affection and love (Kleinman, 2015). There has tended to be an unfortu-
nate dichotomization, however, between care work and the ethics of care, one that 
clouds the social and political dimensions involved in this kind of social action. 
According to Molinier and Paperman (2015), viewing care exclusively in emo-
tional terms overlooks political issues present in the social world. This would 
appear to be the case in mosquito control campaigns. There is an appeal to the emo-
tions: “the mosquito isn’t stronger than a whole nation” and “this mosquito kills.” 
However, these are not emotions that spur or call for collective non-gendered 
action. On the contrary, when we realize that it is women who are responsible for 
care of the home, it is obvious at whom such campaigns are aimed. Feminists have 
historically called attention to this inequality, revealing what Tronto calls “the 
indifference of the privileged.” In other words, by failing to critique the notion of 
care, such media strategies and public campaigns serve only to reinforce the gen-
der inequalities that structure Brazilian society. The act of caring (for other people 
or the environment) has an impact on the caregiver, in so far as it is presumed that 
she has the time to engage in this activity and is emotionally predisposed to do 
so. To continue to ignore the disproportion between the involvement of men and 
of women in such activities is, from a feminist point of view, to reinforce gender 
inequalities and reassert the classical, albeit problematic, division between the 
male public world and the female domestic sphere. This is why Tronto argues that 
there is a need for a feminist perspective on care:
A feminist approach to care must start out by furthering understanding of 
what it means to care for others, both morally speaking, and in terms of the 
need to restructure broader social and political institutions, if caring for oth-
ers is to constitute a more central part of the everyday lives of all members 
of society.
(Tronto, 1997:200)
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Aware that the categories of caring about and caring for should not presuppose 
the classical gender distinction nor even consider subjects only as individuals, this 
broader conception of care enables us to raise questions regarding the role of the 
state as caregiver in providing the basic conditions for a dignified life. Molinier 
and Paperman (2015) argue that we need to understand care as a process, extrapo-
lating it interpersonally onto organizations and social institutions.
In government public health campaigns, the state does not appear as an entity 
responsible for caring for the environment, nor as a provider of essential services, 
such as basic sanitation (including collection and treatment of sewage and provi-
sion of a regular supply of water), dignified housing conditions and solid waste 
collection. This issue, addressed by the feminist movement in Brazil, and indeed 
globally, as a matter of environmental justice, was also raised during the workshop. 
One of the NGO participants called attention both to the inefficiency of urban sani-
tation and to inequalities in access to basic sanitation services by stating that:
the epidemic was treated as if it were merely a problem related to cleaning 
your back yard. In fact, there is a serious lack of sanitation in this State and 
in the country as a whole. This chiefly affects more impoverished localities.
(Fieldnotes, 2017)
The relationships between structural inequalities and Zika virus was also 
addressed by research groups studying environmental questions; these groups 
have, for a long time now, stressed the need to rethink vector control strategies.12 
Critical of government action, these groups reassert the need to concentrate efforts 
not only on environmental issues of an individual nature but more on structural 
challenges, such as reducing social inequality, providing dignified housing and 
democratizing access to basic sanitation – all of which are responsibilities of the 
public authorities.
These state inefficiencies are not, of course, distributed equally among socio-
economic strata and from one geographical region to another (UNDP, 2017). The 
disparities in Human Development Index (HDI) between regions of Brazil are one 
indication of how inequality is produced and perpetuated; the South and Southeast 
regions have higher HDIs compared to the Northeast.13 It is no coincidence, then, 
that the latter was the region most affected by the Zika epidemic and that the 
poorer parts of the Northeast States affected by the epidemic experienced the 
highest incidence. In the case of Pernambuco State, as elsewhere, Zika followed 
the fault lines created by social inequality. In what Castro (2016) has described as 
a state of structural inequality, the virus disproportionally affected economically 
underprivileged groups that live in areas where public services tend to be most 
lacking. A report by the Brazilian Department of Social Development, Children 
and Young People concluded in early 2016 that most families with children with 
CZS have a low household income and not all of these families have access to 
benefits, which is a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.14 Even more 
worrying is the fact that, of the families affected by Zika enrolled in social pro-
grams, 77% still live below the poverty line.15
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This structural inequality is related to another problematical facet of care as a 
predominantly female activity, which has become known as the “feminization of 
poverty” (Pearce, 1987). Pearce used this term to refer to the greater economic 
impact on women when they head households. In a world in which there is still a 
great disparity between men’s and women’s wages, even though this has declined 
slightly, the impact of Zika and CZS on the lives of women tends to impover-
ish them as workers, in so far as many of them give up work to care for their 
children.16 Poor African Brazilian women with fewer years of schooling are the 
hardest hit. Within this ideological framework, the feminist movement has been 
critical of neoliberal policies that have contributed to this impoverishment of 
women, by ensuring that they remain underemployed, earn less than men and are, 
in many cases, forced to endure a triple work load: paid employment, housework, 
and care. What will it take to address this inequality? Perhaps a state apparatus 
that, oddly enough, cares enough about social inequality and the feminization of 
poverty? The severe economic recession in Brazil and ongoing political gridlock 
does not provide substantial hope that such concerted state interventions (as acts 
of social caring) will soon occur.
Health and sexual and reproductive rights during the Zika epidemic
A related point raised by the feminist movement workshop participants concerned 
the quality of health services to which women have access to and the lack of 
training of professionals to deal with the “new” reality of a triple epidemic. Early 
diagnosis (of both Zika virus infection and pregnancy) is still not available for 
most women who use the Brazilian public health system, known as the Universal 
Health System (SUS). Women who take the Zika test often do not receive the 
results. Despite the news headlines, the majority of health service staff are insuf-
ficiently informed regarding CZS and patients are unaware of the range of fetal 
malformations that may occur. According to feminist group representatives, these 
shortcomings may be so grave that they put women’s lives at risk. In such cases, 
the right to a legal abortion should be considered, although a veil of silence still 
hangs over this issue in the Brazilian health services.
The non-viability of a fetus was also an issue raised by feminist organiza-
tions that question the paucity of interaction between health professionals and 
women who go through pregnancy with insufficient access to basic information 
that is vital for their physical and psychological well-being. With the emotional 
and psychological stress of Zika, this raises the question of the mental health 
of pregnant women who do not receive a diagnosis of microcephaly or those 
who are diagnosed as such but are unable to do anything to change the course 
of their pregnancy; prenatal care services still consider Zika infection a low-risk 
pregnancy, making it impossible for women (especially poor women) to exer-
cise their autonomous reproductive rights. This concept is related to the right to 
decide freely on whether and when to have children, as well as to have access to 
the information and assistance for responsible decision making.17 As with many 
countries in the LAC region, family planning programs in Brazil are weak, with 
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various short-term contraceptive methods provided without any form of guidance 
and longer-term methods still not widely available.
For decades, women’s movements across the Americas, with a strong pres-
ence in Brazil going back to the 1980s, have pointed out the lack of access 
to contraceptive methods, poor sex education, little information on women’s 
rights and moral issues related to the patriarchal mentality that obstructs 
(and often denies) a woman’s right to engage in sexual relations and plan 
her reproductive life as she sees fit. This can be seen in the results of demo-
graphic health surveys (DHS/PNDS), from 1996, and other studies made in 
subsequence decades, showing unmet demands for contraception (Coutinho 
et al, 2015; Lacerda et al, 2005; Hakkert, 2001). Women living in poverty 
are especially vulnerable to this; during the Zika epidemic in Recife and Belo 
Horizonte, for example, women of higher socioeconomic status reported hav-
ing greater control over their reproductive wishes, including access to contra-
ception (Marteleto et al, 2017). A national-level survey called “Born in Brazil” 
(Nascer no Brasil) has shown that around half of Brazilian mothers report 
that their pregnancy was unwanted; 25% would have preferred to wait longer 
and 30% said that they had not wanted to get pregnant at all (Leal et al, 2014; 
Brandão & Cabral, 2017).
While the Zika epidemic may have raised concerns about reproductive health 
issues, the government’s response, centered on household-level mosquito control 
and the at times bizarre statements on the need to “delay pregnancy,” show sig-
nificant gaps in health policy (Bond, 2017). Even at the international level, in the 
official statements of the WHO and CDC, we find a marginalization and neglect 
of social facts. The first concerns the failure to see a closer link between gender 
and poverty in Brazil; the result of this is that policies and actions have failed to 
put the most vulnerable – women living in socioeconomically vulnerable circum-
stances – at the heart of the response in any meaningful way. A second crucial 
issue is the failure to address issues of gender violence. More specifically, delay-
ing pregnancy is often not an option for women living in abusive relationships 
or contexts in which patriarchal values impede their freedom regarding contra-
ception and free negotiation of sexual relations. Lastly, official agencies and the 
discourse of Zika control has tended to avoid the issue of contraception, both in 
terms of information and access.
The failure to raise the issue of gender in the initial stages of the epidemic and 
the disproportionate impact on the lives of women, principally when other factors, 
such as class and race were taken into consideration, is in some ways confusing. 
It was one of the motivations for us in bringing together representatives of the 
women’s movement and academics to debate gender issues and Zika.18 Sexual 
and reproductive rights have been on the agenda of the feminist movement for 
some time and have underlined the need for improved and more extensive all-
round health care for women, involving primarily state intervention. Issues such 
as autonomy in decision making, reproductive self-determination, legalization 
of abortion and improved health services have guided the struggle for women’s 
health care (Corrêa & Ávila, 2003). In the context of Zika, Brazilian feminists 
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have highlighted how the virus recasts, and demands the rethinking of, social 
discourses on the issue of safe and autonomous motherhood, the unmet demand 
for contraception, especially long-term contraception, and the extension of the 
right to abortion.
Brazilian legislation is still highly restrictive in relation to legal options involv-
ing abortion: it is permitted in cases of rape, risk to the life of the mother and, 
recently (in 2012) cases of anencephaly.19 In the aftermath of Zika, feminists 
sought ways of expanding the legality of abortion, and developing new arguments 
that address the new ways of experiencing pregnancy, marked by this new form 
of “Zika anxiety” and mental distress related to the fear of a positive diagnosis of 
CZS and concerns as to the viability of the fetus. These sentiments have coalesced 
around a movement for reproductive justice – one part of the broader involvement 
of the feminist movement in Pernambuco State, as summed up in Figure 4.4.
Discussion and conclusions
The workshop we organized, as engaged scholars and activists with decades of 
experience working in and around Pernambuco State, helped us build relation-
ships. From this experience we are now working with the Zika and Social Science 
network, chaired by the president of Fiocruz, Nísia Trindade, and composed of 
national and international institutions, with several sources of financing. This 
network highlights the need to include social science perspectives for a broader 
understanding of the epidemic. In a democratic and participatory manner, we have 
built-up a strategic agenda of demands regarding not only the Zika virus epidemic 
and CZS but also the specific needs of women as a whole and children affected 
by CZS. The debates during our workshop in early 2017 drew attention to the 
advances made and challenges faced in drawing up strategies to improve informa-
tion on scientific progress in the field, health services and rights in the age of Zika.
The national response has focused on clinical medicine and epidemiology and 
has made significant contributions to understanding the epidemic and the nature 
of the virus. However, strategies involving control of the mosquito touted in pub-
lic campaigns presume that women are able, and willing, to use their time, already 
over-extended in socially determined care duties, to prevent pregnant female mos-
quitoes from making more mosquito babies. As we have shown here, those most 
affected by the new virus (CZS mother associations) and those with long-standing 
knowledge of the roots of gender inequality in Brazil that has driven the epidemic 
(feminist organizations) have criticized the lack of a government that cares.
The mothers of affected children, for example, complained of a lack of struc-
tural support to facilitate access to health services for their children’s care and a 
paucity of reliable and intelligible information. The need to break the isolation of 
having a different experience of motherhood led some women to become advo-
cates for their own and their children’s rights, revealing the inadequacy of the 
public authorities in responding in a satisfactory manner to demands of this new 
reality, which are, in fact, issues that have long been debated in feminist circles, 
such as support and autonomy in motherhood.
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As the Zika virus epidemic and the outbreak of microcephaly shadow inequal-
ity, care strategies that do not re-victimize or even blame the affected individu-
als are needed. In other words, we need to look again at theories of care, and 
their moral consequences, that lead care to be valued only because it is provided 
by women, thereby increasing the physical, mental and emotional burden placed 
upon women in their everyday lives. We have thus, throughout this chapter, 
espoused a feminist approach to care, as a way of drawing attention to the asym-
metries and value judgments surrounding such activities, which should not be 
restricted to private life but instead involve revitalizing and challenging Brazilian 
social and political institutions to care for others, as part of their broader moral 
duty. It can thus be argued that the state should be responsible for caring for its 
citizens and, in the case of the Zika epidemic, the feminist and the mother of an 
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Figure 4.4  The demands and engagement of Brazilian feminist organizations in the Zika 
epidemic and its aftermath in Pernambuco State, Brazil.
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As issues of race, class and gender make it even more difficult for individuals to 
act autonomously, there is a need to reflect on developing communication strategies 
regarding Zika that stress the need to defend human rights, without falling back into 
the classic emphasis on the private individual, which reinforce stigmas surrounding 
poverty, color and lack of schooling. Amidst the avalanche of scientific publications 
on Zika, therefore, we need to re-socialize the epidemic in order to produce more 
meaningful narratives that represent the actual experience of Brazilian women – 
narratives that are grounded in the long-standing, and often uncomfortable, histori-
cal and social facts of gender inequality in places like Pernambuco.
Notes
1 This workshop was organized as part of a multicenter mixed methods research project, 
funded by Welcome Trust, on the social and economic impacts of Zika in Brazil. The 
project was a partnership between researchers in Recife (Aggeu Magalhães Institute – 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation and the Federal University of Pernambuco), Rio de Janeiro 
(Fernandes Figueira Institute – Oswaldo Cruz Institute) and London (London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine).
2 We are grateful to the CZS mother associations, the local and national feminist move-
ments and the researchers from local and national universities and research centers who 
kindly attended this seminar.
3 The first bulletin alerting health professionals was circulated in October 2015 and 29 
cases were registered in that month, compared to a mean incidence of 10 cases in previ-
ous years. Three days after reporting began, 90 new cases were registered in the state. 
See http://portalarquivos.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2015/novembro/19/Microcefalia-
bol-final.pdf
4 PERNAMBUCO. Secretaria Estadual de Saúde. Nota de Esclarecimento Microcefalia 




6 According to Technical Inform from Pernambuco Health Surveillance Secretariat n. 
3/2018, in the year of 2018 there were three cases of CZS. See https://docs.wixstatic.
com/ugd/3293a8_4a678a55869042a5b6942409679841af.pdf
7 “Zika children” is an expression commonly used both by the mothers of children 
affected and by reports in the media.
8 Other studies, such as Barros et al. (2017) and Scott et al. (2017) have suggested the same.
9 A social theory characterized by an emphasis on interaction between subjects as an 
effort to understand the construction of the symbolic world of society and social 
arrangements.
10 The feeling of abandonment by the government was also highlighted by several human 
rights dossiers.
11 Two of us (CP & SV) were invited to join the situation room set up by the United 
Nations. From the outset, this initiative aimed to concentrate on social aspects, calling 
attention to issues of gender and race related to the epidemic. Sexual and reproductive 
rights issues thus guided actions that focused on the degree of information and politi-
cal engagement regarding the epidemic, as a way of strengthening political impact on 
vulnerable communities.
12 One example of such a study is a special issue of one of the international WATERLAT-
GOBACIT network’s working papers devoted to microcephaly and structural inequali-
ties. See http://waterlat.org/WPapers/WPSATGSA39.pdf
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13 http://www.atlasbrasil.org.br/2013/pt/consulta/
14 Benefit of continuous rendering (BPC in Portuguese), created in 1993 by the Law 
8,742/1993, guarantees a minimum wage, is guaranteed to the elderly over 65 years 
or for people with disabilities that make it impossible to fully participate in society. 
To obtain this benefit, it is necessary to prove that the income per person of the family 
group is less than one-quarter of the current minimum wage. Brazilian minimum wage, 
in 2018, is R$954 per month, approximately U$290 (at the time of writing). For more 
information: http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/assistencia-social/beneficios-assistenciais/bpc
15 Based on the World Bank’s new poverty metric, which delimits US$5.5 per day per 
capita. An example of social assistance programs is “Bolsa Família,” which is a pro-
gram of income transfer aimed at the population living in poverty and extreme poverty 
to guarantee the right to food, health and education.
16 Early unplanned motherhood also contributes to the feminization of poverty, because 
of the lack of social structure and public policy to provide secure childcare and social 
support.
17 Since the Constitution of 1988, human rights constitute a guiding framework, obliging 
the state to comply with international treaties, including guaranteeing the means for 
free decision making in family planning. However, the restrained rules on abortion and 
its criminalization in Brazil are barriers to this decision-making autonomy. For more 
information, see Ávila (2003) and Vianna (2004).
18 Broader debate regarding gender is relatively recent. Two recent examples of this are 
the publications by Diniz (2016a) and Marteleto et al. (2017).
19 Anencephaly is a malformation of the neural tube of the embryo, causing absence or 
defective formation of the cerebral hemispheres, considered a condition incompatible 
with life. It is worth pointing out that Brazil is currently going through a wave of con-
servatism in relation to the human rights agenda, especially the rights of women. A 
parliamentary commission recently approved broad-scale criminalization of abortion 
on the grounds that life begins at conception. The decision still needs to be approved 
by a plenary session of deputies. However, we now have one of the most conservative 
congresses in the history of the republic, and it has shown little flexibility regarding 
broader debate of issues related to sexual and reproductive rights.
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On Margarita Island, just north of South America, where luxurious five-star hotels 
coexist with the impoverished shantytowns that replaced fishermen’s villages, 
malaria had disappeared. When occasional cases appeared, Venezuelan doctors on 
the island asked patients where they had traveled, and always got the same answer: 
the goldmines of Bolivar State in the Amazon. These patients were former workers 
that the economic crisis had pushed to the forest, returning to Margarita Island to 
visit their family with some money in their pockets, or prostitutes that had returned 
from working in the bars of the mines. But at the beginning of 2017, laboratory 
tests showed that patients had been infected with malaria without leaving the island. 
These were a different type of patient: they were local housewives and children.
In the Americas, arboviral diseases (like Zika and Dengue) coexist with endemic 
malaria, which has been steadily declining over the last few decades. In a recent 
report on malaria, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported that 
in 2015 there were 451,242 cases of malaria, a significant 62% decrease since the 
year 2000 (PAHO, 2017). However, the situation in all countries in the region is 
not the same. There are some, such as Venezuela, where the increase in malaria has 
been remarkable (see Figure 5.1). For example, the 240,631 malaria cases reported 
in Venezuela in 2016 accounted for nearly half (48%) of the total number of cases 
in the Americas (Oletta et al., 2018). Fifteen years earlier, however, Venezuela 
had contributed only 2.5%, a 12-fold increase. In 2017, cases nearly doubled (to 
411,586) and estimates for 2018 are even worse (DGSA-MPPS, 2018).1
What has happened in Venezuela? There are eight countries in which malaria 
has increased since 2000: Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. But Venezuela leads the list, well 
above the others. With just 30 million people, Venezuela contributes more cases 
of malaria in the Americas than Brazil, a country with 207 million inhabitants 
(WHO, 2017).
What is striking about this change is that Venezuela had been one of the 
model countries for the control of malaria in Latin America. In the 1950s, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) declared Venezuela to be the first country 
where it had achieved localized eradication in a tropical country. An eight-year 
campaign with DDT had eradicated it from an area covering about half (49%) 
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of Venezuela’s total population, between the Coastal Mountain Range and the 
Llanos region (Gabaldon & Berti, 1954).
Explanations for malaria resurgence, therefore, on Margarita Island and else-
where in the Americas and the growing expansion of Aedes aegypti diseases, 
such as Dengue, Chikungunya and now Zika, are multiple (Benítez et al., 2004; 
Cáceres, 2011; Grillet et al. 2009; Torres et al. 2017; Hotez et al. 2017). We 
know that climate change, and El Niño and La Niña time cycles, as well as new 
vector dynamics and adapted parasite/viral strains have contributed to malaria 
resurgence and Aedes-borne epidemics, for example. But understanding vector-
borne disease resurgence and emergence also demands some significant historical 
and socio-political explanations. In Venezuela, then, tracing the factors involved 
in the reappearance of malaria in areas where it was considered eradicated 50 
years ago requires that we inspect the history of vector control programs in the 
country – their capacity, functioning, ideologies, effectiveness and motivations. 
Vector control is a public service, after all, and its inner workings are influenced 
by state ideologies and funding decisions. This is manifested in various ways. 
Political decision making can mean that funds are simply cut for vector control 
operations, and redistributed elsewhere, meaning there are less funds for insec-
ticides, medicines and manpower. It can equally be the case that, while these 
essential commodities and human resources are in place, operating funds are not 
available – vehicles, gasoline and travel expenses to allow officials, doctors, ento-
mologists and spray teams to travel from the office to the field. Funds can also 
Figure 5.1  The rapid increase in malaria cases since 2010 in Venezuela. Note that the true 
number of cases may be much larger, due to issues of under-diagnosing and 
reporting. Source: WHO (2017).
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be used wastefully, with ballooned staff numbers kept on the payroll for political 
profit. While all of these constraints have faced those involved in vector control 
throughout Latin America, the situation in Venezuela is striking, and insightful, 
because the slow decay of vector control efforts has, in some important ways, 
paralleled the country’s rise (and now decline) in wealth, as a result of rapid oil 
price increases in the 1970–1980s and the early 21st century.
When we speak about “politics” we are really speaking about institutions, rules, 
roles and routines (March & Olsen, 2006; North, 1991; Peters, 2012) The ups and 
downs of vector control in Venezuela show the relevance of health policy institu-
tions and their politics. In the 1940s, for example, health policy was orientated 
on building institutional capacities for malaria control, motivated by particular 
ideologies around health and state building that allowed technical experts to form 
strong relationships with political groups and generate financial resources. On the 
other hand, a health policy influenced by Bolivarian political ideology since the 
1990s has generated an ethos of institutional destruction, so we argue in this chap-
ter, that has led to the reappearance of communicable diseases that Venezuelans 
believed had disappeared. It is often said that politics is the most severe human 
disease. As this chapter will show, politics can contribute to health but it can also 
be an illness. As with all political approaches, understanding current events neces-
sitates that we first look backwards, to some historical reflections.2
Malaria and World War II
In the Pacific battlefronts of World War II, it was known that malaria could 
end as many lives and disable as many fighters as enemy attacks. That is why 
warfare in the tropics had a major environmental sanitation component, having 
learnt from the building of the Panama Canal in the 1880s, when the French 
company Nouvelle de Panama abandoned their commercial effort due to engi-
neering problems and excessively high mortality among workers and engineers. 
Ferocious attacks from the anopheles and Aedes mosquitoes played a central 
role. The new American company that took over from the French in 1904 
invested in sanitation, roads, the screening of houses and drainage before start-
ing more substantial engineering work. But in the 1940s, when such preparation 
was not possible and one had to act quickly in the context of war, the US Army 
instead turned to a very effective new chemical insecticidal spray to protect its 
troops. Due to its value in addressing malaria, the United States also kept it a 
military secret.
At the time, the American army requested the support of medical personnel with 
direct experience in the control of mosquitoes in the tropics, and in the treatment 
of malaria patients. Dr. Arnoldo Gabaldón, a Venezuelan doctor, was regularly 
invited to courses taught to Army doctors who would, after some preparation, serve 
in the Pacific against the Japanese empire. Gabaldón had spent several decades 
studying malaria and directed the malaria control program in Venezuela, where he 
had faced several epidemics. In one of these courses, a senior military officer, who 
had been Dr. Gabaldón’s student at Johns Hopkins University, confided in him 
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the secret of a wonderful new product called Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, or 
DDT. The army wanted to use Gabaldon´s experience in the tropics to help design 
the best and most efficient insecticide application technique (Figure 5.2).
The product remained in the mind of the Venezuelan doctor. That is why, at the 
end of the war, he did not hesitate in asking the US Army to allow him to initiate 
an intense campaign to control and eradicate malaria in large endemic areas of 
his home country using DDT. Thus, the first-time application of DDT for purely 
civilian purposes could take place (López Ramirez, 1987). Venezuela had been an 
important, secure and politically friendly supplier of oil to the allies during World 
War II. The country also had sufficient income from oil sales that it could buy the 
new “wonder” insecticide, acquire the equipment and pay the salaries of the per-
sonnel needed for what became some of the first large-scale operations. Gabaldón 
formed a strong civilian army of doctors, entomologists, sanitary inspectors and 
insecticide sprayers who, in the following years, dedicated themselves to touring 
the country by car, horse and boat.
In October 1945, when everything was ready for the first application and the 
first shipment of the insecticide had arrived at the port, a coup d’état occurred. The 
president, who had lent his full support to the project, had been deposed, and a 
board of civilians and military officers replaced it. The worst was feared: that the 
anti-malaria campaign would be stopped because it lacked the necessary political 
support. However, the new acting president understood the relevance of stopping 
malaria for the country’s health and economy and gave Dr. Gabaldón his full sup-
port. The president knew, moreover, that he could reap all the political fruits of 
such an action.
Figure 5.2  Arnoldo Gabaldón, at the center, explains the vector control plan to the Military 
Governing Board. Circa 1949.
108 Briceño-León, Guevara and Terán 
A few months later, in December 1945, the vector control campaign began 
in Morón, Carabobo State, and covered large endemic areas along the coast, 
mountain ranges, the plains and on the border with Guayana, where the three 
most aggressive species of anopheles are found (A. darlingi, A. albimanus and 
A. acquasalis) and where the two main species of parasites that cause malaria 
circulated: P. falciparum, which can lead to death, and P. vivax, which causes 
significant suffering and morbidity. By 1949, the strategy to eradicate the disease 
in large areas of the country was already recognized as successful. The mortality 
rate by diagnosed malaria fell from 143 per 100,000 in 1942 to 8 per 100,000 in 
1950 (Gabaldon, 1953); the technical key to this success was, in large part, the 
spraying of house walls with DDT (Gabaldon, 1949)
Vector control under military dictatorship
Systematic malaria vector control programs had already begun in Venezuela in the 
late 1930s after the fall of Dictator JV Gomez. Between 1931 and 1935, the death 
rate for diagnosed malaria cases was 164 per 100,000. With the beginning of the 
construction of the modern State of Venezuela, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Assistance and the Department of Malariology were founded (Yépez Colmenares, 
1995). For some historians, this was the moment when the 20th century began in 
Venezuela. This process was the result of two factors: monetary resources derived 
from oil revenues that entered the central government and the existence of an elite 
who were dedicated to institutional construction and the creation of a bureaucracy 
of professionals and state workers (Briceño León, 2011).
The Department of Malariology began its activities with urban sanitation, with 
the construction of drainage for the reduction of the vectors and with the distribu-
tion of quinine to eliminate the parasite. The medicines were distributed through 
volunteers, who were not paid a salary, but were given national lottery tickets. 
This was a symbolic gesture, which cost little to the program, but could mean a 
lot of money if a volunteer was awarded the prize. As in many other countries 
(see Marco Cueto’s [2007] history of malaria in Mexico and Eric Carter’s [2012] 
work on Argentina), DDT had a major impact on the reduction of the anopheles 
population and resulted in a dramatic decline in malaria cases.
During the most intense phase of the antimalarial campaign with DDT, 
between 1945 and 1948, Venezuela underwent significant changes in the nature 
of the political process and citizen participation. Health and education services 
reached, often for the first time, the most dispossessed and traditionally aban-
doned population groups and communities. The government party had great 
popular support, which made it easier to continue the work of the Department 
of Malariology without major setbacks. In 1947, the first free elections were 
held, with numerous and many new political parties. They were the first direct 
and universal elections in Venezuela. In the election there were three candi-
dates nominated by different political parties of different ideological currents: 
Rómulo Gallegos, by Acción Democrática, a social-democratic party; Rafael 
Caldera, for COPEI, which was a Christian-democratic party; and Gustavo 
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Machado for the Communist Party of Venezuela. In the election, the well-
known novelist, R. Gallegos, who supported and praised the work of malariol-
ogy, was elected with 74% of the popular vote and took office on February 15, 
1948. His government was short-lived, however, as he was overthrown by a 
board of three members of the military in 1948. Despite this political crisis, the 
Department of Malariology continued, remarkably, in its work without major 
setbacks.
In November 1950, the new president of the Republic, C. Delgado Chalbaud, 
was kidnapped and murdered. Because the other two military members of the 
board, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Luis Felipe Llovera Paez, feared that their ambi-
tions would lead them being accused of the assassination, they decided to replace 
Delgado with a civilian puppet as head of the military government. Given the 
high visibility, popularity and significance of the malaria control program, they 
proposed that Dr. Gabaldón take charge of the presidency. Gabaldon had given 
the military two conditions to accept the appointment: the first was to be allowed 
to choose his government team and the second to investigate the strange murder 
of Delgado Chalbaud.3 When neither of these was accepted, Gabaldón declined 
because he was reluctant to become a puppet and understood the trappings of 
political opportunism. Nor did he accept the position of Minister of Health that 
was offered later. As a result, he knew that his democratic positions and profes-
sional vision of work was unpopular with the government and feared that his 
political positions would affect the malaria control program
Gabaldón, therefore, resigned as head of the vector control department in order 
to preserve it. The military elite knew that those in charge of malariology were 
democrats, opposed to the regime, but they tolerated them, because they enjoyed 
the prestige and wanted to maintain their achievements. As a result, the vector 
control program continued during the dictatorship and those responsible carried 
out a detailed monitoring program that would allow them to comply with the 
protocols required to certify the eradication of the disease. In 1954, an article 
published in the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene highlighted 
the achievements of malaria control in the country:
After eight years of an extensive campaign, malaria has been eradicated in 
a large area where about half (49%) of Venezuela’s population lives, being 
the largest area of a tropical zone where malaria has been eradicated. … This 
northern central zone, located between the Coastal Mountain Range and the 
Llanos region, the intensity of malaria was the highest in the tropical zone 
of America. … DDT was applied at the rate of 2 grams per square meter 
every six months … after exhaustive epidemiological investigations similar 
to those carried out in developed countries in the temperate zone, the fol-
lowing evidence was found. In an area of about 20,000 square kilometers no 
primary autochthonous cases have been found during the last three years. In 
another area of about 160,000 square kilometers, no cases of malaria have 
been observed during the last two years, with the exception of two cases near 
the edge of this area, which indicates that endemic malaria has completely 
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ceased. ... With this experience it is expected that the eradication of malaria 
in almost all of Venezuela will be achieved in the near future.
(Gabaldon & Berti, 1954: 795)
The continuity of the program remained despite political differences. From 1952, 
the Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship acquired its most definite characteristics: 
on the one hand, the persecution and repression against the opposition, imprison-
ment and assassination of political and social leaders, and on the other, the alli-
ance with other military dictatorships that governed countries in the region, such 
as Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican 
Republic, Anastasio and Luis Somoza in Nicaragua and Juan Alfredo Strossner 
in Paraguay. The police monitored those responsible for malaria closely, but did 
not interrupt their duties. Thus, it was possible to continue the entomological sur-
veillance and the control of anopheles vectors. Some studies, tests and control 
activities were started for Aedes aegypti, to address yellow fever, and of Rhodnius 
prolixus, for Chagas’ disease.4
During the 1950s, the dictatorship was able to enjoy the economic fruits of 
the expansion of the world economy, which Hobsbawn has called the “golden 
age” of capitalism (Hobsbawn, 2001). This was a period in which oil income 
increased, because the United States stopped being an oil exporter to become a net 
oil importer. Venezuela became the world’s leading oil exporter. That oil income 
allowed the construction of large public works and the expansion of health and 
education services. At the time, Venezuela, with its highways and tall buildings, 
was an emblematic country, a poster child for modernization. The per capita 
income was higher than in many European countries; it was a preferred destina-
tion for migrants from Europe and even America. However, corruption and politi-
cal repression led to the collapse of the regime, while changing economic fortunes 
brought an end to the optimism of 1950s growth.
Controlling vectors in the time of an emerging democracy
After the fall of the military dictatorship in 1958, the three main parties (Unión 
Republicana Democratica (URD), Acción Democratica (AD) and the Christian-
Social Party (COPEI) reached an agreement, calling for universal and free 
presidential and congressional elections. The candidate who was elected was 
R. Betancourt, who knew of and had supported the anti-malaria campaign that 
took place between 1945 and 1947. Due to his familiarity with the program, he 
appointed Dr. Gabaldón as his Minister of Health and, given the new democratic 
climate, Gabaldón readily accepted.
As can be imagined, the political situation was complex. The nascent demo-
cratic government faced two main enemies: the military and guerrillas. On the 
one hand were the military groups, who refused to let go of the power they had 
enjoyed for over a century, during which time almost all Venezuelan presidents 
had been from their ranks. On the other hand were the guerrillas that, inspired and 
supported by the Cuban revolution, had installed several guerrilla fronts in rural 
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areas of the country. These two groups represented the ideologies that threatened 
democracy in the context of the Cold War. Both groups, with their weapons, had 
large influences on Latin America for several decades. The military represented 
a nationalist orientation and a defender of private enterprise following US-style 
capitalism. The Marxist guerrillas, by contrast, were connected to the Communist 
Party of Venezuela (PCV), a party linked to the Communist International and 
the Soviet Union, and by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), a 
youth fraction that split from the Acción Democrática party. In 1967, this group 
organized what became an unsuccessful invasion from Cuba, with Venezuelan 
and Cuban guerrillas landing on the Venezuelan coast of Machurucuto.
In this context, the vector control program became once again a political tool 
to increase support for the new government and reduce the social support of the 
guerrillas. No other social program had more visibility and political importance 
(Briceño León, 1996). Due to the presence of its staff and the size of its build-
ings throughout the country, it surpassed the Ministry of Health in a practical and 
symbolic sense. In those years, some people joked that what existed in Venezuela 
was not a malaria department that was part of a health ministry, but a Ministry of 
Health within a Department of Malariology.
There were three components to the government’s anti-guerrilla policy, aimed 
at getting support from the peasants to defeat the guerrillas. The first was an 
Agrarian Reform Law, started in 1960 that facilitated the distribution of land par-
cels to the peasants, as well as an Agricultural Credit Program created in 1970 to 
increase their production. The second was a rural education plan, which involved 
both adult literacy and the installation of rural schools for children. And the third 
was a rural sanitation program involving the control of vectors, such as mosqui-
toes but also Rhodnius prolixus, with residual insecticides, the construction and 
improvement of rural housing and the installation of rural aqueducts.
It is important to emphasize that the rural housing program that began in 
Venezuela was implemented by the Department of Malariology of the Ministry of 
Health, not the government agency in charge of housing. That is, the housing pro-
gram had a very clear sanitary purpose of improving health conditions and promoting 
the control of vector-borne diseases, especially Chagas’ disease, which was endemic 
in much of the country. The traditional wattle and daub, palm-roofed houses were 
easily colonized by R. prolixus. In endemic areas, traditional peasant housing could 
contain up to five thousand blood-sucking insects that fed on the family living there 
(Rabinovich, 1985). The purpose of the plan was to replace wattle “ranchos” with 
a house with plastered walls and a sheet metal roof, where the vector of Chagas 
disease could not be so easily lodged and hidden (Briceño-León, 1990) (Figure 5.3).
These programs were successful at many levels. Despite the reduction in rev-
enue from oil exports that forced the devaluation of the national currency and 
lowered the salaries of public employees by 10% in 1960, such health and social 
programs were still maintained. The vector control program reduced the popula-
tion of Anopheles sp. and malaria cases, even in areas where the vector became 
resistant to the lethal action of the insecticide (Carquez, 2007). It also decreased 
the presence of R. prolixus in rural dwellings and new cases of Chagas’ disease; 
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and with the reduction of Aedes aegypti–breeding sites came a reduced risk of 
new cases of yellow fever.
In the middle of the political crisis that faced the democratic government, the 
health policy sector was not neglected. On the contrary, health was prioritized and 
integrated into the plans of general social welfare. During this period, the govern-
ment of Rómulo Betancourt (with Dr. Arnoldo Gabaldon in charge of the Ministry 
of Health) focused heavily on preventive medicine and environmental and basic 
sanitation, seeking to increase life expectancy at birth, which increased from 59.2 
years in 1960 to 62 years in 1965. A balance was established between preven-
tive and curative medicine for the allocation of budgetary resources, responding 
to epidemiological criteria. Mortality from infectious diseases decreased signifi-
cantly for children, especially in regards to gastroenteritis. The general mortality 
rate reduced significantly as well during this period.5
As a result of these social policies, the guerrillas did not find support in many 
rural areas among the peasants, or in urban society. In the elections of 1963, 
although the guerrillas called for abstention, the civilian country voted in the 
midst of the armed conflict and elected Raúl Leoni, of Acción Democrática. The 
guerrillas were then defeated, and their leaders, to varying degree, joined the for-
mal political and electoral process.
The emergence of rent-seeking behavior
The consolidation of democracy came slowly, as did the recovery of the economy. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a program of industrialization based on import substitu-
tion, a strategy that Argentina, Brazil and Chile had already done decades before, 
Figure 5.3  Housing structures and Chagas disease.
 Politics as disease in Venezuela 113
was launched. However, the central mechanism of operation was completely dif-
ferent. For the Southern Cone countries, industrialization during World War II 
was a way of saving scarce foreign currencies, while for Venezuela it was some-
thing radically different: it was to find a way of spending the abundant foreign 
exchange that the oil revenue generated. This difference marked the type of indus-
trialization that occurred in Venezuela, but also the rest of social life, including 
social policies and health policies, such as vector control.
Three circumstances marked the fate of vector control during the boom years: 
the loss of importance of vector-borne diseases due to the success of control oper-
ations; the existence of lots of money for programs; and the substitution of health 
goals for political goals. That is to say, it was not a question of using health targets 
to underpin political goals, as had been done before, but to misrepresent health 
goals to achieve political party goals.
It was believed that the great nightmare of malaria had passed. It was a battle 
that had been won by destroying the vector and the parasite. The slogan that had 
been developed, following the Latin expression, was to end the disease: Malaria 
delenda est. As that goal had been achieved, the Ministry of Health, with the 
legitimate pride and satisfaction of the work carried out, concluded: et delete fuit 
malaria. The same had happened with yellow fever and the breeding grounds of 
Aedes aegypti. In Venezuela, and the region, the idea spread that the goal of eradi-
cation had been achieved. But this triumphalist attitude, even if it had a reason-
able basis, weakened the ideological support for the program. Politicians began 
to wonder: why maintain a program that serves to control a threat that no longer 
exists?
The second issue was the increase in oil revenue. The 1973 oil embargo by the 
Arab countries, begun as a response to American support for Israel in the Yom 
Kippur War, boosted oil prices in a hitherto unknown manner. The price of a 
barrel of oil doubled and then tripled in a few months, and with it the tax income 
that the government of Venezuela received was transformed. In 1974, the national 
budget tripled in relation to the previous year. That is, the new government of 
President Carlos Andrés Perez had three times more resources to spend than the 
previous one. And the money came without planning or notice. The new govern-
ment party, Acción Democrática, managed to obtain a majority in the congress 
and this one granted extraordinary powers to the president to make the changes 
that were necessary, in the financial and economic policy of the country, to be able 
to spend the abundant wealth that arrived so quickly.
This could be interpreted as an unexpected blessing, and indeed it had been, 
but it was also a source of conflicts and perversions. A sudden infusion of oil cash 
changed the habits and attitudes of government authorities and institutions, and 
replaced politics as usual with a social behavior that has been called “competition 
for oil income” (Baptista, 1997; Briceño-León, 2015). Health policy and vec-
tor control ceased to be guided by epidemiological or entomological goals and 
became oriented towards the appropriation of the new oil wealth.
In the Department of Malariology, a mantra was repeated that malaria could 
end, but not malariologists. The affirmation referred to the continuing relevance 
of those personnel specialized in environmental health and in the control of other 
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diseases transmitted by vectors in the tropics. And it was true. However the com-
bination of these two factors, a triumphalist attitude and the big money in the pub-
lic coffers, perpetuated a set of perverse practices that ended up distorting social 
attitudes and practices. Let’s look at some examples.
The vector control program for Chagas’ disease in Venezuela began in the 
1960s with entomological inspection and intra-domiciliary spraying of a residual 
insecticide. The main vector causing the disease was R. prolixus, which is a wild 
triatomine that lives in palm trees and tropical forests, no higher than 1,500 meters 
above sea level. The insect hides during the day on the walls and palm roofs of 
peasant homes and goes out at night to feed on the family while people sleep. The 
program developed an ingenious system, which consisted in placing an envelope 
behind the front door of the house. In the envelope was placed a registration card, 
with the date and results of the visit. The inspectors left a small glass jar with a 
lid and instructed families to capture any of the insect Chagas vectors that they 
encountered. After some time, between three to six months, the entomological 
inspectors returned, checked the envelope, and if there were insects in the bot-
tle, wrote it on the card and took the insects to the laboratory to confirm if they 
had the parasites. This strategy worked quite well, because it allowed health offi-
cials to identify the foci of reinfection and to apply the insecticide in the places 
where it was necessary. However, once the oil money came pouring in and the 
government’s budget tripled, bosses had to find ways to distribute the expanded 
budget. Entomological inspections began in places where the disease had not been 
detected, including in areas where the presence of the vector was not possible due 
to weather and elevation. For example, in our own investigations in the Andean 
mountains, we found peasant houses that had envelopes with visiting cards and 
bottles located at more than double (3,000 meters) the elevation above sea level 
where the vector is known to survive (Briceno-Leon & Mendez, 2007).
The rural housing program of Venezuela, initiated in 1958 as part of the gov-
ernment’s overall vector control approach, built more than half a million houses 
in its 40 years of existence. The program included the construction of housing, 
the installation of septic tanks and latrines and the provision of drinking water 
with rural aqueducts. The aspirations of the program went beyond the control of 
communicable diseases, as it represented an improvement of the conditions of 
rural life in general. But its purpose, at least originally, was clearly sanitary and 
rural. In times of financial abundance and the reduction of the threat of disease, 
however, housing began to be built in non-endemic areas and in non-rural areas. 
In some cases, the distortion was so great that housing was built for suburban 
middle-class families or in tourist areas, where they quickly changed ownership. 
The reason for this was political. Government officials needed to obtain political 
support, paying for loyalties, or making electoral propaganda without any relation 
to vector control or environmental health. For the population, this represented 
a way of obtaining a part of the distribution of the oil income, as housing was 
almost given away.
Employees of the public sector also had ways of competing for oil revenue. 
The union of the Ministry of Health employees had a contract stating that people 
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should be paid travel expenses when they were ordered to work outside their nor-
mal place of work. It is a reasonable measure and applies almost everywhere; if 
someone is employed in a city and sent to work temporarily in another city, they 
must be paid those extra expenses through per diems. However, at one point the 
union decided to request a change in the rules and demand that travel expenses be 
paid when leaving the “office” instead of the “usual place of work.” The conse-
quence of this change was that entomological inspectors or insecticide sprayers, 
whose usual place of work was in endemic areas, could now be paid per diems 
when leaving the office. Therefore, if they had to cross the street in front of the 
office to check out Aedes breeding sites, they charged per diems. This change 
was approved, as it was a matter of guaranteeing political loyalties, and there 
was ample money to pay for it. Problems only began when there was not enough 
money for travel expenses.
Under these conditions, malaria outbreaks began to occur in different parts 
of the country, and in 1989 a Dengue epidemic hit. Authorities were baffled and 
ministers were trying to hide the situation. What had happened in Venezuela? 
The experts of international organizations were beginning to ask questions. Dr. 
Gabaldón, who by that time was working in his malaria laboratory at the Central 
University of Venezuela, had an ironic answer that we heard, personally, from 
him in his lectures: the increase of malaria was the fault of the air conditioners. 
And why air conditioners? The explanation was not entomological, nor related to 
mosquitoes, but to the work culture that had caused the oil wealth. The answer 
was simple: since the government had put air conditioners in the headquarters, the 
staff stayed in their offices and did not go out to study or fight mosquitoes in the 
heat and humidity of the tropics (Briceño León, 2011). Competition for rent had 
won the battle for vector control.
The Bolivarian revolution and the destruction of institutions 
At the end of the 20th century, there was a strong demand for political change in 
the Venezuela. The economic boom that had begun in 1973 was reaching its end. 
While oil crises had generated abundant government revenue during this time, 
they proved to be short-lived and generated many expenses, waste and corruption.
For example, at the end of the seventies, a second oil crisis precipitated by 
political events in the Middle East again boosted prices and the rent economy. 
The “Islamic revolution” in Iran (1979) removed Mohammad Reza Pahlevi from 
power, the Shah of Iran, and turned the country into a theocracy under the direction 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. When the war began a year later, between Iran and Iraq, 
both exporting countries, the price per oil increased and the abundance of resources 
returned to Venezuela. However it was short-lived. The world economy had taken 
energy saving and production measures to protect itself from oil dependence. From 
this, a decline in oil prices began that led to a deterioration of Venezuela’s econ-
omy and a sustained fall in real income. This has continued into the present.
The average Venezuelan could not easily understand the changes in the world 
economy that caused the reduction of oil prices and Venezuela’s income. And just 
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as politicians never explained to the population that the oil wealth, that in many 
ways facilitated populism, came from circumstances outside the country and not 
from their policy work, so too they could not explain that scarcity was the fault 
of others and not of themselves. Therefore, the national feeling was that if there 
was no money to distribute, it was because the politicians had stolen it. This was 
not entirely false, but neither was it the real cause of the drastic reductions in the 
national government’s budget.
The system of two main political parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, 
with which democracy in Venezuela had functioned, no longer represented the 
views of the population. Anti-political sentiment was widespread. For the 1998 
presidential elections, the two parties that had ruled the country for 50 years lost 
popularity, and disenchanted voters declined to participate in elections. Voters 
wanted someone other than a traditional politician to govern. Sympathy grew for 
the mayor of Chacao, one of the municipalities in the Caracas capital city, Irene 
Saez, who had won the international beauty pageant Miss Universe. A well-known 
figure, albeit one discussed more in sports and celebrity circles, she appeared 
likely to become the future president. However, two facts changed that destiny. 
First was the loss of sympathy of the county’s mayors because she accepted the 
support of one of the traditional political parties (COPEI), and the second was the 
appearance on the political scene of an ex-military man called Hugo Chávez, who 
had been imprisoned after a failed coup attempt in 1992. This altered the electoral 
landscape. Putting aside weapons to wield votes, Chavez became President of the 
Republic.
From 1999, then, the political situation changed radically. However, the oil and 
statist model remained in place, becoming also the model of the new regime. The 
new government raised the population’s hopes for change and social improve-
ment, and the charisma of Hugo Chávez, coupled with a good media campaign, 
placed the “Bolivarian Revolution” in the spotlight. For many, this change also 
brought hope in the new health policies that Chávez intended to implement. The 
most ambitious were proposals to establish a universal and free public health sys-
tem, develop as far as possible the primary health care and prevention system, and 
reinvigorate the now noticeably declined environmental and community vector 
control programs.
As oil, the country’s main export and income, was trading at around US$10 
a barrel, the government started with limited resources and with a proposal for 
diversification of the non-oil economy. However, over the 2000s there was a 
steady increase in the price of oil, eventually topping over US$100 per barrel. 
This increase was the result of economic expansion in China and India, which 
increased their oil consumption, and a crisis in the prices of other commodities, 
which led financial capital to move towards oil, boosting the increase in prices to 
levels never seen before. Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between oil prices and 
political changes and the implications for mosquito-borne disease.
That increase meant that the national government had ten times more resources 
at its disposal. With the abundance of money in the coffers from the sale of oil 
abroad, domestic production and civil society became, again, insignificant. 
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Additionally, the presidency of Chavez gained increased powers due to the inter-
mixing of high oil revenue and a compelling ideology that was systematically 
broadcasted to the rural population, where he held his powerbase. Eventually he 
succeeded in controlling all aspects of legislative, judicial, and military power. 
The president had all the power and all the money he needed. The state, that is, the 
government, assumed that it could dispose of everything and decide on everything 
in society. The old separation and autonomy of the judicial and legislative powers 
proper to democracy that, although with its limitations, had existed in the country, 
completely disappeared and presidential power became almost absolute.
But oil revenues entail a paradox. This wealth, created on the international 
market, needs to be spent, in large part, on the same international market. In a 
globalized world economy, there is no way of spending most, or at least a large 
quantity of it, in the country itself, since there are insufficient goods produced 
domestically to buy. An oil state does not produce cars, electronics, clothes, dia-
monds or other luxury or consumer goods. Therefore, oil money necessitates for-
eign transactions, cycling back outward to the global market. Understanding this 
political economy is essential to appreciating the contradictory health policies 
applied in those years.
In the 20th century, Venezuelan politics had little formally defined “conserva-
tive” or “right” political parties. Rather, most political ideologies were generally 
variations on traditional social democrat or Christian democrat positions. From 
its beginnings, however, the Chavez government, with its Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy, assumed that everything that had been done in the past was bad and had to 
be destroyed. Repeating the slogan of the French Revolution that it was necessary 
first to destroy l’ancien régime before the new one could be built, the govern-
ment set about dismantling the vector control program. Certainly this program 
had many shortcomings and problems – there was inefficient oversight, and a 
Figure 5.4  Key events in Venezuelan politics and vector control (1950–2017) related to 
fluctuating oil prices and government revenue.
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suspicion of management corruption, for example – but it also had experience, 
a professional staff and a valuable history that should not have been so easily 
discarded. The government’s new health and vector control policy only managed 
to destroy structures that had existed for more than a decade, without building 
something different with which to replace it. After 18 years in power, the govern-
ment failed to make a health policy or vector control system that was either new 
or better.
Throughout this process of institutional and anti-political destruction, there 
was military dominance in government. It was not a military government like 
the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile or Uruguay. But it was very different from 
what had been the discrete role, largely confined to the barracks, that the military 
had taken since the 1950s. Although President Chávez defined his government 
as a “civic-military” alliance, the weight of military officials in important gov-
ernment positions was remarkable. Many institutions, such as Ministry of Food, 
Citizen Security, Health, Education, Finance and Oil were in the hands of retired 
or active military personnel. This military presence played an important role in 
health programs, as senior staff were not only doctors who had assimilated into 
the military but also military personnel who had had no training or experience in 
health. Between 2007 and 2013, all health ministers were from the military.
Parallel to this, the Cuban presence in the country, given the ideological simi-
larities between Chavez and Castro, increased in a very important way in the 
healthcare sector. Rather than model the Venezuelan system on the Cuban model, 
which has some of the highest health indicators of a low-income country and is 
lauded for this, the oil money created a situation of dependence, of exporting 
patients and importing expertise. According to official declarations, there were 
an estimated 31,700 Cuban aid workers in 2012: 11,000 doctors, 4,931 nurses, 
2,713 dentists, 1,245 optometrists and 11,544 unspecified (Marcano, 2014). By 
2015, the number had jumped to 46,000 (Telesur, 2015). At first, the government 
of Venezuela bought health, education and sports services from the government 
of Cuba. In 2004, an airplane was leaving Caracas every day, with more than 
300 patients, who were taken to have eye surgery in Cuba. Although there are no 
reliable statistics, the official figures of the governments of Venezuela and Cuba 
mention hundreds of thousands of patients operated on for eye problems in Cuba 
with the so-called Misión Milagro (Telesur, 2015). A primary health care system, 
called the Misión Barrio Adentro, was installed, which operates in parallel to 
the Venezuelan health system but with Cuban personnel. Remarkably, this was 
run under the orders of a Cuban deputy minister who was not accountable to the 
Ministry of Health of Venezuela. In 2010, the policies of Dengue prevention and 
control presented by the officials of the vector control program in Caracas were 
discarded. By presidential order, the policies proposed by the Cuban advisers were 
assumed. This double policy also led to the existence of two parallel health statis-
tic systems, which informed the ministry’s epidemiological department. Official 
government statistics appeared alongside the alternative statistics offered by the 
Misión Barrio Adentro, that is, the government of Cuba. This situation led to con-
flicts, because diseases of international notification, such as syphilis, Dengue or 
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malaria, were not reported to the ministry, but instead were sent directly to Cuba. 
These statistics arrived at the Ministry of Health only after being processed and 
delivered by the Cuban Ministry of Health to the president’s office.
Although from the outset the government attacked private medicine, its 
practitioners and hospitals, and extolled the mandatory public nature of the 
health system, government ministries and the oil industry offered hospitaliza-
tion insurance, surgery and maternity care with private insurance companies to 
state employees, as labour benefits. The consequences was that these individuals 
and their families (which numbered into the millions) went to private hospitals 
instead of public ones, strengthening the private health system and weakening 
the public system.
The reasons for these erratic health policies were political. The goals were not 
to improve the health of the population but to guarantee the political support of 
the voters before an election or a referendum. The sustainability of programs did 
not matter. In the end, not even the public health system was relevant, except that 
it caused public employees to have loyalty for the prevailing power and to vote 
for the government candidates in races for mayors, governorates or members of 
parliament.
This is why malaria reappeared in Venezuela with a force unique to the 
Americas. For these same reasons, after years of reducing R. prolixus vector trans-
mission of Chagas’ disease, cases of vector and oral Chagas transmission have 
also increased in urban areas. In Caracas, a secondary vector of Chagas’ disease, 
Panstrongylus geniculatus, is now found throughout the city (Noya et al., 2009). 
And in the Chacao municipality of Caracas, which has the best economic and 
social conditions in the country, there was an outbreak of acute Chagas’ disease 
in one school, in which a child died and several dozen children and some teachers 
contracted the disease. Investigators found that this was caused by the ingestion 
of guava juice, where an infected T. cruzi parasite had been liquefied (Noya et al., 
2010).
Political conflicts and vectors
The national office of vector control has been located in the city of Maracay, 
capital of Aragua state, located in the north of the country and separated by a high 
mountain from the Caribbean Sea, for over 70 years. However, it is also one of 
the cities with the most cases of Dengue fever and, more recently, Chikungunya 
(Barrera et al. 2000; Camacho et al. 2016). In a recent study carried out in two 
of the three municipalities that make up the city, 21% of houses had breeding 
sites positive for Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus larvae/pupae (Guevara & 
Teran, 2017). The first reported cases of human deaths caused by Chikungunya 
in Venezuela were reported in this city (Torres et al., 2015), although these were 
immediately denied by the authorities. The president of the city’s medical asso-
ciation, Dr. Angel Sarmiento, who had made the complaint, was charged with 
trying to create a “state of anxiety”; to escape persecution, he had to leave the 
country and flee to neighboring Colombia.
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When local elections, for mayors, were held in late 2013, government party 
candidates managed to win 16 of the 18 municipalities in Aragua state. Maracay, 
the capital city, has 1.2 million inhabitants, and is made up of 5 municipalities. In 
one of these municipalities, an opposition candidate, Delson Guarate, was elected, 
representing an exception to political domination. The spread of Dengue in pre-
vious years had been closely linked to the trash and debris that accumulated in 
homes and streets as a result of irregular garbage collection. Failure to collect 
garbage had been part of the population’s demands, and the new mayor promised 
to fix this problem. After he began his term, however, clashes between the new 
mayor and the state and national government transformed garbage collection into 
a political tool. In 2015, the governor seized the garbage trucks they had assigned 
to the mayor to prevent them from doing their work; then the mayor obtained 
other informal trucks to collect the garbage. In response, the government’s politi-
cal activists diverted trucks picking up garbage from other municipalities on their 
way to the landfill site and unloaded them in the streets of the opposition munici-
pality. Garbage and Dengue had become a tool of political attack.
But as Mayor Guarate resisted, the national government sent police to arrest 
him in his office in September 2016, accusing him of “environmental crimes,” 
because, the government argued, the mayor had not collected the garbage that 
had accumulated in the municipality causing an increase in Aedes mosquitoes 
transmitting Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika. He was detained in prison for 
the next 14 months without formal accusation; the initial hearing before the 
judge was deferred 10 times in 1 year. During this time, the national govern-
ment wanted to legitimize elections for mayors to which opposition political 
parties had refused to participate because they did not comply with national laws. 
To increase the semblance of legitimacy, the government proposed to several 
imprisoned opposition mayors that they could be granted parole if they accepted 
to register as candidates in these elections. It was another legal violation, because 
it makes no sense to grant parole to anyone who is neither accused nor con-
demned. Two mayors accepted these political conditions, among them Mayor 
Guarate in Maracay. And so it was that in November 2017, he left the political 
prison to register as a candidate and campaigned for one month until the day of 
the elections, on December 13, 2017, when he fled the country to request politi-
cal asylum in Colombia.
Gone were garbage, environmental crimes and Dengue and Chikungunya. 
That was never the problem, nor the real concern of the Bolivarian revolution. 
Only political control and the destruction of everything that could mean independ-
ence, autonomy or dissidence. That is why not only malaria or Chagas disease 
expanded, but also the diseases transmitted by A. aegypti. In 2014, for example, 
the country registered 3,750,698 cases of acute fever with no apparent expla-
nation, and the great majority of these cases occurred between week 23 (June) 
and week 44 (November), at the peak of the Chikungunya epidemic. At some 
points, there were more than 200,000 cases each week, which has led to an esti-
mated excess of 2,203,198 acute febrile cases, which can only be attributed to an 
explosive epidemic of Chikungunya. This is not surprising. In 2011 the House 
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Index (HI), which reports on the presence of Aedes vectors in homes, was never 
below 5%, the maximum allowable limit according to PAHO. In 2014, this index 
reached 17.4% nationwide (Oletta et al., 2014). Vector control faded in the midst 
of the country’s political crisis.
Discussion and conclusions
The remarkable and early success of vector-borne disease control in Venezuela, 
as well as its recent decline, shows the relevance of political processes in vec-
tor control. Other factors, such as climate and available financial and human 
resources, and even geopolitics are equally important (Orsenna & de Saint Aubin, 
2017). But the handling of any of these factors occurs in a social context that 
links health actions with the country’s political orientation and decisions. From 
this experience, there are some factors we find important to understand, that are 
Venezuelan-specific but also have wider relevance to the region in the context of 
Zika, old resurgent diseases like malaria and future hitherto unknown ones.
In the Venezuelan context, the politics of vector control, and the political 
narratives underpinning them, have relied both on proclamations of success as 
well as threats of the recurrence of disease. Vector control policies have to be 
proven successful, for that is their purpose, and political leadership needs success 
in order to justify the resources allocated and reap the fruits. But, if success has 
been achieved, why should we continue to invest in vector control? This dilemma 
has arisen since the 1950s in the discussion between eradication and disease con-
trol in the World Health Organization (Litsios, 1998). The thesis of eradication 
expressed a valuable social ambition and a trust in technology, but it created an 
illusion of permanence that has proven to be epidemiologically incorrect and 
politically dangerous. Political management of the dilemma between success and 
permanent risk in vector-borne diseases has not been adequately communicated 
to the political leadership or to society.
The lack of resources to carry out vector control programs has been an impor-
tant constraint for health ministries in many countries. However, the experience 
of Venezuela over several decades shows that an overabundance of resources can 
also lead to harmful consequences; namely, in the proliferation of unnecessary 
tasks, wastes of money and corruption and accompanying declines in motivation 
and purpose based on notions of social betterment. Overabundance, at least with-
out civic oversight and good public management, promotes a culture of passivity.
The sustainability of health goals also requires the participation of communi-
ties at risk, and that is only possible if people believe that their actions are relevant 
and have the real possibility of contributing to health improvements. If people 
do not believe that their actions can prevent disease, why do something? There 
are two reasons why people may believe that their actions are not important in 
the prevention or control of vector-borne diseases. The first is frustration, having 
tried and never achieved anything. The second is passivity and apathy: if the goals 
are achieved solely through the effort and work of others, such as state officials 
or the politician of the day, why try? Where citizens assume that, given all the 
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cash, vector control is the sole responsibility of the government, who must pay 
the officials to do the work of eliminating vectors, this may itself lead to passivity 
and apathy.
Politicians regularly face the dilemma of balancing recognition of health prob-
lems (by raising alarm bells and calls for action) with minimizing the problem, 
hiding it or even censoring information. Recognizing an epidemic or a re-infesta-
tion can be interpreted as recognizing a failure and can jeopardize political pres-
tige and the government’s position. However, hiding it can mean a late response, 
and can make the problem even greater. The difficulty for politicians and commu-
nities is to recognize that there is a problem and that the problem is “their own.” 
There is a temptation, however, to interpret the problem as “somebody else’s” 
and so it can be ignored or overlooked by authorities, civil society and families. 
The balance between recognizing successes and raising attention to threats must 
be guided by the political purpose of maintaining a sense of shared responsibility 
in society.
Since its origins, vector control programs have had two competing orienta-
tions: one military and vertical, and one civil and horizontal or participatory. In 
the former approach, for example, an entomological surveillance officer identifies 
the presence of disease vectors in homes by quickly inspecting houses and yards 
at a set time period. In the latter model, surveillance can also engage family mem-
bers who live there 24 hours a day. The organization of malaria programs was 
the clearest expression of the military model. As part of this, sanitary programs 
and large-scale insecticide spraying programs were implemented by authoritarian 
governments, often among rural populations with high illiteracy. The entomo-
logical inspection team or the house sprayers arrived with a military authority 
that imposed the activities and applied the insecticide without asking the family 
for consent. However, society in Venezuela and elsewhere has changed dramati-
cally; citizens have studied and learned their rights, governments became demo-
cratic, and restrictions have been placed on the exercise of arbitrary authority. The 
dilemma between authoritative military programs, which can be very efficient in 
their execution, and educational and participatory programs, which can guarantee 
the sustainability of the achievements, remains a relevant paradox.
Consistent with the controversy between a civilian or military approach to vec-
tor control, there is also the dilemma between centralized and decentralized man-
agement. Military and vertical vector control in Venezuela functioned in the past 
within a centralized system in the national government that had delegates in the 
different regions of the country. As in an army, the decisions were taken by cen-
tral officials and met little comment or protest in the different regions. Changes in 
government systems and ideological forms in the Latin American political land-
scape has now led to a push for decentralization, which brings with it a transfer 
of responsibilities to provincial governments (states or departments) and munici-
palities (Yadon et al., 2006). The goal of decentralization is to bring the exercise 
of government closer to communities, so that there can be greater efficiency and 
a greater possibility of monitoring and demanding the fulfilment of programs by 
citizens. Decentralization has been carried out very irregularly in Latin America. 
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Responsibilities have been transferred, but not the resources for their execution. 
Some politicians in Venezuela have voiced, in public and private, that vector-
borne diseases and health problems increased as a result of decentralization. To 
be successful, decentralization, at its core, requires a wider distribution of power 
in society. But military and authoritarian governments want to concentrate power, 
not distribute it. That is why in Venezuela President Chavez declared that cen-
tralization was returning, and that the country’s health problems would be over 
when decentralization was reversed. Centralization and de-centralization are two 
political strategies with advantages and disadvantages; there is no single answer. 
Decentralization, with its proposal of carrying out vector control from the small-
est and closest government bodies, such as the municipality, is attractive, but it 
requires local technical capacity and honesty and transparency so that it can work.
Lastly, the experience of Venezuela shows the conflicts and tensions between 
the perspectives of communities and vector-control departments. While commu-
nities think of health in a holistic way, as general welfare, vector-control programs 
often look only at particular diseases. This difference creates an issue between the 
goals of the Ministry of Health and the demands of the population. For politicians 
in charge of vector control, their responsibility is to reduce or eliminate the vector 
and thereby control the disease. For the population, malaria, Dengue fever or Zika 
is just one problem among many.
In communities where we have worked between 2015 and 2018, in the munic-
ipalities Francisco Linares Alcantara and Mario Briceño Iragorry, in Maracay, 
Aragua State, Dengue fever and Chikungunya can be a major annoyance, but 
more important for daily life is not having enough water to cook, clean or drink. In 
focus groups we conducted in 2017 with pregnant women at risk of Zika, the risk 
of congenital fetal malformations was considered of great concern, but it was of 
no less importance than the problems they face securing enough food to survive in 
the present. So, when people are forced to choose between keeping water in tanks 
and preventing Dengue fever, they do not hesitate to choose: water. For Amazon 
miners searching out gold in the precarious circumstances of the post-Chavez 
economy, malaria may be a resurgent problem that reaches into the international 
news, but these people are, really, more concerned about snake bites, robbery or 
abuse by the military.
In Venezuela, the Bolivarian revolution has converted one of the richest coun-
tries in Latin America into one of the poorest, and in so doing it has also trans-
formed the country’s effective national vector control system into dysfunction and 
led to rampant disease reemergence. This social and health calamity is the conse-
quence of wrong policies in the economy, institutions and society at large. In the 
economy, policies have destroyed national production and a diversified business 
class through expropriations and subsidized imports, with the goal of reducing the 
social class of business leaders and owners. In society, policies have destroyed the 
social fabric of civil engagement by dividing the population into rich and poor, 
friends and enemies, into patriots and foreign agents and fomenting the struggle of 
classes and groups. And all of this has been accomplished in the name of a revolu-
tion that has destroyed the economy, the social fabric and rule of law.
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Venezuela in 2018, then, is a nation defined by hunger, poverty and disease. 
In a national representative survey carried out by three universities, 72% of those 
interviewed stated that they had lost weight the previous year. Inflation is the high-
est in the world, estimated at more than 3,000% in 2017 and the average monthly 
salary does not reach US$20 per month (Encovi, 2018). The population does not 
receive medical attention; private or public insurances have a coverage that, due to 
hyperinflation, hardly serves to cover a laboratory test or an X-ray. Patients can-
not find the most common medicines for hypertension or diabetes in hospitals or 
pharmacies, so they have to buy them on the black market or, if they are wealthy 
enough, import them directly from abroad. This has made out-of-pocket spending 
on health in Venezuela among the highest in the world (Encovi, 2018). The fact 
that Pfizer, in 2016, donated acetaminophen to assist with the Zika epidemic, some-
thing that was commented on in international news, shows how tragic the situations 
has become. As there is a lack of food for sale on supermarket shelves, a large part 
of the population depends on a box of imported food distributed by the govern-
ment. And university professors, schoolteachers and policemen have abandoned 
their positions. More than 20,000 doctors have left the country. Workers and the 
unemployed from all social sectors are preparing to emigrate, in what is considered 
the largest migration exodus ever experienced in the Americas. For those of us who 
remain, including the authors of this chapter, there are more and more mosquitoes.
Notes
1 The annual incidence rate went from 122.9 per 100,000 inhabitants in the year 2000 to 
775.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016.
2 The research on which this text is based received financial support from the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada. The opinions expressed do not neces-
sarily reflect those of IDRC.
3 His murderer had requested asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy. However, he had been 
taken from the embassy by the police and was killed while on route to jail. The police 
alleged that he had tried to escape.
4 In an alliance with private business, experiments were begun on the construction of 
“healthy houses,” and a “construction manual” of mud dwellings that preserved the 
health of its inhabitants. With the construction of houses, the control of the transmis-
sion of Chagas disease was mainly sought, but also to create a healthy habitat that 
would prevent intestinal parasitic diseases, schistosomiasis and yellow fever. The work 
was interrupted because the entrepreneur, Eugenio Mendoza, who promoted the initia-
tive, had to leave the country due to political persecution in the final months of the 
dictatorship.
5 The general mortality rate reduced from 21.1 per 100,000 in 1941, to 13.7 per 100,000 
in 1950, and then 6.6 per 100,000 in 1971 (Paez Celis, 1974).
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Introduction
At the height of the Zika epidemic in 2016, investigators from the Center for 
Global Health and Translational Sciences of the State University of New York 
(SUNY) Upstate Medical University received a US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) Zika Rapid Action grant to study transmission dynamics in a “high burden” 
region of Ecuador. The central site of the study was to be Machala, Ecuador’s 
fourth largest city of 280,000 people, also known as the “banana capital of the 
world.” This coastal city is located close to the border with Peru, making it a site 
of frequent cross-border transit where bananas, shrimp and gold mining make up 
the local economy. All four Dengue virus serotypes had been co-circulating in 
Machala for many years before Zika, disproportionately burdening those living 
on the outskirts of the city where garbage collection is limited and interruptions of 
the water supply are are common occurrence. The projected risk of Zika transmis-
sion was thought to be high.1
While funding mechanisms like the Zika Rapid Action grant are meant to pro-
vide agility in response to an emerging pathogen, being a successful grantee – 
winning the grant – requires considerable informal infrastructure, networks and 
skill. The ability to implement meaningful rapid research – a type of funding 
that is becoming more common in the world of epidemic response – is depend-
ent on long-term relationships and groundwork that is simultaneously invaluable 
and yet often invisible, or at least marginal, to funding applications and formal 
publications. 
Just as social forces shape the lives of Aedes aegypti (where they breed and 
who they bite) in an increasingly dynamic world impacted by eco-social forces, 
they also influence the efforts of scientists, policy-makers and vector control staff. 
In this sense, understanding the sociability of Aedes aegypti involves a great deal 
of labour to understand the eco-social forces influencing the mosquito while also 
navigating the (all-too-human) social world of global health funding, capacity 
building and the politics of policy.
6
Tracking Aedes aegypti in a 
hotter, wetter, more urban world
Capacity building, disease surveillance and 
epidemiological labour in Ecuador
Anna M. Stewart-Ibarra, Rebecca Rose Henderson, 
Naveed Heydari, Mercy J. Borbor-Cordova, 
Yui Fujii and Kevin Bardosh
Tracking Aedes aegypti in Ecuador 129
Tracking Aedes aegypti in Ecuador
Tracking mosquitoes in a changing world is particularly difficult and relies on an 
assortment of entomological data, statistical reasoning, mathematical models and 
GIS maps. A range of social, environmental and climatic phenomena, operating at 
different scales, needs to be brought together. But contextualized datasets and path-
ways for model calibration and validation are frequently lacking, calling into ques-
tion the trustworthiness of scientific models and their representations (Braks et al. 
2013). The lack of long-term epidemiological series data (> 30 years) means that 
researchers often have to work with shorter timescales (<10 years of data), a major 
impediment given the nature of the earth’s climate which operates across seasonal, 
interannual, decadal and long term time scales. As discussed by Brisbois and Ali 
(2010), opposing interpretations can emerge of short-term meteorological data, and 
such ambiguities make causation and attribution very challenging. Ensuring that the 
science is useful outside academia, through acts of translation and engagement with 
the worlds of policy and day-to-day government vector control, is also fraught with 
troubles. Working in Cameroon on emerging zoonoses, Judson et al. (2018) explored 
the utility of disease models, constructed mostly by outside academic groups, for 
public health experts and found that most of the experts were unfamiliar with the 
academic models. The models typically lacked essential contextualized (local) 
knowledge that would have made them more detailed and accurate; for instance, of 
environmental boundaries and basic administrative regions. As Leach and Scoones 
(2013) argued, models of vector-borne diseases have social and political lives.
The few publications on disease models have examined the forces impacting model 
adoption at a national and international level, rather than the local forces that impact 
modeling groups. In this chapter, we take a slightly different route and examine the 
ways that disease-modeling projects are socially embedded in day-to-day practices, 
and how scientific research in global health – in this case, of Aedes agypti – is made 
real through what we call epidemiological labour in Machala, Ecuador.
Scholars of science and technology studies (STS) have long showed how the 
production of scientific knowledge takes place in a context and is the result of 
relationships (Janes and Corbett, 2009). Individuals and groups work together 
to gather data, and a diversity of viewpoints, backgrounds and interests shape 
the scope of science and how data are collected, analyzed and displayed. Social 
networks, and formal and informal relationships, also shape how knowledge is 
mobilized and made real through policy and social actions.
Despite clarion calls for capacity building and the creation of networks and 
“networks of networks” in global health, the description of science networks 
rarely describe the informal efforts of scientists out in the world, interacting with 
their local policy champions, friends and collaborators. Anthropologists have 
become interested in the idea of global health labour, for example, in the work 
of community health workers (Maes and Kalofonos, 2013) and field assistants 
(Biruk, 2012) and more broadly in the nature of transnational research partner-
ships (Crane et al., 2018). This work tells us that the mobilization of resources 
to collect scientific data, the creation of a locally skilled scientific workforce and 
collaborations with national scientific and government actors all have profound 
effects on the settings in which knowledge is produced and transformed.
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An emerging disease crisis, like Zika, offers a unique opportunity to understand 
the social and political labour of global health. The humanitarian and medical emer-
gency literatures are replete with the mantra of capacity building as a form of preven-
tion for calamity (Lakoff, 2017). In reality, though, and in an era of new, unfolding 
geopolitical change and anti-globalism, most funding follows the epidemic curve. 
Projects are funded from epidemic-to-epidemic, or emergency-to-emergency, where 
atmospheres of fear and uncertainty co-exist with an urgency to act, to do something 
now. The challenge is this: acting in these contexts requires having informal social 
and biophysical infrastructures already on the ground, something that is often insuf-
ficiently acknowledged, unrepresented, underfunded and invisible.
In this chapter, we expand on these ideas and explore the decade-long history of 
collaboration, partnership and scientific labour of a US-Ecuadorian disease surveil-
lance group working on Aedes agypti transmitted diseases in the city of Machala. 
Using reflections from team members gathered through auto-ethnographic writing 
as well as unstructured interviews, we describe the ways in which this group has 
participated in social worlds in order to build capacity at local and national levels 
and to maneuver in the world of science, policy and public health. This includes 
tracking the creation and texture of scientific partnerships, the mobilization of 
health resources and capacity building efforts, the work of entomology teams and 
the consequences of science for public policy. A socially-embedded science is 
particularly important to connect climate change to Aedes-borne illnesses; in order 
to track the complex, long-term changes that are impacting vectors and viruses in 
a hotter, wetter and more urban world, we need equally long-term partnerships to 
transform the landscapes of science, policy and public services.
Informality and earthquakes: Launching an 
agile research network in Ecuador
As mentioned earlier, the seamless implementation of “rapid” Zika surveillance 
in Ecuador was not as rapid as one would at first assume; rather, it was built on 
the effort of a formal and informal infrastructure that was already on the ground. 
Although the work of the Center for Global Health and Translational Sciences 
at SUNY had been ongoing in Machala since 2012, one of the project’s lead 
investigators, Dr. Anna Stewart-Ibarra, a dual US-Ecuadorian citizen, was estab-
lished in the region in 2007. As a graduate student in systems ecology, a professor 
of Anna’s connected her with Dr. Mercy Borbor-Cordova, an Ecuadorian envi-
ronmental scientist who was finishing a postdoctoral fellowship at the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in the United States. At the time, 
relatively few groups were doing research on Dengue fever in the region, and 
even fewer were doing field studies to look at the interactions between climate, 
social vulnerability and Dengue. Mercy proposed that they start investigating this 
important area of emerging research.
Together, Mercy and Anna began meeting with researchers and practitioners in 
the climate and health sectors to identify health priorities and who was doing what 
in Ecuador: such as the National Directorate of Epidemiological Surveillance of 
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the Ministry of Health (MoH), the National Vector Control Service (SNEM), 
and the National Institute of Hydrology and Meteorology (INAMHI in Spanish), 
among others. The idea of linking climate and health was novel and challenging 
given traditional departmental and disciplinary siloes. Dengue provided a malle-
able scientific subject, in that the incidence, severity and distribution of Dengue 
fever were increasing at the time in Ecuador, while malaria declined year after 
year in the 2000s. There was public and policy interest in Dengue. In the early 
2000s, the first cases of Dengue hemorrhagic fever were reported, resulting in 
hospitalizations and deaths. A clear opportunity emerged for Anna and Mercy: 
to conduct scientific studies on the basic epidemiology, etiology, and ecology of 
Dengue that linked climate and health outcomes through social-ecological mod-
eling that would help inform public health interventions.
This period involved much “door-knocking” and “elevator pitches.” Mercy’s 
prior experience in government in Ecuador as the Province Director in the 
Secretary of Risk, which eventually led to a senior position in the Ministry of 
Environment, and Anna’s Ecuadorian family roots played important roles. Unlike 
other scientists, Anna and Mercy wanted to connect science with the public sector, 
an approach not often taken by traditional academic scientists. In 2007, a fortui-
tous family connection helped Anna to meet with the head of SNEM, the national 
agency responsible for Dengue control and vector surveillance. This opened the 
doors to conduct a small collaborative study with SNEM one year later, to study 
Aedes aegypti and social risk factors in peri-urban communities in the coastal 
tropical city of Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador, and a hotbed of Dengue 
transmission. This project was possible through pilot funding that Mercy received 
from NCAR. This productive partnership with SNEM in Guayaquil eventually led 
to the establishment of the Machala research program in 2010 in El Oro province, 
in partnership with local SNEM staff, as part of Anna’s doctoral research.
El Oro province experienced the biggest Dengue epidemic in 2010. Over 2,000 
cases were reported from the city of Machala, almost 1 out of 100 hundred peo-
ple reported Dengue in this city with a population of 240,000 people – the true 
number of infections was likely much higher. Young people under 20 years of 
age accounted for 58% of all cases.2 At the time, there were few scientific stud-
ies published on basic Aedes entomology or Dengue epidemiology in the country, 
let alone research looking at the links between urbanization, climate and Dengue 
transmission. Initial research in Machala, capital of El Oro Province, started with 
some nominal funding to Anna from a Fulbright Fellowship, and the local SNEM 
provided significant support, including two full-time staff and two half-time staff 
to assist with field and laboratory work, transportation, logistics and coordination 
with communities and the public health sector. These early studies with SNEM pro-
vided the first evidence for the effects of climate on Dengue and Aedes aegypti in 
Ecuador, and documented community perceptions of social-ecological risk factors.
The subsequent disbanding of SNEM in 2015, and decentralization of vector 
control activities, led some of Anna’s collaborators to assume faculty positions 
at the local public university, the Technical University of Machala (UTMach). 
As the only university in El Oro province, UTMach plays an important role in 
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supporting public health capacities, by training physicians, nurses and biophar-
maceutical technicians, among others. As a result, UTMach emerged as a cen-
tral partner in the Machala research program. INAMHI had greatly advanced the 
agenda in Ecuador on climate variability and change and also became a perma-
nent collaborator at this time.
Research linking climate and health requires special attention to capacity 
building in places like Machala, Ecuador. The work is inherently trans-discipli-
nary, involving complex causal pathways and nonlinearity. Developing methods 
of assigning causal contribution to climatic influences, to link Dengue to weather 
patterns, for example, demands that we reason several steps removed from the 
health outcome of interest (McMichael, 2015:51). This level of causal discon-
nection requires teams of entomologists, epidemiologists, social scientists, phy-
sicians, climate scientists, statistical modelers and ecologists, to name a few. It 
requires access to health and vector data, climatic data and geospatial data on 
demographics. And it requires skills of interpretation, of re-interpretation, and 
political skills in translating these scientific interpretations – statistics, maps and 
models – into something that local collaborators understand, need and want.
The first five years of work in Ecuador (2007–2012) represented a time when 
formal institutional and project footprints did not exist in Machala. Without the 
established backing of institutions or large grants, the enthusiasm of graduate 
research, the support of local SNEM leaders and the emerging importance of 
Dengue played important motivational forces in establishing friendships, trust 
and a sense of camaraderie in this group of scientists and public health experts. 
The Dengue epidemic in 2010 coincided with a time of political tension and vio-
lence in Ecuador, including the national police going on strike and the president 
being held hostage, which also bonded the group together during late nights in the 
SNEM lab and community meetings on Dengue prevention, organized with out-
of-pocket money and unpaid overtime.3
From this emerging collaboration came a set of long-term goals that the team 
frequently discussed together, and which ultimately, over time, provided leverage 
for the short-term aims of the Zika Rapid Response Fund in 2016–2017. These are 
summarized in Table 6.1, and included a focus on building partnerships, generat-
ing multidisciplinary knowledge, sustaining legitimacy and trust and maintaining 
a long-term presence on the ground. These goals, one could call them a code 
of conduct or even an ethical framework for engagement, created the agility to 
respond to Zika in Machala. But it also created the motivation and capacity for 
other forms of agility: to respond to humanitarian need and study the impact of 
Zika transmission dynamics after an earthquake, for example.
Just after the WHO declared Zika a public health emergency of international 
concern (PHEC) in February 2016, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck the north 
coast of Ecuador on April 16, several hundred kilometers north of Machala. In 
addition to the 660 reported deaths and 4,605 injured, the earthquake displaced 
over 30,000 people and left approximately 720,000 in need of humanitarian aid, 
without basic infrastructure and access to food, water, shelter and health care.4 
Many people experienced significant psychological trauma, which continued 
Table 6.1  Informal infrastructure for capacity and surveillance strengthening





Early grassroots partnerships with 
Ecuadorian institutions and 
researchers
Involvement of Ecuadorian public 
health professionals at every stage 
of the research process, including 
agenda-setting
Creation of formal agreements with 
Ecuadorian institutions and 
universities through Memorandums 
of Understanding (MoU). This 
provided a solid foundation upon 
which to develop research and 
training collaborations.
Everyone (local and international 
partners) brings unique assets to the 
collaboration.
Flexibility and openness to partnering 
with a diversity of researchers and 
funding partners. 
Ability to mobilize existing 
partnerships and 
relationships to respond to 
emerging Zika disease threat.
Zika Rapid Response Grants 









Early studies prior to the emergence 
of Zika provided the evidence base 
for the effects of climate and social 
vulnerability on Dengue risk through 
a social-ecological systems approach 
– a transdisciplinary and participatory 
research framework. This departs 
from a traditional epidemiological 
biological model of disease 
transmission.
Participation in the creation 
of relevant national policy 
documents, such as the 
National Communication 
of Ecuador for the UN 
Convention on Climate 
Change, linking Zika and 
other Aedes-borne illnesses 
to climate change and socio-
economic factors.
Publications to forecast arboviral 
outbreaks using climate 







Close collaborators in Ecuador provide 
an engine of advocacy and legitimacy 
for the research, and continue to 
ensure that research is relevant for the 
country.
Convening a group working to advocate 
for the implementation of the 
framework of climate services and 
health (WMO, 2014)
Mobilization of the team in response 
to national crisis and emergency 
(earthquake in 2016).
Movement of team resources to 
document impact of natural 
disaster on Zika transmission 
dynamics in the midst of 
co-occurring epidemic and 
earthquake.
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to be triggered during a prolonged period of strong aftershocks that lasted for 
months (Stewart-Ibarra et al., 2017).
In the immediate aftermath, the Machala team coordinated with the National 
Secretary of Risk and municipal government leaders in Machala, who were mobi-
lizing humanitarian aid efforts for the communities affected in the north coast of 
Ecuador.5 These relationships had been established as a result of a recent study 
that the team had conducted on flood risk in vulnerable peri-urban communities 
in Machala. The team (including the lab coordinator, project manager, Anna, her 
husband and driver) relocated from Machala to Bahía de Caráquez, a small city 
near the epicenter of the earthquake in Manabi Province. There were strong after-
shocks and insecurity in the streets. At that point, two days after the earthquake, 
they assisted local public health professionals collect survey data on injury and 
damages. A school then invited them to establish a makeshift clinic in a classroom 
and they worked with Ministry of Health physicians and others to provide medical 
care to > 100 people per day, creating a functional pharmacy. They also coordi-
nated the flood of donations of medications and supplies, including with donors 
and the US embassy. They distributed hundreds of gallons of drinking water, 
which had been sent from Quito by other scientist collaborators. As the efforts 
turned from short to long term, under the supervision of local ministry officials, 
the team collaborated with clinicians and government field teams to visit affected 
communities to provide primary health care and to collect more detailed health 
data that would aid in the relief effort (Figure 6.1).
After the earthquake, the Ministry of Health reported an increase of Zika cases, 
as well as Dengue and Chikungunya, as people faced increased exposure to Aedes 
aegypti due to inadequate shelter and increased water storage (Ortiz et al., 2017; 
Sorensen et al., 2017; Vasquez et al., 2017). The total number of ZIKV cases in 
Figure 6.1  Water storage around homes in Bella Vista, Manabi Province, Ecuador in the 
months following the earthquake (Photo credit: A. Stewart).
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Ecuador surged from 103 to 1,275 cases between epidemiological weeks 14 to 
25 in 2016, in the aftermath of the earthquake. The majority (85%) of all cases 
in 2016 were reported from Manabí Province, near the epicenter. With Anna’s 
team already working at the heart of the destruction, the ZIKV outbreak could 
be documented and explored in detail (Stewart-Ibarra et al., 2017). The team’s 
ability to contribute to a coordinated earthquake response was the product of 
the interpersonal relationships and embedded commitments that emerged after a 
decade of local research and capacity strengthening. The temporary re-allocation 
of research resources towards recovery efforts reflected an overall agility that 
allowed for flexible shifts of focus and repositioning relative to specific on-the-
ground needs and opportunities (Domachowske, et al. 2017). It also blurred the 
line between research, systems strengthening and humanitarian assistance.
The emergence of a global health partnership
The first major extramural grant project, begun in 2013 and funded by the Global 
Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response Program, was entitled “Capacity 
Strengthening in Ecuador: Partnering to Improve Surveillance of Febrile Vector-
Borne Diseases” and was focused on the then-emerging threat of Dengue 
(Stewart-Ibarra et al., 2018). Scientifically, it established a passive and active 
surveillance system for Dengue infections in Machala, based on protocols devel-
oped in Thailand (Thomas et al. 2015). Working with a network of four sentinel 
clinics and the central hospital of the Ministry of Health, the team recruited study 
subjects who were clinically diagnosed with Dengue and visited their homes, as 
well as four neighbouring homes in each cardinal direction within a 200-meter 
radius. They visited these neighbours, and conducted clinical and household sur-
veys and collected blood and adult mosquitoes in and around the home, that were 
later tested for viruses. The team was able to leverage other funding (in this case 
a study funded by the Ecuadorian government) and connect this epidemiologi-
cal data to a network of automatic weather stations that had been installed by 
INAMHI across Machala.6 Social-ecological information gathered at the house-
hold level allowed the team to analyze risk factors and link them to climatic data.
As global health embraces an equity focus, considerable efforts have been 
made to address the fact that local health researchers and academic institutions 
are often underrepresented or excluded entirely from health research projects 
(Adam et al., 2011). As Crane (2013) argued in her book Scrambling for Africa: 
AIDS, Expertise and the Rise of American Science, health research partnerships 
can come with major imbalances and power dynamics, for example, represented 
in the low indirect cost reimbursements from foreign US grants and high bureau-
cratic overheads, structures and expenses. As Musolino et al. (2015) summarized:
Low-income and middle-income countries (LIMCs) lag behind in their abil-
ity to sufficiently reap the benefits from research and innovation partnerships 
for systems building, capacity strengthening, and economic growth … global 
health research is not merely about global health but also about reinforcement 
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of economic activity, research competitiveness, employment, and growth – a 
benefit package that today appears to stream more into high-income countries 
than into LMICs.
Equitable research partnerships involve, among other things, strengthening the 
capacity of local labs and universities (Larkan et al., 2016; Vasquez et al., 2013) 
and, as noted by Munung, Mayosi, and de Vries (2017), increasing access to 
training unavailable in country, support for research ethics systems, establishing 
research infrastructure and increasing access to funding and leadership positions. 
The Machala partnership has attempted to address many of these conventional 
critiques, although often in an organic, unscripted way: through trainings for 
researchers and public health practitioners (on research integrity and bioethics, 
geospatial analyses for public health and Dengue research), formal university col-
laborations, international training for local staff and research infrastructure devel-
opment at the university and public hospital.
For example, the original 2013 project was presented directly to the Minister of 
Health for her approval, but the team spent an additional eight months going back 
and forth between Ecuadorian and US Institutional Review Board (IRB) commit-
tees before the protocol was approved. This process required patience and persis-
tence to include the priorities and feedback of all parties. All of this was further 
complicated by the fact that the Ecuadorian government had recently established 
national norms for IRB committees and regulated human subject research. The 
Machala team did two things. First, in order to avoid lengthy revisions, they devel-
oped the habitat of designing protocols with local experts from UTMach but also 
members from the Ministry of Health in vector control, health promotion and epi-
demiology. This collaborative approach built shared values and purpose but also: 
(1) generated additional scientific knowledge in the form of access to local statistics 
and data of disease burden; (2) built capacity and networks by organizing meetings 
with local authorities; and (3) helped create legitimacy and visibility for imple-
mentation. By bringing a diverse number of Ecuadorian government and academic 
researchers into the scientific process, the team also included these key individuals 
as co-authors on multiple publications, creating soft incentives and motivations. 
Secondly, the team organized national-level workshops on bioethics, research 
integrity and regulatory considerations for human subject research, with participa-
tion by the senior leadership of the Ministry of Health, local universities and SUNY 
Upstate, including the directors of the Upstate IRB and research integrity commit-
tees. The trainings were conducted in Machala and the two largest cities of Ecuador 
(Guayaquil and Quito) over two years, with hundreds of participants from local 
universities and the public health sector.7 Currently, an Ecuadorian member of the 
Machala research team is spearheading efforts to establish an IRB at UTMach.
This support and capacity building for research ethics was never an explicit 
part of any large and significant grant. Rather, it grew naturally from collegial 
discussions, meetings, casual conversations and a desire to be helpful and respond 
to emergent social expectations of a burgeoning partnership network. It was an 
act of solidarity. Within the 40-page protocol of the original study that outlined 
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the study background, methods, potential risks, data assessment, there was a one-
page section on capacity strengthening. It read:
By strengthening the capacity of operative personnel of the MoH researchers, 
doctors, and students in the different steps of diagnostics, surveillance and 
control of vector borne diseases, the quality of surveillance information will 
improve, allowing for a more efficient response by the public health sector.
Although this objective represented a minor component of the formal IRB protocol, 
and of the total budget, it was a key part of the informal objectives of the team. To 
meet this objective the investigators also focused on university training, including 
an exchange program for health professionals, providing educational opportuni-
ties for local MoH field personnel, UTMach students and faculty, and regional 
researchers. These efforts represented capacity building as a necessary invest-
ment, and even by-product, to conducting high-quality longitudinal research that 
responded to local health priorities. Unlike the efforts of Sanchez et al. (2013) to 
strengthen infectious disease capacity through a formalized research-based gradu-
ate program at the National Autonomous University of Honduras, these efforts 
focused on mobilizing research resources to increase training opportunities.
SUNY Upstate’s growing bond with UTMach and the MoH represented a 
mutual “win-win” relationship, especially as the university system in Ecuador 
was undergoing reform to increase research standards and greater emphasis on 
publications and international collaboration. In 2013, in preparation for the sur-
veillance study, a basic clinical laboratory was set up in the MoH central hospital. 
Having a proper physical space in a shared setting made the team more visible and 
allowed for easier interactions and communication between the research team and 
MoH members. Starting in 2015, and continuing the following year, the project 
acquired space within UTMach including land to construct entomological huts to 
run semi-field trials, administrative offices, a laboratory to process mosquito sam-
ples and another space to grow adult mosquitos and conduct insecticide-resistant 
assays. In addition to the physical infrastructure growth, the team began to take 
on various student-interns to work for periods of two to eight weeks. Ecuadorian 
professors from the School of Medicine became increasingly active participants 
in mentoring both Ecuadorian and international medical students.
Like any healthy relationship, the costs and benefits flow two ways. The pro-
ject accepted UTMach students to complete research practicum hours by conduct-
ing a combination of work in the field or labs, depending on requirements for their 
degrees; these volunteers were often hired by the team post-graduation. In fact, 
this process led to most project staff (there were five staff in 2018) being graduates 
from UTMach with most staff supported to pursue part-time Master’s degrees. 
These graduates were attracted by the opportunity to work for an international 
research group, participate in a unique field of work with flexible and dynamic 
work expectations, and build their personal resumes. And it led to continuity in 
the team, allowing new projects to be informed by previous ones. Administrative 
offices and experimental huts for mosquito experiments were located in the School 
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of Medicine at UTMach while entomology labs were located in the School of 
Chemical Sciences and Health, which increased access to faculty and students. In 
2016, UTMach improved its national accreditation rating, in part due to increas-
ing lab infrastructure, international collaborations and a strong publication record 
(all of which the Aedes research team was involved with), raising their profile 
and capacity to train students in research. The team also developed working rela-
tionships with universities in Quito and Guayaquil, expanding their capacity to 
conduct molecular analyzes of arboviruses in human and mosquito specimens in 
the country.
Urban Machala: Science landscapes and 
the social determinants of health
The science of the SUNY-Machala group, begun in 2007, has provided some 
of the most comprehensive social-ecological epidemiological investigations of 
Aedes aegypti transmitted diseases in the Americas. But this work depends on 
another set of infrastructures: fieldworkers and community members, operating in 
the physical landscape of Machala. Science is connected to the city (Figure 6.2).
As noted earlier, Machala is Ecuador’s fourth largest city. It is off the beaten 
path, and one rarely sees any foreign tourists, or vacationing Ecuadoreans, there. 
Rather, it is a place known for its economic productivity due to agriculture and 
mining. The “banana capital of the world” sits on top of mangroves, and floods 
Figure 6.2  A map showing land use and land cover around the city of Machala (from 
Lowe et al. 2017 The Lancet Planetary Health).
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annually with high tides and rains. Close to the border with Peru, it is a bustling 
city but with a small-town feeling about it, somewhat of a backwater. Why would 
you go to Machala, people ask?
The identity of Machala, however, has had important influence on the success 
of the research program. Historically, Machala is a place with limited scientific 
research, at least by academics. Unlike the larger cities in Ecuador, where scien-
tists may look down their noses at vector control staff muddling through in the 
community, Machala’s off-the-beaten-path culture contributes to a small town 
pride and, with the public health collaborators of the research group, a “can do 
attitude.” It was this proclivity, to work hard with limited resources, that first 
cemented the chemistry between Machala public health leaders and Anna in 2010.
There are stark contrasts in social conditions in Machala, with wealthier fami-
lies living in gated communities and low-income young families concentrated in 
the urban periphery, which lacks adequate sanitation. In the 2010 census, one-
quarter of households lacked access to paved streets or sewerage, and one-third 
lack piped water inside the home (Stewart Ibarra et al. 2014b). Although Dengue, 
Chikungunya and Zika infect rich and poor alike, sickness has a greater impact 
on low-income families, due to lost wages and other costs associated with caring 
for the sick. Machala is a growing city, having officially added nearly 40,000 
residents from 2010 to 2018, to 280,000 people. With the economic boom of the 
mid-2000s, the municipal government began ambitious urban renewal and gen-
trification in the city center, but national budgets were cut in 2015 following the 
decline in oil prices (which corresponded with a Chikungunya epidemic) reducing 
investments in infrastructure.
The early work of the research team investigated these social and ecological 
factors in relation to Dengue fever. Statistical modeling studies provided the first 
evidence that Dengue epidemics were associated with extreme climate events (El 
Niño) that resulted in warmer, rainier conditions (Stewart Ibarra and Lowe 2013). 
They found that rainfall did not affect Aedes aegypti abundance in all communi-
ties, due to differences in mosquito larval habitats (rain-filled abandoned con-
tainers vs. tap-water-filled domestic use containers) associated with differential 
access to piped water in the home (Stewart Ibarra et al. 2013). Studies showed 
that Dengue risk was unequally distributed across the community and the city. 
Entomological surveys revealed that 5–11% of homes contained 80% of mosquito 
pupae, posing a threat to neighboring homes (Stewart Ibarra et al. 2013). Using 
spatial analyses, they found that neighborhoods with high Dengue incidence were 
clustered, creating hotspots of transmission (Stewart Ibarra et al. 2014a). Using 
qualitative methods, the team found that local perceptions of Dengue involved a 
range of interrelated biophysical, political-institutional and community elements 
(Figure 6.3). People indicated that the lack of inter-institutional coordination and 
lack of social cohesion limited their ability to control Dengue.
The cooperation of community members can mean the success or failure of 
projects that seek to invade homes in search of mosquitoes, human blood, intimate 
health information or efforts to change human behavior and test the efficacy of 
new disease control strategies. These activities rely on trust and commitment on 
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behalf of community members who may otherwise feel that they have very little 
to gain from these efforts.
Community activities in the first large-scale internationally funded project, 
begun in 2013, were certainly influenced by the impact of the 2010 Dengue epi-
demic. Machala was hard hit by the largest Dengue epidemic on record in El Oro 
province. The Machala research team collaborated with local leaders and stake-
holders (health promoters, neighborhood presidents, school principals and vector 
control fumigators) who advocated for the interests and needs of their communi-
ties.8 The team organized educational meetings with community leaders, which 
allowed MoH staff to hear community concerns and voices. On the tail end of an 
epidemic, everyone was interested. Since then, the team has continued to empha-
size building community buy-in and trust, which has included health outreach 
events and dialogues between communities, UTMach and the health sector.
People were interested in participating in these initial surveillance studies 
because they could be diagnosed and have same-day results, using rapid Dengue 
Figure 6.3  Key themes identified by periurban and central community members asked 
about Dengue risk factors in their neighbourhood. Text size indicates the 
importance of the theme (e.g., themes mentioned in more focus groups are 
larger). Themes in italics were identified only in the periurban community. 
Themes underlined were identified only in the central community (from 
Stewart Ibarra, et al. 2014 BMC Public Health). 
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tests that were not available at MoH labs. The investigation included visiting 
neighbors, taking blood samples from them and alerting them to Dengue infec-
tions in their locality. Risk was seen, and discussed, as real and nearby. However, 
this level of community interest has not been the same with the cohort study, 
begun in 2016 and funded by the NSF Zika Rapid grant. This study takes blood 
from healthy volunteers and, due to challenges with diagnostics, has not been able 
to deliver rapid test results for Zika and Chikungunya. While the team conducted 
community meetings and talks in an engagement campaign, the lack of rapid test 
results has been a barrier to community interest and participation since molecular 
diagnostic (PCR) capabilities are not currently present in Machala.
Some elements of community inclusion took place on a more personal level. 
As part of any data collection, community members want to feel that their 
voices are heard and their humanity recognized, that they are treated not sim-
ply as sources of biological samples. However, this can be no easy task, espe-
cially when the field team is required to visit multiple homes in one morning. 
The cohort study required longitudinal visits to the same homes over a 3 year 
period. Interpersonal relationships between the field technicians and household 
members require energy, patience and time. This presented a conflict of priori-
ties for field technicians attempting to build lasting relationships while managing 
multiple responsibilities and under pressure to meet data-gathering goals. These 
concerns came about during the weekly team meetings and the local team decided 
to decrease the number of households visited each day, and to allow more time 
at each home to converse. This gave participants the opportunity to better engage 
with the research processes, asking personal or project-related questions or ena-
bling teaching opportunities about the spread of Dengue or habits of the Aedes 
Figure 6.4  Local community member examining mosquitoes captured in their home, 
Ecuador (Photo credit: Dany Krom).
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aegypti mosquito. For example, after aspirating mosquitoes, field technicians then 
had more time to show the captured mosquitoes and teach families to distinguish 
Aedes aegypti mosquitos (with their black-and-white striped legs and abdomen) 
from Culex and other species (see Figure 6.4). Friendly banter, including talk-
ing about changes in the city infrastructure and recent events, were important. 
Fieldworkers would frequently be invited for fresh tropical fruit or, if they were 
lucky, a shrimp ceviche. All of this likely increased the rate of retention of house-
holds participating in long term studies, and retention of field staff.
At the city level, the team has daily interactions with government employees 
as they share offices with ministry officials working on vector-borne illness. The 
local head of vector control in Machala likewise has been an active participant in 
several research projects and was included on multiple publications. However, 
there have been important limitations in the translation of the research into better 
vector control operations. The lack of vector control capacity in Machala is due 
to historical and policy decisions. As with other countries in the region, verti-
cal and centralized vector control departments had been first established by the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950s as part of malaria and yellow fever eradica-
tion efforts. These top-down programs operated somewhat independently from 
the MoH. While other countries, like Peru, had disbanded them in the 1990s, 
Ecuador did so only in 2015, integrating (in principle) vector control into pri-
mary health care systems and local municipal government. The rationale for the 
restructuring of vector control processes often centered on eliminating corruption 
and reducing the budget. What has happened in practice is that vector control 
faces serious capacity limitations (vehicles, field staff, materials and supplies), 
and medical entomological capacity has all but withered.
Soft money, hard problems
Maintaining the research activities in Machala is a constant balancing act. 
Difficulties, of course, come in many shapes and sizes but have included the central 
issue of juggling financial resources through a patchwork of projects from diverse 
funding sources, primarily from SUNY Upstate investigators.9 The team has strug-
gled to create a sustainable funding model in Machala. This has pushed the team to 
be nimble and able to respond to new funding opportunities, allowing the team to 
grow despite a tough environment for scientific funding. Efforts have been made to 
diversify funding, with periodic visits from SUNY investigators and international 
collaborators to the area, and a new ongoing pediatric respiratory study, which 
has helped to formalize the institutional collaboration between SUNY Upstate and 
UTMach. SUNY has also provided vital funding to fill gaps at critical points.
These grants have not, however, included covering the salaries of key collabora-
tors at UTMach and the Ministry of Health – their efforts are considered in-kind 
contributions of the projects. Instead, extramural funds are effectively managed by 
a local community health NGO that supports the collaboration and research. These 
funds support UTMach and the MoH by covering the costs of training students 
and technicians, purchasing materials and research infrastructure that end up at 
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the university and public hospital, such as the entomology laboratory and clinical 
research laboratory. In addition, the way the university system is set up prevents 
faculty from recovering their salary from grants and the local university is not cur-
rently set up to receive US federal grant dollars, although research visibility has now 
become a prerequisite for promotion. The MoH and UTMach have provided critical 
support such as laboratory space, student trainees, expert collaborators, access to 
data, and hosting annual research symposia. In this model, all institutions and collab-
orators bring valuable resources and expertise to the collaboration as equal parties.
The incentives, then, for UTMach staff center on knowledge exchanges, skills 
development, trainings, networks, publications and impact on their local commu-
nities. Many collaborators in Machala have a life-long commitment to community 
service, and the fact that the scientific work facilitates and strengthens academic-
government-community relations is also seen as important.10 In addition, the 
grants have provided faculty with the opportunity to present at and participate 
in relevant workshops, meetings and travel opportunities in the country, and col-
laborative conference and publication costs are paid for by the grants.
While funding grants have overlapped in many cases, current funding mecha-
nisms designed to respond to specific diseases, epidemics and research questions 
do not facilitate the long-term maintenance of a vector-borne disease research and 
surveillance infrastructure, or of the capacity strengthening activities described 
earlier. Research and infrastructure has been entirely dependent on soft money 
and voluntary contributions by local partners (e.g., laboratory space at no cost).
While epidemics like Zika, and their surging public health fears, can be mobi-
lized to support research and build capacity in places like Machala, this infra-
structure is precarious and may crumble as fears and priorities recede. In 2016, in 
part as a result of the long-term presence of the SUNY team, Machala was chosen 
as one of the sites for an experimental Zika vaccine trial sponsored by the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH).11 This phase 2/2B multisite study was rolled 
out across Latin America and Caribbean to the evaluate the safety, efficacy and 
immunogenicity of the DNA vaccine in healthy adults. In order to enable this clin-
ical trial to move forward, the team utilized their networks to approach national 
level MoH staff to facilitate formal support from the Ecuadorian government. The 
involvement of key ministry officials on past projects and publications facilitated 
buy-in on this clinical trial, and these leaders skillfully brought together key stake-
holders at local universities and hospitals, such as Hospital Teofilo Davila, the 
provincial hospital in Machala. The SUNY team and UTMachala collaborators 
spent a year preparing for the clinical trial, a first to be conducted in the El Oro 
region and the first by the NIH in the Ecuador. In this context, the labour of sci-
ence involved hiring and training six local staff and associate investigators (AIs) 
in clinical research coordination, recruitment, sample collection, data entry and 
data storage; renovating a new space adjacent to the hospital with new equipment 
for sample processing, storage and patient intake; and reexamining Ecuador’s 
research approval structures to enable an international clinical trial to take place, 
given new regulatory frameworks. The site was reviewed in June 2018 by the 
National Agency for Health Regulation, Control and Surveillance (ARCSA), the 
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Ecuadorian equivalent of the FDA, and became the only site in Ecuador at that 
time with approval to do clinical trials.
However, all of this was on a strict time limit. Cases of Zika were rapidly 
diminishing, which meant that enrolling patients in the trial would be increasingly 
difficult. The study team knew there was a risk the NIH would pull funding once 
case numbers reduced to a certain threshold. But the team kept working for about 
one year in total. At the time, the hope was that this study would not only provide 
solid funding for a few years but that once the group had conducted its first NIH 
trial other studies and funding would follow. However, within one week of the 
projected start of study enrollment, the NIH canceled funding, which would have 
fully sustained the site for at least two years. This was a major setback for the team, 
highlight the fickle nature of soft funding for international research programs. 
However, SUNY stepped in and committed to support the team and site. UTMach 
and the MoH were unwavering in their commitments. This institutional stability 
was crucial to sustain the team. Today, the group has weathered this wave in fund-
ing, and have successfully received several grants that support ongoing research.
Policy and science: Impacting vector control 
in an era of climate change?
The need for researchers in the global south to produce locally relevant policy rec-
ommendations has been a key justification for health research capacity strength-
ening (Brownson, et al. 2009). The divide between science and policy also 
contributes to undervaluation of research at a national level, perpetuating gaps in 
funding by national governments. Within epidemiology and medical entomology, 
these problems are especially acute. Routine data collection and analysis emerg-
ing from government vector control department are often weak and fragmented, 
while scientific colleagues gear their labour and attention towards academic audi-
ences. From the beginning, then, the goal of the Machala team was to generate 
good science, but good science that connected to capacity building and policy 
change. In this last section, we ask: what types of “impact” have emerged from 
this scientific labour?
In Ecuador, as in many countries, health policy is frequently created in a top-
down, highly vertical manner, which makes researchers dependent on national 
ministries of health or environment, rather than local or regional offices. Despite 
the decentralization of vector control programs, there remains a rigid hierarchy 
that defines and structures budgets, personnel and activities. High-level changes 
require high-level connections. But in Ecuador, as elsewhere in Latin America, 
frequent changes in administrative staff at the national level limited efforts to form 
strong, sustained relationships with this policy world.
Nonetheless, the Machala team tried to build these relationships. An impor-
tant shift occurred in national political culture that favored investment in science 
and technology with the election of the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa in 
2007, who was part of a wave of leftist governments in the region that included 
Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Correa’s relatively long presidency (2007–2017) 
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provided sufficient political stability to strengthen governmental organizations, 
after many years of short-lived presidents, political coups and economic crises (the 
flip side of this is that he rapidly grew the government; massive corruption scandals 
are now hot news topics in 2018). All of this brought increased prioritization of bio-
medical research and evidence-based policy, partially framed as a way to shift the 
base of the economy away from primary production and export (e.g., oil, bananas, 
shrimp, coffee). The Ecuadorian government began placing greater emphasis on 
research and higher education, establishing SENESCYT (National Secretary of 
Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation) in 2010, which is the 
equivalent of the US NIH and/or NSF. As a new agency, and for the first time, sub-
stantial funding for academic research and international scholarships were available 
between 2011 and 2015, until oil prices crashed and reduced government coffers.12 
This favorable political context, with respect to academic research, also helped the 
research program to become established and grow Machala.
In forming connections, the Machala and SUNY team recognized that there 
was frequent movement between the worlds of academic health research and 
health policy-making. By co-developing and co-implementing research stud-
ies with public health practitioners and local researchers the research team was 
able to create connections to future policy leaders, who were then presented with 
research created by colleagues they knew and trusted. These connections were 
also created through local forums, workshops and consultative meetings where 
the Machala team presented information in an easily understandable, digestible 
and usable format. The team crafted Spanish-language data narratives, drafting 
presentations and creating policy briefs. These focused on the effects of climate 
on Dengue risk, such as increased risk of epidemics during El Niño events. As 
another example, in 2016, the team organized a symposium in at UTMach where 
research posters that had been presented at international academic conferences 
were translated by SUNY student interns into Spanish for local researchers and 
public health practitioners in Machala.
One of the ultimate scientific goals of the Machala work was to generate the 
scientific data to develop an early warning system, or seasonal forecasts, for 
Dengue, thereby contributing to climate change adaptation measures to mitigate 
disease (Lowe et al., 2017). This was seen as a tangible way for the climate-health 
research to be applied and picked up in the policy world. To date, weather and 
climate information are rarely used to inform public health decisions in Ecuador, 
or more generally in Latin America and the Caribbean. As a first step, the research 
found clear connections between climate and Dengue, with El Niño events 
increasing the possibility of Dengue outbreaks. Surveillance studies showed that 
the burden of Dengue was higher than previously thought. For every Dengue case 
captured by a MoH clinic, there were an additional three cases in the community. 
These studies also found that Dengue virus in Machala was related to virus strains 
in neighboring countries, highlighting the role of human movement in the region 
in the spread of disease.13
Despite these advances, weather and climate information are rarely used to 
inform public health decisions in Ecuador, or more generally in Latin America 
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and the Caribbean. The Machala team is applying the Global Framework for 
Climate Services (GFCS) for public health and has developed data collection 
with an eye to creating operational disease forecasts that consider climate and 
non-climate factors to predict disease outbreaks. These forecasts would form part 
of an epidemic early warning system (EWS). When a certain threshold is passed, 
an alert would be issued, triggering a sequence of predetermined actions to pre-
vent the outbreak. If an EWS were developed, the public health sector would be 
able to make informed decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, such as 
personnel, and could begin alerting and mobilizing healthcare providers and local 
communities to take preventative actions and to identify the first cases of an out-
break. Actions include preventative vector control, education campaigns, retrain-
ing of medical personnel and purchasing of diagnostic supplies. In 2016, the team 
generated the first successful Dengue forecast, which correctly predicted an early 
Dengue following a specific heavy rainfall and flooding event (Lowe et al. 2017). 
The team is currently working to scale this up to the national level.
Although an early warning system has not yet arrived, the science in Machala 
has led to the group being invited to key national and international policy meetings 
and authoring the climate and health section of a policy report for the Ecuadorian 
government. It has raised the profile in national policy discussions, and opened the 
conversation about the siloed nature of policy decision making between sectors 
involved in health, including risks management, environmental control, housing 
development, water supply, sanitation, education, defense and others. By empha-
sizing the importance of local social factors in high-risk zones of disease transmis-
sion, the team attempted to make visible to policy-makers the ways that disease 
risk can be socially determined. Climate change consequences are not equally 
distributed across society. Members of the team were co-authors on the National 
Communications of Ecuador for the UN Convention on Climate Change, provid-
ing a Spanish-language synthesis of policy-oriented findings on climate and health.
Importantly, this scientific work has not changed day-to-day vector control 
operations or, really, controlled Dengue fever in Machala.14 Rather, the impact of 
this scientific labour has been on strengthening a culture of science in Machala, of 
strengthening the scientific gaze in the collection, analysis and reporting of data. 
This has included data rescue, where historical MoH data has been cleaned and 
re-analyzed. It has included a general increase in the people’s appreciation of the 
value of science in the public sector and significant influence on student experi-
ences and career paths. And it has included raising the profile of MoH staff, who 
can now present their data locally and nationally. In short, public health staff have 
become more like scientists (and scientists more like public health staff). Let us end 
on an example: the political crisis in Venezuela led to a large influx of refugees in 
Machala in 2018 and worries about the importation of malaria, which has increased 
significantly in Venezuela in recent years. A number of imported and locally 
acquired malaria cases were confirmed in Ecuador-Peru border region, where a 
large number of people transit each day. The head of epidemiology in Machala, 
motivated by a writing workshop organized by the MoH, drafted a scientific paper 
on these cases in collaboration with the SUNY team, which has helped to raise the 
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profile of the issue at a national level (Jaramillo-Ochoa et al. 2019). Slowly, so the 
hope is, scientific collaboration can promote evidence-based decision-making.
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter has meandered around various corners of global health that are all 
too often invisible to the end products of science but so essential to their success 
and inner workings. One of our goals was to move beyond the pretention that 
scholarship is divorced from the social contexts in which it operates, and that 
engaged global health science needs to think more about the labour of epidemiol-
ogy in the real world, especially if we are to confront the challenges of climate 
change, urbanization and an increasingly globalized world. At the same time, we 
need to remain self-conscious and critical of the ways that these relationships can 
reproduce or undermine existing power structures. Scientists who hope to have an 
impact on society have the opportunity (and perhaps the responsibility) to expand 
the scope of impact of their research though capacity building at multiple levels. 
This is the informality of global health labour so important to making science 
relevant in cities like Machala.
Building a global health partnership around Aedes agypti and climate change 
demands navigating problems of money, priority and care in response to chang-
ing circumstances. Activities that depend on soft money engage with hard prob-
lems. Infrastructures, both physical and relational, bring with them the ability to 
respond to new diseases, to conduct innovative scientific research, after an earth-
quake or in the midst of an epidemic. The visible depends on the invisible labour 
of these groups, of global health scientists working – networking, writing and lots 
of traveling – in ways that are often unseen and unacknowledged.
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the ways that long-term relationships, 
both formal and informal, may be productively established so that they are in place 
when a critical new crisis, like Zika, emerges. It likewise has attempted to highlight 
some of the ways that local capacity surrounding climate change and health research 
may be built in this context even without dedicated funding, again using infor-
mal relationships to transfer knowledge and skills and build institutional research 
strength. As the chapter has attempted to demonstrate, these informal actions are 
of vital importance in the creation of a robust research response to emerging patho-
gens in an era of climate change and urbanization. They are likewise vital in efforts 
to help local and national governments to grapple with the dynamic and expanding 
health threats wrought by climate change in a hotter, wetter and more urban world.
Notes
1 The first reported cases of Zika virus (ZIKV) infection in Ecuador were documented 
on 15 January 2016. By the end of 2017, a total of 912 cases of ZIKV in pregnant 
women had been confirmed, and there had been 15 cases of microcephaly associated 
with ZIKV and one case of malformacion congenita without microcephaly. As of the 
end of 2017, two neonatal deaths were associated with ZIKV, and there has also been 
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one case of encephalitis and two cases of Guillain Barre reported (Pan American Health 
Organization, 2017). The virus has since spread widely across the country, with distri-
bution varying by region but remaining concentrated along coastal areas.
2 Epidemiological studies since then have continued to show that children bear the great-
est burden of Dengue in the city.
3 There is very little funding available to SNEM to do community mobilization and edu-
cation, despite PAHO and national policies promoting this approach.
4 See https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/ecuador_eq_fs05_05-
06-2016.pdf
5 These relationships were formed as part of a study (2014–2015) the team led on early 
warning systems for flooding and community responses in Machala, funded by the 
InterAmerican Institute for Global Change Research (IAI). This resulted in a strong 
partnership with the National Secretary of Risk and the municipal government of 
Machala. A major flood occurred in Machala in February 2016, which in some ways 
prepared the team to respond to the earthquake two months later.
6 The research group was awarded a national Ecuadorian grant for the project “Modeling 
of Climate and Dengue in Ecuador” (CLIDEN), funded by the Secretaria de Educación 
Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (SENECYT). As part of this project, the 
Instituto Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología of Ecuador (INAMHI) assisted with 
the sophisticated sensor system to study the impact of climate on health. Machala was 
the first city in Ecuador with such a system.
7 Travel for SUNY participants in the workshops was paid for by the Research Office of 
SUNY Upstate, some expenses were covered by the GEIS grant and other expenses were 
covered by local partners who hosted the trainings. We also held multi-day trainings in 
geospatial tools for the public health sector in Machala and Guayaquil, with around 100 
participants from research and health sectors. The trainings were free for participants. 
We contracted GIS experts to develop and run the workshops using local health data and 
open source GIS software (QGIS). We paid for this using GEIS grant funding. These 
trainings showed our strong commitment to our partners in Ecuador. By holding the 
workshops in three major cities, we also got a lot of visibility and press attention.
8 Prior to beginning data collection in a new community, the team would hold public 
meetings with local leaders, local Ministry of Health employees and community mem-
bers to explain the research design and the protocol. Initially we had thought to pay 
the community members a nominal fee, but the study team felt that this was not cul-
turally appropriate. Amendments to research protocols were made to include a non-
monetary compensation to thank volunteers for their participation. Instead of gifting 
based on researcher’s perceptions of what might be valued, the team held community 
meetings and asked participants, “What type of gift would be most useful?” The top 
answers were health kits and educational materials (most likely because the start of the 
school year was just around the corner) and so the group prepared and passed out over 
250 health kits and 150 educational kits. The team also made a strong commitment to 
ensure that individuals received the results of all diagnostic tests done as part of the 
study. The field team also requested that all families receive mosquito nets at the end 
of the study, because they felt that this was the best way to shown gratitude for their 
participation and to lower the risk of disease (our recent study in Machala showed that 
homes that used mosquito nets had lower risk of Dengue infections).
9 This has included funding from GEIS, NSF, Deployed Warfighters Protection program, 
CDC, Clinical Research Management (a private CRO), IAI and others. US students 
have received competitive research fellowships to spend two months in Machala con-
ducting guided global health research. Sources include Rotary club, Kean Fellowships 
of ASTMH, Fulbright and SUNY student scholarships, among others.
10 For example, in 2017, the SUNY team, with UTMachala, conducted Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) training in Machala and Guayaquil, with close to 100 par-
ticipants, including individuals from the local MoH epidemiology and vector control 
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units, and university students and faculty. Another training took place in early 2017 
with US Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) staff, on insecticide resist-
ance to Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. Such types of symposiums and trainings, done often 
over the years on different subjects, are excellent venues to take pride in mutual growth 
and share results with a wider audience. UTMachala provides space and computers 
in various auditoriums, classrooms, or labs, and capitalizes on inviting investigators 
from SUNY Upstate, University of Florida, University of Colorado and other interna-
tional schools as guest speakers for conferences and events. Such events and scientific 
networking has also helped create Ecuadorian collaborations, for example, between 
UTMachala and the Escuela Superior Politecnica del Litoral (ESPOL) in Guayaquil, 
and the Catholic University (PUCE) in Quito. As part of the Machala project an impor-
tant collaboration was also developed with the Escuela Superior Politecnica del Litoral 
(ESPOL), in particular with Biomedicine Laboratory, considered a leading public 
research university in the country.
11 In 2015, the first Dengue vaccine (Dengvaxia) was licensed by Sanofi Pasteur; however, 
the vaccine has proven to be quite controversial, and was never licensed in Ecuador, 
due to its limited efficacy.
12 Through the PROMETEO fellowship program, hundreds of PhD researchers came to 
Ecuador to conduct research with local partners. Anna was a funded Prometeo fellow 
for almost two years.
13 This is especially important today with the crisis in Venezuela and the mass movement 
of Venezuelan refugees into Ecuador.
14 That said, some steps have recently been taken. Vector control in Machala is based on 
chemical control but recent work, funded by CDC’s Zika budget through the Machala 
group, has shown high levels of resistance to malathion. This will hopefully change the 
government’s procurement decisions. The group in Machala has also piloted a school 
education program and tested a novel mosquito control device, both strategies that may, 
in time, assist with control efforts in the city.
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Introduction
In Mexico, arbovirus epidemics (especially Dengue) have a long history, with 
public politics and social responses entangled with different discourses and 
practices. During the 20th century, basically two approaches for the control and 
prevention of mosquito-borne diseases have taken place, vertical interventions 
and horizontal ones. Although they followed different rationalities, they pursued 
almost the same objective: to eradicate mosquitoes. These battles were fought not 
just against “nature” but also between social groups, in “the culture.”
Yucatan state, located in the south of Mexico, has had mosquito-borne dis-
eases circulate since the pre-Columbian period (around 1480), where a Mayan 
Codex recorded a “blood vomit illness” called xeek kik (Góngora-Biachi, 2004). 
This could be the first reference to the presence of yellow fever in Mesoamerica. 
Mérida, the current capital city of Yucatan, has been an important center of trade, 
politics, science and art for a long time. It is one of the most important cities of 
the so-called peninsular region, where Mayan people have been the predominant 
cultural group for centuries. In the pre-Colombian period, it was one of the 16 
Mayan provinces, known as Ichkaansihó (Five stones). With the arrival of the 
Spaniards in 1541, and upon finding most pre-Hispanic buildings abandoned, 
the modern city of Mérida was born. The history of this city is rich in impor-
tant events, including a short independence period in 1841 when the Yucatan 
Peninsula separated from the rest of the Mexican Republic, although it was only 
for a short period (Cáceres et al, 1998). Later this area was divided into the states 
of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatan during a process of armed and political 
conflict in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Cáceres et al, 1998).
Another important historical event was the Caste War, in which the indig-
enous population revolted against the political oligarchy (criollos and mestizos) 
in 1847 (Reed, 2007, Cáceres et al, 1998). This ethnic resistance took place in 
the then main cities of Yucatan (especially in the south and east), but also had its 
repercussions in the city of Merida. One of these effects was of a symbolic nature 
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and resides in the adjective “white city” with which Mérida is known today. This 
whiteness has nothing to do with the habit of painting house walls with lime but 
rather denotes the distinction of Merida as a city for the “whites.” Outside the 
urban enclave was where the native population lived. Currently, Merida is still 
known as the “white city” but without any reference to the racial segregation of 
the colonial period.
Since then, the city has expanded significantly in population, with about 
900,000 people in 2015. As it is a capital city, Merida attracts people from the rest 
of the state, searching for work and educational opportunities; likewise, people 
from outside the state have emigrated for similar reasons, resulting in the enrich-
ment of multi-culturalism in Yucatán (Figure 7.1).
Merida also has ideal socio-urban conditions for the proliferation of Aedes 
mosquitoes and their related viruses. The city and its surrounding towns have 
been especially known as a place infested with mosquito-borne diseases since the 
1980s. As part of an international Aedes eradication campaign from 1964 to 1970, 
Aedes-endemic places such as Yucatan (southern Mexico) was apparently free of 
this vector; but in the following years, rapid re-infestation took place, as well as 
the introduction and circulation of new Dengue virus (DENV) serotypes (Gómez-
Dantés, 1991; Gómez-Dantés and Willoquet, 2009). Indeed, in comparison to 
other regions, the prevalence of Dengue in Yucatan from 1980s onwards has been 
increasing with major epidemics in 2011 and 2012. In 2014, Chikungunya virus 
(CHIKV) emerged in Latin America, with severe consequences for the Yucatecan 
population in the next year. In 2015, Zika virus (ZIKV) appeared as an emergent 
and controversial disease. In Table 7.1, we can see the reported cases for the capi-
tal city in Yucatan.
Figure 7.1  Map of Mexico (in white) and the State of Yucatan (in black).
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Our anthropological team has been doing research, on different aspects and in 
different capacities, on Aedes-borne diseases (ABDs) for almost seven years now. 
In this chapter, we reflect on what we have found, both in terms of our research 
data and also through our personal experiences in public health interventions and 
research.1 We draw upon this portfolio of studies, some past and some ongoing, 
to discuss the nature of multi-disciplinary approaches, the challenges of social 
research and the ways in which ethnography can have practical applications in the 
world of overlapping arbovirus epidemics.
Many of the results discussed here are under analysis for further publications. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the anthropological analy-
sis, considering multi-disciplinary views, on the challenges of mosquito-borne 
diseases in Yucatan, Mexico. To achieve this objective, we will discuss several 
issues from different scenarios. First, we discuss the current portfolio of socio-
anthropological research on ABDs in Yucatan and how these studies have shifted 
within a changing epidemiological situation. Second, we will analyze how recent 
outbreaks are changing the social perception of society about ABDs as well as 
prevention and control behaviors. Third, we make a call for an anthropological 
reflection on local vector control programs not just in Yucatan but also in the 
whole of Mexico; in this regard, we propose to view the existing surveillance 
system as a “system of meaning” with roles, social actors and normative practices 
that shape ABDs in Mexico. Finally, is also important to study how Zika virus is 
already changing practices, perceptions and prevention and control programs into 
a more complex reality given the role of sexual transmission and maternal risk.
The Yucatan portfolio: Anthropological 
research on Aedes-borne diseases
Yucatan has been the site of many anthropological studies for many decades, due 
to its links to Mesoamerican ruins and Mayan culture. One of the most pioneer-
ing anthropological studies in modern times was conducted by Robert Redfield, 
which focused on the socio-cultural transformation of Yucatecan society, specifi-
cally the transition from rural villages to a more urbanized existence (Redfield 
1944). In the 1990s, applied anthropological research emerged on Dengue for 
the first time in Merida City with Rockefeller Foundation support and focused on 
Table 7.1  Cases reported in Merida, Yucatan, Mexico 2015–2017
2015 2016 2017 Total
Dengue 5,391  2,387   173  7,951
Chikungunya   478    695    21  1,194
Zika   ‒  8,932 2,291 11,223
Total 5,869 12,014 2,485 20,368
Source: SINAVE.
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cultural beliefs and practices and the development of a vector-control intervention 
grounded in community participation and health promotion strategies (Winch et 
al, 1991; Lloyd et al, 1992). A key finding from this early work was that local per-
ceptions of Dengue (illness and symptoms) were very different from the scientific 
and biomedical discourse (see Table 7.2).
The impact of this work in public policies or governmental programs was not 
very clear since, when funding stopped, there was little follow-up. This is a per-
sistent problem in social studies on arboviruses; research is often short term, with 
little time and room to engage in long-term perspectives and network building 
at the local level, which are needed to engage public policies and interventions. 
Nonetheless, these local classifications of Dengue fever, identified almost 20 years 
ago, gave us some clues for further anthropological studies on mosquito-borne dis-
eases in Yucatan. In 2010, former members of that previous project and a new 
social science team started a new research as part of a World Health Organization 
(WHO) project aimed at addressing the social determinants of neglected diseases, 
including Dengue (Barrera-Pérez et al, 2010).2 We, as part of these new projects, 
observed many similarities on the local classifications of fever mentioned in Table 
7.2 in both rural and urban settlements. But we also found a greater emphasis, from 
the population, on the ways in which the social environment could shape the preva-
lence of Dengue. These new findings were likely the result of geographical and 
demographic changes, but were also likely influenced by theoretical shifts in the 
social sciences too that moved beyond sociocultural beliefs to pay more attention 
to the lack of public services, public insecurity, illegal drug activities and racism, 
for example.
Since this time, we have been involved in several projects, many of which 
have had a social science component. Normally for this kind of research, anthro-
pological work is focused on three main aspects: to conduct a social analysis of 
the communities where the (biomedical or entomological) projects are planned; 
to assist with community activities to promote the interventions in collaboration 




Barely elevated 38–39° Above 40°
Associated 
symptoms
Tiredness, sweating Tiredness, 
weakness, cough
Delirium, convulsion
Causes Hard work, vigorous 
exercise, begins in 
sun often followed 
by exposure to 
something cold
Same as irritación, 
failure to take 
care of irritación, 
winds





Home treatment Home treatment, 
then doctor if not 
better in 3 days 
Go to doctor first
Source: Winch et al (1991:4).
156 Josué Villegas-Chim, et al. 
with entomologists, epidemiologists and medical doctors; and, lastly, to examine 
the social acceptance and perceived efficacy of the control tools. In all aspects, 
ethnographic observations are a key dimension for our work.
The project “Aedes aegypti–proof houses” formerly ran in Acapulco, Mexico 
(Che-Mendoza et al, 2015), was scaled-up in Merida in 2013 and the objective 
was to install insecticide-treated house screens on door-windows (Manrique-Saide 
et al, 2017).3 As in many interventions with new methods for mosquito-vector 
control, this small-scale trial had to be evaluated from the communities’ perspec-
tive. We applied a survey to a subsample of households; an important finding 
was that participants accepted the project because the screens were free and were 
perceived to be beneficial for their families in many ways: to avoid mosquito-
human contact and reduce the risk of Dengue, which was perceived to be high at 
the time and in this particular community. This research was part of a huge effort 
of the Autonomous University of Yucatan and the federal Mexican government 
to reduce mosquitoes by using a new type of household intervention strategy. 
Currently, the project is being implemented in more neighborhoods in Merida.
In 2014, a cohort prospective study on Dengue infection began, funded by 
Sanofi-Pasteur. The main goal was to generate a statistically-robust baseline of 
Dengue epidemiology for planned vaccine field trials of Dengvaxia (Hladish 
et al, 2016; Pavía-Ruz et al, 2018; Rojas et al, 2018). A total of 450 families 
were enrolled for this project and social research was also done on local per-
ceptions and behaviors around Dengue. Interestingly, and in contrast to the high 
perceived threat of Dengue found in the Aedes-proof house study, many aspects 
of the research findings found almost 20 years ago continued to be found during 
our research: a low risk perception of Dengue and few corresponding preven-
tive practices being undertaken.4 Nevertheless, this situation was about to change. 
The emergence of Chikungunya in 2015 and Zika virus in 2016 impacted health 
systems, social practices and social perceptions of Yucatecans about mosquito-
borne diseases. Risk perception due to this new scenario changed the way people 
conceptualized domestic preventive measures such as the use of body repellent 
and cleaning of their properties and backyards.
Our multi-disciplinary team has been involved in two projects related to Zika 
virus, coordinated by the Autonomous University of Yucatan, in Merida since 2015. 
The first was funded by CDC in a rural village (Ticul) and in an urban city (Merida); 
the second one was part of an EU-Horizon 2020 funded initiative, called ZikAlliance 
(which involved the anthropology-team.). The first project, known as “Pregnancy 
without Zika,” was aimed at timely detection of Zika cases, with emphasis on 
changes in the normal course of pregnancy and birth of children with microcephaly 
or other abnormalities. As part of these activities, we conducted three social science 
studies related to pregnant women: (a) socio-cultural factors associated with Zika 
virus; (b) in-deep interviews with pregnant women about how they lived and experi-
enced the Zika outbreak; and (c) a social assessment of the perceived efficacy of the 
medical project, which included observing the clinical practices of health profes-
sionals, who were in charge of managing the intervention. This fieldwork provided 
some additional insights on the cultural meanings of Zika in Yucatan.
 Arboviruses in Yucatan, Mexico 157
Lastly, we have also been involved a Wolbachia-based strategy for Aedes-
vector control in Yucatan. The main difference here, in contrast to the other men-
tioned projects, is that the Mexican government is actively promoting this project. 
Key aspects of our activities for this project are networking with national and 
international entities (academic, governmental and private sectors) and a strong 
community engagement approach for local stakeholders and inhabitants from the 
mosquito releasing sites.
Clearly, Yucatan has become a focus for Aedes research, an assemblage of 
knowledge generation and one that is targeted towards translating research, 
including anthropological research, into public health intervention plans and pol-
icy. A part of this collaborative work, the Yucatan group has collaborated with 
many foreign universities (Emory University, Washington University, University 
of Florida, James Cook University, Sun-Yat-Sen University, and Michigan 
University State) and governmental institutions (Ministry of Health and, from 
Mexico; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, from the United States; and 
the Chinese government). An essential part of this collaborative work has been the 
stronger ties with the municipal and state governments. Another important col-
laboration has been in the creation of the State Committee for the Prevention and 
Control on Aedes aegypti, which aims to work closely across government, aca-
demia, private enterprises and society. Epidemiological and entomological issues 
have been the major concerns to address, rather than research and novel tools.
Global outbreaks, local concerns: Social perceptions 
and cultural responses in Yucatan
In Yucatan, as in many other Aedes-endemic places in Mexico, the presence of 
mosquitoes and of “fever” are often seen as both a symptom of disease and a dis-
ease itself. Historically, there has been a lot of focus on the therapeutic practices 
of the Yucatec Maya, including the classification of fevers and the traditional 
medical practices and hybridized categories (with biomedicine) that revolve 
around them.5 In 2014, we conducted an anthropological study focused on social 
understanding of fever in Merida and found that despite individuals going to a 
clinical facility, they also look for self-medication. Dialogues with doctors are 
often limited because symbolic elements typical of local Mayan-speaking heal-
ers are not shared.6 This can limit communication between patients and health 
workers. During our research, as well as in the earlier social studies in the 1990s, 
“fever” was not always associated with DENV, and small outbreaks were nor-
mally expected in the rainy season. In fact, despite the ubiquitous presence of 
mosquitoes, and the high circulation of arboviruses, social perception of Dengue 
risk was actually very low.
Our studies found that Dengue was not a very big deal at all for many families 
in Yucatan; they considered other illnesses such as pneumonia more relevant.7 
People are very accustomed to keeping buckets in their backyards for cleaning 
and drinking purposes and although they recognize that these are potential mos-
quito-breeding sites, they only wash them when they become visibly dirty. There 
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is also a clear gender dimension, as mentioned in other studies in Latin America 
countries (Cepeda et al, 2017; Arenas-Monreal et al, 2015; Danis-Lozano et al, 
2002; Davies et al, 2016; Guerra-Reyes et al, 2019). Some families collect “gar-
bage” (small or medium-sized containers) for sale, storing these in their back-
yards, where they become mosquito-breeding sites. However, something changed 
in 2015 with the CHIK outbreak.
Before the CHIK outbreak in Yucatan, the state government, through the pub-
lic health department, promised via media press that Yucatan was “bullet-proof” 
against the new virus. The explosive outbreak that ensued (see Table 7.1) demon-
strated a different scenario. The disjunction between these official proclamations, 
which stressed confidence and safety, and the high CHIK infection rate as well 
as new debilitating symptoms and chronicities (like arthritis) led to a number of 
consequences. Distrust in authorities arose because of this false sense of security 
and took health services by surprise. Popular perceptions began to shift. Despite 
the widespread concern and attention to CHIK, a similar type of helplessness 
emerged as the appearance of this new disease was quickly “normalized,” as had 
occurred with DENV previously (Chávez Arias et al, 2017). Chikungunya was 
seen as an additional sickness that festered in poor environmental conditions, part 
of “daily life” of Yucatecan society, especially for low-income families. One key 
informant reported, “There is nothing we can do. If you go to hospital you prob-
ably get infected because there are a lot of mosquitoes there; even the nurses and 
doctors have that sickness. So, tell me, why should I go there?” The problem was 
not with the low capacity to deliver health services in an outbreak situation; with-
out a vaccine or treatment and given the rapid illness course, that typically lasted 
a week or less, there was little for the health services to do. The response of the 
government was to increase vector control activities, such as fogging in the streets 
and spraying inside houses when a positive case was confirmed. These epidemics 
have proved to be very challenging to the government.
In Yucatan, the social-ecology of Aedes breeding is intimately related to increased 
urban space. Since the fieldwork of Robert Redfield and others in the 1960s, the 
geography and economy of Yucatan has shifted dramatically, as it has in other 
areas of Mexico. The region has seen increased migration to cities and town; almost 
50% of the entire population of Yucatan now lives in Merida (Fraga, 1991; Pérez-
Campuzano et al, 2014; Fortuny-Loret de Mola, 2006; Pérez et al, 2014). In the south 
of Merida, for example, 40 years ago the land was occupied by forest without any 
human settlements and certainly no water supply services. But as people migrated 
from rural towns to seek employment, they have also built up mosquito-breeding 
sites. These include public spaces, especially open sewers. During our research, 
we have observed a tendency for people to lay blame for mosquito reproduction 
on others, either using the narrative of public habitats (without any owners but the 
municipal government) and private spaces that are neglected and uncared-for. These 
are seen as sources of disease spread. They are commonly associated, as Dengue 
itself is, as a “disease of poor people.” So, if a household is recognized as a potential 
mosquito-breeding sites, it means that they are “a poor family.” In both cases, locals 
say that mosquitos proliferate because the government is not doing their job.
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Just as CHIK faded from social consciousness in 2016, another disease emerged: 
ZIKV, suddenly embedded in an even more political set of discourses. Once again, 
the particularities of the virus shifted social perceptions and responses, but in dif-
ferent ways (Manrique-Saide et al, 2018). In our research, we found that the recent 
ZIKV outbreak did not invoke the same level of social fear as CHIK for most peo-
ple in Yucatan, something that is supported elsewhere by other studies (Bardosh et 
al, 2017). This may be confusing, if one follows the health communication scheme 
of the Mexican authorities or of international agencies like PAHO and WHO. Both 
viruses are thought to have infected large-numbers of the population, although the 
rates of asymptomatic infections are considered to be less for CHIK (~50%) than 
ZIKV (~80%). Another issue is the more severe, and more widespread joint and 
muscle pain of CHIK, some of which can last one to two months or longer. A final 
reason is that the number of natural abortions, and cases of microcephaly and other 
congenital consequences, have not risen to alarming levels in Mexico.
Another important sociocultural reason to take into account for the “low status” 
of Zika in Yucatan is the “feminization” of the virus. Our initial fieldwork shows 
that Zika is perceived as a disease that affects “only women”, and more specifi-
cally, pregnant women and their children. This situation will bias the search for 
cases to young women, and neglect those infections in younger children and old 
males who are also bitten by mosquitoes and help transmit the virus. These find-
ings challenge the very idea of an effective prevention program in Yucatan. The 
social understanding of this new virus changed the face of arboviruses because of 
its associations with additional cultural practices and beliefs related to intimacy 
and sexual taboos on top of transmission through mosquito bites.
The culture of vector-control evaluation: 
Some anthropological reflections
In a national meeting of vector control experts held in Yucatan in 2016, precipitated 
by the ZIKV epidemic, the following statement was made in one of the opening 
sessions: “the enemy is the mosquito.” That is to say, the problem is the mosquito, 
whose very existence is a modifiable factor, through better and more organized 
vector control. This perspective is, in many ways, practical. It involves targeting 
the “guilty entity” in a way that mobilizes humans against the enemy – it is a form 
of public health militancy, grounded in historical experience. But it is neither an 
interdisciplinary perspective nor a holistic overview of the arbovirus problem.
In the Yucatecan context, the “social issues” of vector-borne diseases are often 
described as being related to “communities,” “the population” and “local inhabit-
ants” but almost never to the official institutions that lead prevention and control 
programs. In other words, these institutions also have “cultures” because they 
produce and reproduce social norms, values, hierarchies, status, social relations of 
power and, most importantly (and apparently not obvious to many of these stake-
holders), they are part of local cultures with global connections due to collabora-
tion with different governmental agencies, private companies and research centers. 
Here we have one of the biggest challenges from an applied anthropological point 
160 Josué Villegas-Chim, et al. 
of view: to effectively communicate to, and facilitate changes with, the culture of 
public health programs. Governmental institutions, in an anthropological sense, 
are systems with cultural meanings. However, asking and obtaining permission 
from government agencies to study their cultural practices and inner-workings 
as an institution is very challenging, and requires asking some uncomfortable 
questions. As vector-borne disease researchers, the politics of access is, in many 
ways, congruent with the difficulties we face in asking permission from families 
to access inside their homes and community – for entomological inspections, for 
example, or to administer a questionnaire or conduct a focus group. In a sense, 
we can say that this lack of access is itself a “structural barrier” to the efficacy of 
prevention and control programs, albeit one that is rarely part of Venn diagrams 
or other typical frameworks.
In our daily ethnographic observations, we have noticed that very few of our 
colleagues (including biologists, medical doctors, epidemiologists, ecologists, 
nurses and technical and operative personnel) use any personal protection prod-
ucts to prevent mosquito bites, despite the fact that many of our projects and 
the official public health risk communication materials recommend these sprays 
to much less educated and wealthy “target communities.” When we ask them 
the reasons for this discordance, our colleagues typically answer with various 
arguments justifying why they do not have repellents inside their bags at this 
very moment. They seem annoyed at having been “busted” or “exposed” by this 
inconsistency. This tells us something about how a “culture of evaluation” is seen 
as very important for “vulnerable population,” but apparently does not apply to 
the scientific teams that promote those same preventive measures. Our anthro-
pological team can only imagine what we would find if we asked these kinds of 
questions in a more systematic fashion and with a view to understanding the rela-
tionships between governmental institutions and Aedes-borne diseases in Mexico. 
Again, some informal observations have given us clues to the formal and informal 
management of the surveillance system.
In Yucatan, as in the rest of Latin America, there are many opportunities to 
improve the culture of public evaluation. There are key systematic reviews on 
the efficacy of different vector-control strategies (chemical control, environmental 
management, community participation, biological control) against the mosquitoes 
that evidenced different results regarding manifold variables such as functionality 
of vector control programs, building capacity, training operative personnel, com-
munity engagement-participation, public campaigns to promote actions, budget 
of the programs, following the guidelines, and so on; every method or mecha-
nisms have their own efficacy and limitations and an integrated approach make 
more sense, due to several challenges, rather than apply just one strategy (Dusfour 
et al, 2019; Mendes Luz et al, 2011; Bowman et al, 2016; Erlanger et al, 2008; 
Horstick et al, 2010). Although authors like Bauman et al (2016) argue that there 
is still need for a more robust research focused on the evaluation of different 
vector control methods (i.e. insecticide susceptibility and resistance), the ques-
tion here is: what will be the contributions from an anthropological perspective? 
First at all, the evaluation process on the efficacy of vector-control programs are 
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indeed social practices embedded into wider cultural context, politics of diseases 
control, financial resources, interests of private companies on validation for the 
promotion of products, societal acceptance, and the way the prevention actions 
are deployed. Suárez (2004) calls the attention to the way the prevention-control 
mechanism is understood from public politics vs community-target, is key for 
the sustainable life of the interventions itself. However, it is important to remem-
ber Manderson (1998) that pointed out that there is a juxtaposition of science 
over ‘local knowledge’ in a wider public health field. Thus, the question here 
is: do the society really understand how every vector control method works, or, 
the so-called Integrated Intervention Management? Whiteford (1997), gave us an 
example of how things goes in the wrong or unexpected way in her study about 
the ethnoecology of Dengue fever as a way to link culture, history, and politics 
into the way people understand the failure or success of the prevention of Dengue 
infections in Dominican Republic; here, she identified that the concept of Mala 
union, uncovered that government failure is part of the context of a vector-control 
failure. There is a lot to be done towards a holistic approach for the evaluation of 
vector-control programs aimed to enhance the strategies for better results.
Dengue vaccine in an inter-epidemic context
Chasing urban mosquitoes with fumigators and finding their breeding sites in 
vases, tires and bottle caps has proved to be very challenging in Yucatan and 
elsewhere. One of the most important events in the history of Dengue control, 
therefore, has been the recent production and licensing (now in 19 countries) of 
an effective vaccine. There were many laboratories that pursued this apparently 
unachievable goal, which took almost 40 years to accomplish, but finally we have 
a vaccine against four Dengue serotypes based on the related yellow fever vac-
cine. Sanofi-Pasteur invested hundreds of millions of euros in its Dengvaxia® 
program since it began in mid-1990s (Guy et al, 2015).
While WHO sets the guidelines for the introduction and evaluation of new vac-
cines in endemic areas, international initiatives (Dengue Vaccine Initiative, DVI) 
and Latin American agencies support research and provide information required 
to evaluate the best scenarios for the introduction of vaccines (WHO, 2012, 2016). 
In the case of the only registered Dengue vaccine, Dengvaxia®, the results from 
randomized clinical trials in Yucatan (and other Latin American and Asian coun-
tries) have illustrated the merits of the vaccine (Capeding et al, 2014; Villar et al, 
2015) and have promoted the recommendations from WHO’s Strategic Advisory 
Group of Experts (SAGE). Nonetheless, international attention to Dengvaxia®, a 
live recombinant tetravalent Dengue vaccine, has highlighted the complex socio-
political relationships between vaccine trials, national health policy, scientific 
knowledge and socio-cultural aspects of new vaccines, and the importance of 
pharmacovigilance after licensing.
In the case of Mexico, the advent of the vaccine promoted the creation of a 
Mexican Dengue expert group (MDEG). The exercise carried out by the MDEG 
was directed to the early adoption of a Dengue vaccine in Mexico, and included 
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the proposal that Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) actively partici-
pate in the generation of evidence, the analysis of data from clinical trials, the 
estimation of the burden of disease and the use of national-level evidence by deci-
sion makers to create a sustainable immunization program with all the resources 
required for the adoption of the new vaccine (Betancourt-Cravioto et al, 2014). 
This exercise was designed to prepare the regulatory processes, epidemiologi-
cal background information, economic evaluation and the logistical organization 
for the early registration, introduction and evaluation of the Dengue vaccine in 
Mexico. This process found uneven ground with academic groups questioning 
the safety of this vaccine since preliminary results demonstrated low protection 
to DEN2 serotype and potential risks of increasing hospitalizations (Hernández 
et al, 2016).
The emergency caused by the 2015 Chikungunya epidemic followed by Zika 
virus in 2015–2016 produced an unexpected amount of attention that displaced 
Dengue from the concerns of the community in Yucatan as well as from public 
health programs. The discourse around vector control (Aedes aegypti) transitioned 
from the hopes of a new vaccine to a more integrated approach focused on several 
arboviral diseases, instead of targeting only one: Dengue.
The vaccine itself has also played a role in this reconfiguring. Further studies 
have shown that the vaccine is not as effective as first thought, specifically in 
naïve populations (those who have never had Dengue) and children under nine 
years old. This has to do with pathogenic mechanisms and the immune enhance-
ment produced by the combination of certain sequences of Dengue virus infec-
tions in some populations. This has generated a set of critical and precautionary 
warnings amid calls for its immediate introduction. WHO has subsequently issued 
interim guidance recommending the vaccine be used only in individuals with a 
documented past Dengue infection (WHO, 2016). The findings have led to cessa-
tion of a large public vaccination program in the Philippines, in which > 700,000 
children aged ≥ 9 years were vaccinated in 2017, amidst widespread media cover-
age focused on the possible role that severe Dengue played in the deaths of several 
children who had received the vaccine.
This has not been the only element that has shifted the conversation. The 
anthropological challenge for us, with funding from Sanofi-Pasteur to explore 
issues of acceptability and implementation, was how to advocate for a “magic bul-
let” that targets one disease, instead of introducing a weapon (or refining existing 
vector control approaches) that deals with three infections that happen to be trans-
mitted by the same vector: Aedes aegypti. It is one thing to do years of research 
and clinical trials but another very different problem to introduce a new vaccine 
to the global market and convince local governments to pay for it and citizens to 
take it.
The main goal of the project, Familias sin Dengue in Yucatan, funded by the 
Sanofi-Pasteur laboratory, was to evaluate the vaccine Dengvaxia®, approved 
by the national agency that evaluates and establishes pharmaceutical regulations 
(COFEPRIS). When Familias sin Dengue began in 2014, the remains of the 2012 
Dengue outbreak lingered in Yucatan. This was fresh in the memory of local 
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citizens. Although Dengue fever remains, from a community viewpoint, not really 
an “important disease” (as discussed earlier), governmental prevention and con-
trol programs of Aedes aegypti have had very different points of view on this 
problem. Previous work, in other countries, on the acceptability of a (hypotheti-
cal) DENV vaccine has shown widely differing results – for example, with very 
high acceptance (94%) of a potential paediatric DENV vaccination programme 
in an Indonesian survey (Hadisoemarto and Castro, 2013) but poor attitudes to 
vaccination in another Indonesian study, particularly among those of lower socio-
economic status and with poor knowledge of DENV (Harapan et al, 2016). Major 
barriers to participation in a DENV vaccine trial (lack of trust and information, 
fear of side effects and of exploitation) were also identified in Puerto Rico (Guerra 
et al, 2012). When we asked the participants of Familias sin Dengue about the 
acceptance of Dengvaxia®, 90% of the answers were, “Yes, I’ll accept this vac-
cine.” For the local community, remember DENV was not a big deal, but they 
were okay about the implementation of this new vaccine. Ethnographically, we 
have found that many families normally ask, in their medical consultation, for a 
vaccine rather than pills for all sorts of ailments and diseases, because they are 
viewed as more effective and less of a burden.
However, the situation changed with the CHIK and ZIKV outbreaks, as sud-
denly we have two new diseases in Yucatan and no available vaccine against 
these viruses. While some efforts were made at developing a ZIKV vaccine, with 
some advocates thinking that this could be developed relatively quickly, these 
statements were overly-optimistic. This made people in Yucatan wonder, “Why 
should I accept this dengue vaccine,” many informants of our research reported. 
The same situation occurred when ZIKV emerged in 2016. However, our recom-
mendation is to conduct more in-depth research on the socio-cultural complexity 
of this subject, as the initial studies were relatively limited in scope.
Towards a socio-political surveillance of 
Aedes-borne disease prevention
Decades of Dengue outbreaks, a widespread and very debilitating CHIK epidemic 
(from the perspective of local people) and the emergence of a new congenital 
syndrome (ZIKV), all followed in rapid secession, point us to some important 
questions that should be asked about the efficacy of the current vector control 
program and about local sociocultural logics. It is one thing to study topics such as 
social perceptions of risk and another very different activity to conduct a rigorous 
and critical sociopolitical analysis of Aedes-borne disease prevention programs, 
as Suárez (2004) and Nading (2014) pointed out as a key dimension for mosquito-
vector control strategies. The complexity of reducing or eliminate mosquitoes is 
not just about what communities do or do not do, accept or reject, but also encom-
passes an institutional process, the bureaucratic rules in action and the informal 
ways that individuals manage vector control programs. In a sense, we need a 
new type of anthropological engagement, at least in Mexico and in Yucatan; in 
the words of public health, we need an “anthropological surveillance” of vector 
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control programs, of their social and political forms, mechanisms, outcomes and 
impacts.
We can already anticipate some barriers to such an activity. There is a common 
complaint among anthropologists working in health, that no matter how illuminat-
ing our findings might be, they are not taken seriously by other colleagues (such 
as epidemiologists, medical doctors, biologists, etc.), government stakeholders or 
private entrepreneurs. The main reason is that “slow research” (as discussed by 
Adams et al, 2014) is in conflict with the hegemonic perspective of the perspec-
tives that dominate epidemiology and entomology, at least in Mexico. Of course, 
when things get rapidly worse, as in an outbreak of Zika, Chikungunya, Ebola, 
cholera or whatever, there is a demand for rapid responses that quickly assess the 
situation; there is no time for years of research, for example, although there is cer-
tainly an opportunity to link the response with anthropologists who already have 
a high-level of cultural knowledge and experience.
So how can we transform the perception of public health practitioners about 
the value of anthropology and transform anthropological findings themselves to 
be more operationally relevant and concrete? As Kleinman (2010) stated, many 
anthropologists have spent a lot of time attacking biomedicine, of critiquing the 
power and control involved in bureaucratic and scientific knowledge forms, but 
it is important that such attacks are also constructive and, ultimately, transforma-
tive. To do such work, however, there needs to be some resources available for 
meaningful employment.
We can draw upon some examples from our portfolio of current research pro-
jects. We had the opportunity to study the Chikungunya outbreak in 2015 by 
observing 200 households in a semi-urban city, Ticul, in Yucatan. Although our 
data could not be of use during the outbreak itself, we systematically documented 
the social behavior and cultural responses that gave us important clues for future 
epidemic events. These included some important findings, such as changes in 
preventive practices, health-seeking behavior, social perceptions on how CHIK 
could spread within households and the different ways that these disease symp-
toms are normalized. When the Zika outbreak occurred in 2016 in Yucatan, we 
were able to repeat aspects of this research, this time interviewing 200 pregnant 
women in Merida, which allowed us to validate and deepen our previous findings 
and uncover additional cultural aspects that people associated to this new virus.
From these ethnographic observations, an important question about interven-
tions is: who is responsible for the efficacy of these preventive programs? From 
the communities’ perspective, the government is responsible and the failure of 
their actions is proof of this disappointing management. Nevertheless, we have 
found that the communities themselves have also ignored their responsibilities. 
This is to say, for many local inhabitants, carrying out preventive domestic prac-
tices is, simply speaking, not a priority. New interventions (for example, insecti-
cide-treated screens in doors and windows or even new vaccines like Dengvaxia) 
can reinforce these attitudes because they are vertical interventions managed in 
collaboration with the local government of any kind outside of passive compliance 
and acceptability (these types of interventions are typically provided for free). As 
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an informant highlighted during our fieldwork, “[i]f I have this intervention, why 
do I have to worry about doing other things by myself?” This is a central paradox 
of public health. Nevertheless, this could create a false sense of security because 
the interventions do not always work as they should due to many variables, not 
only social but also entomological and epidemiological ones as well.
Zika virus: New disease, new paradigm?
With the emergence of Zika, the very nature and notion of what a vector-borne 
disease is, how it is transmitted and how it affects people, has been challenged 
(Cepeda et al, 2017; Davis et al, 2016; Guerra-Reyes et al, 2019). This has pushed 
social scientists engaged with Dengue, like our team in Yucatan, to consider other 
kinds of topics in vector-borne disease research other than the classic focus on 
environmental health. This has included issues on maternal and child health care, 
contraception, abortion and women rights and sexual intercourse as a new mecha-
nism for virus transmission of an Aedes-borne illness. Talking about Zika, there-
fore, expanded our idea of anthropological surveillance into other, sometimes 
uncomfortable areas, like abortion and disability. These are imbued with new 
cultural and moral values related to maternity, taboos on sexual intimacy, guilt or 
blame related to abortion and contraception practices and gender relationships of 
power. In addition, pregnant women and their families may have already started 
the process of resignification of mosquito-borne illnesses as well as the social 
appropriation of scientific-biomedical discourses about this emergent disease.
We identified that ZIKV is something “in-between” Dengue and Chikungunya 
and “something else”, although easily confused with the “normal symptoms” of 
pregnancy. Pregnant women have access to information about ZIKV, but they are 
skeptical about some issues, like the relationship between ZIKV infection and 
“small-heads in newborns.” At the time, there was much uncertainty and a feeling 
that access to information was limited and not always very clear.
Zika also bumps up against another cultural dimension long seen in the “old 
challenges” to HIV programs: sexual education. Here we have an unexpected 
dichotomy between vector control and now this very new world of sexual trans-
mission. Thus, as we could say, to fight mosquitoes is not what it used to be. 
Combining the use of body repellents and condoms to prevent a mosquito-borne 
disease makes the work of prevention campaigns much more difficult. For exam-
ple, cultural biases on sexual education in Yucatan have not been well addressed 
in this new scenario. A recent study demonstrated that two concepts are key to 
understand the wider context of HIV in Yucatan: social vulnerability and risk-
groups (Quintal-López et al, 2014). These researchers focused heavily on indig-
enous immigrants as a high-risk HIV group, which offers an important frame for 
thinking about the social vulnerability of pregnant women to ZIKV. Religious 
beliefs can also have important impacts on vector-borne diseases. We found some 
insights into local discourses when people told us that it is God’s will that their 
families have had, for example, Dengue fever. One interesting question to be 
answered will be: do pregnant women think in the same way about Zika virus in 
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Yucatan? As ZIKV vaccine trials began in a number of countries, it is also unclear 
how pregnant women will respond to separate Dengue and ZIKV vaccines, not to 
mention the complex immunological effects this may create.
Conclusions
There are important avenues for sociocultural engagement in arboviruses, both 
during endemic and epidemics periods, that are still emerging for anthropologists. 
As attention increases, and as more potential threats come into existence, how can 
we develop methodologies – or “gold standard guidelines” – for anthropologi-
cal knowledge, focused on the improvement of Aedes-borne disease prevention 
and control in places like Yucatan? While an interdisciplinary approach, draw-
ing together different disciplines, sounds like an ideal option, the real challenge 
is not about “bridging disciplines.” In Yucatan, we have interdisciplinary teams 
where our anthropological inputs are valued and considered, but most of the atten-
tion we get from these recommendations are focused on “the community.” This 
“community focus” is itself reinforced by common perceptions about anthropol-
ogy; that is, it is a field focused exclusively on “the other” – often remote tribes, 
exotic peoples or Neolithic remains. In Yucatan, this includes a heavy focus on 
Mesoamericans.
But the social realities of Aedes-borne diseases are a complex reality that 
extends beyond the community; thus, we also need to see prevention and con-
trol mechanisms as social practices with rules, social norms, cultural values and 
power relations (Suárez, 2004). Public health policies on arboviral diseases are 
part of social discourses assembled in a larger discursive matrix. Anthropologists 
should not just be instrumentalist in how they approach collaborations with bio-
medical researchers and public health staff; they should also provide a critical 
praxis to efforts to reduce mosquitoes, educate the public about sex and protect 
pregnant women from congenital syndromes. This should include more of a focus 
on community participation, which up until now has remained a very poorly inte-
grated element in mosquito-borne disease prevention and control in Yucatan. 
Here, the inclusion of anthropologists and the deep consideration and respect for 
what we bring to the table is not as developed as it is in more developed nations. 
Therefore, in the future, we seek to expand our focus, and to better develop some 
of the ideas we have outlined above, specifically for an anthropological platform 
for socio-political surveillance of public health activities to assist with pre-, inter- 
and post-epidemic events.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Dr. Kevin Bardosh for constructive editorial inputs and the 
Welcome Trust for funding the open access fee associated with this book chapter. The 
opinions expressed here of the authors do not reflect the view of their institutions or the 
financial agencies that provide funding for the studies mentioned in this chapter.
2 As part of the project, we organized several workshops with many types of participants. 
The interviewers and leaders of the peripheral communities or urban neighborhoods 
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(located in the South of Merida) were invited as well as different government authori-
ties (health departments, education, natural resources and environment, and politi-
cians), researchers and the public press.
3 Historically, there was no enough or solid evidence on the efficacy of the mosquito-
screens installed on doors and windows in Mexico. Therefore, one of the main objec-
tives of the project was to prove the efficacy of the method with some improvements. 
Since the trial intervention was implemented successfully, our lab (UCBE-UADY) has 
been working with the federal and local government to scale-up this intervention to 
more houses in Merida, especially in hot-spot areas where the number of mosquitoes 
is very higher (this data is provided by the government through the entomological sur-
veillance system).
4 We found that risk perceptions were different in the Aedes-proof house intervention 
study (2013) in comparison to the Dengue cohort prospective study, which was con-
ducted the next year (2014). The first study was performed in a small neighborhood 
(called Manzana 115) where risk perceptions were high largely due to the fact that 
Manzana 115 had been hard-hit by the Dengue outbreak in 2012. In contrast, the sec-
ond study was done across all of Merida, in high-, medium- and low-risk transmission 
areas. Here, we found much lower risk perceptions.
5 All medical practices in Mesoamerica today respond to both diachronic and synchronic 
processes that together make up traditional healing methods and biomedicine, rooted in 
pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica models. One of the practices we documented in fieldwork 
consisted of the use of painkillers that were not ingested but prepared as a mixture with 
commercial unguent. The people put this mixture on the whole body to eliminate high 
fever. When we asked about the efficacy of this measure, some informants said that it 
works. Perhaps the “symbolic efficacy” is playing an important cultural association 
here but also the same interviewees reported that they went to see a doctor.
6 As an example of cultural limitations in health care we can refer to the management 
and care of fevers: “In Yucatec Maya, as well as in many other Mesoamerican lan-
guages, a subset of temperature terms is used to talk about sensory temperatures as 
well as categorical temperatures. Although the distinction between sensory tempera-
ture (non-marked) and categorical temperature (combined with kùuch ‘load’) seems 
a straightforward one, the term kùuch is not always mentioned in everyday conversa-
tions and speakers talk simply about ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ things (chokoh/síis ba’al) without 
explicitly mentioning ‘its load/effect’, which is implied. This is one reason why the 
distinction between sensory and categorical meaning is not always so obvious” (Le 
Guen 2015: 157–158).
7 Although they did consider fever, as a symptom, to be something to be taken very seri-
ously.
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8
I think that Aedes aegypti-transmitted diseases, like Zika, are an opportunity for 
Girardot’s people. It is a chance to move forward … maybe we can see now, how 
paralyzed and resigned we are. It is a call to action.
(Teacher, Girardot, 2017)
Belonging is an amorphous concept, but one with relevance to the control of mos-
quito-borne diseases. Public health authorities, in their quest to sever the ties of 
mosquito reproduction, aim to dislodge insect populations from “belonging” in 
their ecological niche. For Aedes aegypti, this means household water contain-
ers, and other habitats, in urbanized and urbanizing cities and towns of (mostly) 
tropical regions. On the other hand, implementing effective vector control inter-
ventions also means creating and maintaining human connections – of systems, 
staff and stuff, so to speak – that can “belong” and hold program goals together. 
This includes the motivation, meanings and shared cooperation that sustain, or 
disrupt, intersectoral action. Belonging, in all of its psychological complexity, is 
an important but often overlooked component to the process of community par-
ticipation in vector control. In this chapter, we expand on the idea of belonging, as 
a concept, by exploring the physical and social landscape of a Colombian city – a 
stage for the drama of arbovirus infection.
The quote at the beginning of this chapter, from a leader of a local public 
university exemplified a citywide dilemma that, as public health researchers, we 
became aware of during our work, from 2005 to 2017, in the city of Girardot, 
Colombia. The dilemma related to the municipality’s development plans and 
the relationships between government entities and local residents, resulting in a 
lack of “community” participation. Girardot was/is in a continuous, ongoing and 
uncertain process of developing an identity, something that heavily depends on 
current resources and politics, and past histories. Our foray into the city’s identity 
politics began in 2005 when we lead a team of entomologists, anthropologists, 
epidemiologists and geographers to assess Dengue transmission, including vector 
density, community practices and people’s knowledge and attitudes. Since then, 
we have conducted research in Girardot, under different research projects, which 
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has allowed us to view the city through more than a decade of sustained change. 
Over time, and with our local interlocutors, we have gained insights into what 
belonging means to people in Girardot and how important these issues are for 
attempts to control mosquitoes.
Although it is common for social scientists to use the word “belonging,” ter-
minological ambiguities remain (Antonsich, 2010). Usually, the word is used 
as a synonym of identity and/or of citizenship. But belonging has individual 
(emotional) and collective (political) dimensions (Bauböck, 2005; Jones and 
Krzyzanowski, 2007; Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2007). It simultaneously refers 
to the intimate emotion of feeling at home in a certain place (place-belonging-
ness), and an official discursive resource used to construct or justify forms of 
social inclusion/exclusion (politics of belonging).
In the city, belonging also has physical, social and historical textures. Our 
interest in this chapter is to explore this, with a focus on individual and collective 
ideas of urban history, development and sociality in the small Colombian town of 
Girardot.1 In other words, we seek to explore how “belonging” offers an oppor-
tunity to reinterpret the social and ecological interactions involved in mosquito-
borne disease spread and vector control programs.
But why focus on cities? For the first time in history, more than half of the 
world population lives in urban areas (54% in 2016). From an urban health point 
of view, this imposes a triple health threat, especially for tropical countries: 
infectious diseases (such as HIV, tuberculosis, influenza and vector-borne dis-
eases), non-communicable diseases (diabetes, cancers and heart diseases), and 
injuries related to traffic accidents and violence (WHO, 2010). Urban spaces are 
profoundly heterogeneous and the negative impacts of unplanned urban growth 
create and reinforce existing health inequities (UN-HABITAT & WHO, 2010). 
Colombia does not escape this trend. In 1937, only 29% the population lived in 
urban areas; but by 2005, it had risen to 75%, largely concentrated in the Andean 
and Caribbean regions (Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2007).
Girardot Aedes-Free: Approaches and 
activities of a participatory project
Girardot Aedes-Free was a project funded by the Special Programme for 
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR-WHO) in collaboration with 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). It sought to follow an 
eco-bio-social approach (as part of a broader EcoHealth approach), which had 
been previously developed by TDR and IDRC in six Asian countries, focused on 
improving community-based vector control through multi-disciplinary research 
groups and partnerships between academic institutions, communities, munici-
pal services and NGOs (TDR, 2011). This served as our research framework, 
in which macro- and micro- factors are identified as both part of the problem 
and part of the solution for preventing arbovirus transmission. Rainfall, humidity, 
temperature, vector behavior, ecology, demographic change, urbanization, health 
systems, vector control and health services, political contexts, sanitation, sewage, 
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garbage collection and water supply are all among the factors to be explored under 
this holistic research framework. Understanding how these factors overlap and 
reinforce one another in both the natural and human environment helps to deter-
mine the effectiveness of public health interventions.2
The project went through three distinct phases. In the first phase (2010–2011), 
we explored ecological, biological and social factors through different field stud-
ies. Large rectangular cement tanks (known as albercas) and large round plastic 
containers (tanks/barrels) were identified as the most productive Ae aegypti habi-
tats, most of which were kept indoors. Seventy percent of all pupae were found 
in albercas and 24% in tanks/barrels, compare to only 6% in tires (Quintero et 
al., 2014). These findings suggested that any effort to reduce larvae/pupae should 
focus on the household level, with an important component on water storage prac-
tices. Despite the fact that water service interruptions have now become rare, a 
long history of water shortages and high water prices were one of the principal 
factors driving water storage (García-Betancourt et al. 2015).
In the second phase, a community-based intervention was designed, imple-
mented and evaluated. This intervention consisted of the design of long-lasting 
insecticide-treated net (LLITN) covers for the most productive containers. Two 
types of covers were design: (1) aluminum frame covers for the albercas; and 
(2) elastic waterproof fabric covers for the large round plastic containers. A total 
of 354 covers were constructed and used in four clusters, approximately one per 
household. We then focused our attention on evaluation; the results showed a 
decline of 71% in the pupae-per-person index in the intervention group compared 
with a 25% reduction in the control group. We found that 60% of households 
reported a willingness-to-pay for the covers, 83% would recommend them to 
friends and neighbors and 90% would be happy to receive them again for free 
(Quintero et al., 2015). Furthermore, 26% reported less use of personal insecticide 
sprays.
The last phase of the project aimed to scale-up the intervention to 5,000 of the 
25,471 total households in Girardot (DANE, 2008). This phase ended in September 
2017 with 5,672 covers implemented in 3,900 households. As an intervention pro-
ject, our goal was to initiate a series of actions focused on community participa-
tion and, ultimately, some form of permanence or, as it is typically called in global 
health, “sustainability.” Fostering participation, however, has not proven to be an 
easy task. We found that Girardot’s sense of itself – of belonging and the realities 
of inclusion and exclusion that accompany it – played an important, defining role 
in shaping our efforts. Belonging is a major topic of conversation these days in 
Girardot, on the street, in the market and in the comfort of the home where people 
chat, gossip and debate about institutions, municipal leaders, neighbors and com-
munity leaders. These private conversations shape public health efforts.
From a town to a city: The biography of a city
The city of Girardot, located 120 kilometers southwest from Bogotá, Colombia’s 
capital, has an average tropical annual temperature of 33°C. This entails an inter-
esting paradox in that the city’s climatic and ecological conditions are a perfect 
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breeding ground for vector reproduction and virus circulation but also tourists 
from distant cities, such as Bogotá, who come searching for rest and fun. With 
a population of just over 100,000 people, Girardot is an example of a city influ-
enced by conurbation processes, where urban growth links up previously discreet 
small towns and (slowly) transforms the rural countryside into urban sprawl. In 
the case of Girardot, this meant the growth of residential, recreational and com-
mercial infrastructure and services. The city is the largest urban center in the 
department of Cundinamarca but shares its administrative limits (the important 
Magdalena River) with the department of Tolima. Girardot, however, is not a 
forgotten city; it has an important history as a regional center. This changed from 
the 1970s onwards, as a centralization of finance, services and administrative 
power became more consolidated around Bogotá, and reduced the urban growth 
of the cities within its zone of influence, such as Girardot (Molina et al., 2003; 
UNCRD & UNDESA, 2005) (Figure 8.1).
The history of Girardot, as an urban physical space, is both ecological and 
socio-political. As with much of Latin America, it begins with European con-
quest and colonial subjugation. The first known human inhabitants of modern-day 
Girardot were the Panches tribe, known for their agriculture, fishing and trading 
networks. Spanish soldiers, having arrived in what is now Bogotá in 1537, heard 
of the wealth and riches of the Panches and soon began a military campaign to 
conquer their land. This ended in 1544 with the destruction of the Panches indig-
enous group, the control of their territory and the founding of a new Spanish urban 
Figure 8.1  The urban ecosystem of Girardot, Colombia. Photo by Gabriel Leaño.
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settlement, called Tocaima. Girardot was only founded later, in 1852, as a fluvial 
port; nevertheless, it quickly gained regional importance when the national rail-
way, coming from Bogotá, reached the port. Soon the city was considered a hub 
for important communication and transport infrastructure in Colombia, a cross-
roads due to its location on the Magdalena River. This river is one of Colombia’s 
most important fluvial arteries, connecting the center of the country with the 
North, passing through eleven departments and flowing into the Caribbean Sea 
at Barranquilla’s commercial port. Combining the fluvial port with the railway 
meant that Girardot was in the middle of important economic exchanges between 
Bogotá and the rest of the country.
The city’s development was certainly influenced by the railway that con-
nected half of the country with Bogotá in 1881 (Banrep, 2011). The fluvial port 
and its link with the railway influenced the city’s physical growth; more houses, 
businesses, schools, churches and streets were developed for the city’s growing 
port and attendant commerce. However, the railway of Girardot was a truncated 
project from its beginning. A lack of technical capacity for construction, cor-
ruption in budgeting, a national civil war from 1899 to 1902 (between conserva-
tive and liberal national political parties), low railway productivity and high fees 
for transport all influenced the railway crisis during these years (Benavides & 
Escobar, 2014). In 1970, the railway closed due to administrative issues, nation-
wide highway construction, low profitability and the introduction of air transport 
(Benavides & Escobar, 2014; Correa, 2014). 
This city has undergone several demographic changes due to both external and 
internal migrations. In the 1880s, the warm climate, nearby coffee and tobacco 
farms, a burgeoning textile industry and railway and fluvial port construction 
drove migration into the city. Furthermore, international migration of Lebanese 
communities into Colombia took-up home in Girardot, adding a new cultural 
group. Two new factors also helped to enhance the economy and importance of 
Girardot: a major annual livestock fair (beginning in 1908) and beauty contests 
that began in the 1950s. Both strengthened Girardot as a commercial and tour-
ist center. This history of transitions, migrations and movements, combined with 
the failure of Girardot’s railway and fluvial port, shifted the city’s development 
ambitions. As stated by the Urban Development Pilot Plan of Girardot, published 
in 1972:
Girardot does not have a life of its own. The agricultural sector is not located 
in its jurisdiction, so it has no other alternatives for its commercialization and 
obtaining services; industrialization is almost impossible, trading is highly 
competitive due to its proximity to Bogota and the emergence of expansion of 
urban centers in areas of special agricultural affluence, and the services sector 
has a deficient and unprepared infrastructure – both material and human – on 
which to capitalize. Perhaps the only medium-term perspective that the city 
appears to have is tourism.
(IGAC, Urban Development Pilot Plan 
of Girardot, 1972)
176 Tatiana García-Betancourt et al. 
In many ways, Girardot has followed a general pattern for growing Colombian 
cities, where agricultural and industrial activities have gradually been abandoned 
and replaced with service, retail and recreational industries. In this long transit, 
Girardot has also physically grown from its initial placement around the fluvial 
port into the mainland, spreading northwards away from the Magdalena River. In 
1880, the limit of the urbanized area of Girardot was less than 700 meters away 
from the river (now the city center). In 1930, the city spread 1.5 kilometers away 
from the river. By 2017, this distance reached 3.4 kilometers, while the city was 
also about 6 kilometers from the port to the northeast, where a massive second 
residence complex of 900 houses (with a golf course and lake) had been built in 
the 1980s.
Over the last two decades, the city has experienced rapid urbanization due to a 
growth in tourism that has created new housing types (serviced, self-catering, sec-
ond residence complexes) and shopping centers. The principal economic activity 
of Girardot is retail (58%), and services (principally restaurants and bars (36.5%) 
and hotels and hostels (10%) (Camara de Comercio de Bogotá & Facultad de 
Ciencias Universidad Nacional, 2007). Due to its favorable climate, Girardot has 
become known as a “tourist city,” mainly for residents of greater Bogotá. During 
small periods, like long weekends and vacation periods, the population can triple 
its normal size.
As many Latin American countries, government decentralization policies 
became the norm in the 1980s (Duque Cante, 2017). Cities in Colombia are clas-
sified into six categories that define the level of local decision making over health 
and education, based on institutional capacity and financial and administrative 
autonomy (Portal de alcaldes y gobernadores de Colombia, n.d.). Girardot’s clas-
sification was updated in 2018 to a category one city, giving it a high level of 
autonomy in, and responsibility for, public health and vector control activities.
Girardot’s initial growth was deeply dependent on external forces imposed by 
commerce and transportation development. Now, as a larger modern city, the offi-
cial discourse is that tourism is the main opportunity for socio-economic develop-
ment. But at the same time, the municipal government struggles to face structural 
problems typical of Colombian cities, such as unemployment, insecurity, trans-
port (informal use of motorcycles as taxis) and informal economic activities (that 
do not provide taxes). As we will see, this shift from a town to a city has also 
brought with it a new corpus of psycho-social anxieties for local residents, as they 
struggle to feel at home in an expanding urban space.
Girardot and Aedes aegypti–transmitted diseases
In the 1860s, several febrile disease epidemics were documented along the 
Magdalena River valley, following the commercial trading and workers’ migra-
tion routes related to tobacco and Indigo dye production. These “fevers,” as they 
were reported at the time, were likely different diseases: typhoid, pneumonia, dys-
enteric, smallpox, cholera and yellow fever (García, 2007). The origin of these 
epidemics was attributed to warm and unhygienic environments and uncivilized 
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populations, an interpretative heritage left over from the Spanish conquerors 
(García, 2007; García, 2012). Two examples of how economic growth, transpor-
tation and fevers were related in Girardot can be found in historical documents. 
The first involves the fact that, two months after the beginning of railway con-
struction, in October 1881, a yellow fever epidemic hit Girardot, killing some 
railway staff. The second is an article about the sanitary issues of the port in 
1927, which argues that “the complete abandonment of sanitation in the port has 
increased the mosquito plague” (El Tiempo, 1927). This exemplifies the local 
coexistence of Aedes aegypti–transmitted diseases and city development.
The threat of Aedes aegypti, first with yellow fever and then with Dengue, 
has been linked with the expansion of international trade, economic interests and 
commercial ports in tropical countries. At the beginning of the 20th century, the 
control of yellow fever was one of the main concerns of the United States for the 
expansion and intensification of trade and great efforts were aimed at achieving 
the continental eradication of Ae aegypti in infested countries (Padilla et al., 2012). 
Several attempts were made for the eradication of the mosquito, for example in 
the 1950s the continental-wide use of DDT, achieving important but unsustain-
able results. These costly national programs were abandoned, and within a few 
years a massive re-infestation of Aedes aegypti took place and lead to the reap-
pearance of two epidemics and the introduction of a new Dengue serotype in 1977 
(Padilla et al., 2012). In Colombia, the Ministry of Health has since documented 
regular Dengue epidemics in 1971–1972, 1975, 1977–1978, 1983, 1987, 1990, 
1995, 1998, 2001–2002, 2005, 2009–2010 and 2014. In all of these, the region of 
the Magdalena River valley and, in particular, Girardot, has been affected.
Project challenges: How to make it “their” project?
As researchers, we are always thinking about the next step and thus the sustain-
ability of any public health intervention. From our perspective and given the eco-
bio-social and Ecohealth approaches used for the Girardot Aedes-Free project, 
the key is convincing local actors and the community in general that this is their 
project. Scaling-up processes require the identification of key actors, understand-
ing the user experience and contextual elements and the creation of empowerment 
mechanisms like knowledge transfer, social networking, considering community 
priorities and promoting problem-solving. These are done through focus groups, 
stakeholder collaborations, local leadership development and the inclusion of par-
ticipants across all social groups, for diversity and equity.
While community involvement is essential for integrated Dengue control 
strategies (Caprara et al., 2015), it is also one of the major limitations in current 
Dengue vector control services (Horstick et al., 2010). Strengthening community 
involvement and enhancing interactions with local actors are potential strategies 
for sustainability (Alfonso-Sierra et al., 2016; Quintero et al., 2017). Conversely, 
social participation can happen in a disorderly and discontinuous manner, from 
an operational, political or institutional point of view (Caprara et al., 2015). Also, 
it can be time-consuming and costly, although it is rewarding when actions are 
178 Tatiana García-Betancourt et al. 
sustained over time (although this is never guaranteed!). In Colombia, vector con-
trol programs have been vertical and limited, with institutional weaknesses and 
low response capacity (Padilla et al., 2012). Since 2010, however, the traditional 
program has been shifting towards a new national program that highlights com-
munity participation as a transversal pillar (Padilla et al., 2012).
One of the central issues faced by our community-based intervention was social 
participation. We involved community and local leaders in all project phases from 
the intervention design through implementation by using participatory research 
tools. One such tool, during the intervention design phase, was workshops on cre-
ating water containers covers. The objective was to incorporate local knowledge 
(of water use practices and preferences for water storage innovations) to allow us 
to construct and install the best water container covers, adapted to the needs and 
expectations of Girardot residents (García-Betancourt et al., 2014).
In community-based interventions, the consultation process can be time-
consuming; problems are inevitable as negotiating participation and navigating 
different interests and expectations are a major part of the intervention itself 
(Alfonso-Sierra et al., 2016). In Girardot, some problems related to local partici-
pation, such as a lack of attendance at community and local leader meetings, low 
commitment by municipality personnel and a breach of contract by local suppli-
ers causing delays on the delivery and installation of container covers (García-
Betancourt et al., 2014).
To evaluate the community’s acceptance and participation in the project, we 
explored three main questions: (1) What are the residents’ perception of Girardot? 
(2) Is Dengue a central concern for the community and its leaders? and (3) How 
can we achieve intervention buy-in and project sustainability? Our ethnographic 
findings3 showed that the answers to these questions were related to two princi-
pal themes: belonging and identity. Being born and living in a certain place can 
determine our feelings and sense of belonging (Licari, 2011), and the city in its 
architecture, history, politics and culture shapes this human experience (Raffaetà 
& Duff, 2013). As La Cecla (2011) states:
The map of the house, the rules of residence, the neighborhoods of the vil-
lage, altars, public places, the division of the territory, correspond for eve-
ryone to a set of possibilities, rules and prohibitions with a spatial, social, 
identitarian, and historic content at the same time.
Space and territories are places of dialogue (Licari, 2011), that create certain types 
of relationships, and inhibit others from taking place. Identifying how the city 
shapes local etiologies of belonging and identity is an important method to appre-
ciate what limits or enhances community participation in mosquito control.
Perceptions: Instability and individual interests
Our exploration of residents’ perception of Girardot focused heavily on insta-
bility in governance, confidence and a commitment to collective welfare. These 
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elements were related to individual feelings of place-belongingness or attachment 
towards the city, although this was not always reflected in commitment to be 
involved in community well-being or participatory processes. In other words, an 
absence of a sense of community was widely reported. As a teacher told us during 
an interview in 2017:
I would say that Girardot is a confused society. It has immense potential, 
a wonderful climate, spectacular geography, wonderful hydrography and a 
privileged location. But I think it’s a confused society that stands on only one 
foot … because the system doesn’t provide opportunities and there are two 
options: to stay under this socio political condition or go to another city and 
take a risk.
As the quote suggests, some positive attributes are identified but also a feeling of 
instability related to the “system,” and linked to political processes, corruption, 
unemployment and lack of governance.
Institutional and governance instability
The perception of instability, as a defining sentiment about the identity of Girardot 
City, was overwhelmingly explained in reference to institutions and governance, 
predominately as a lack of confidence in municipal authorities. Insufficient urban 
development was reported in connection with a loss of confidence in local leaders, 
due to corruption and the social cost of extensive political chicanery.
Corruption, defined as the “abuse of positions of power or trust, for particular 
profit, carried out through offerings or requests, delivered or received in money or 
in kind, in services or benefits, in exchange for actions, decisions or omissions” 
(Copello & Ejecutivo, 2011), was often linked with a failure of economic growth. 
Corruption has permeated public and private life: daily bribery, direct appropria-
tion of public goods, vote buying, manipulation on decision-making processes 
and nepotism are examples of corruption in Girardot. These dynamics determine 
the relationships between governments and citizens (Langbein & Sanabria, 2013), 
and can weaken already fragile governance structures.
Colombia scored 37 (out of 100) on the corruption perception index in 2017 
(zero being highly corrupt and 100 very transparent). Based on the Global 
Corruption Barometer, 61% agree that the level of corruption has increased over 
the last few decades (Transparency International, 2017). Since the 1990s, national 
administrations have developed strategies for establishing anticorruption policies 
at the national level, but corruption dynamics are also present locally. Cities and 
towns appear to be less concerned with designing particular policies and programs 
to deter corruption (Copello & Ejecutivo, 2011). Girardot is one of these cities, 
with a history going back to the nineteenth-century experience with railway con-
struction where administrative mismanagement, contractual errors, delays on the 
construction and unnecessary spend resources were rampant. Actually, corrup-
tion is a common front-page news issue; in 2016 the mayor and the ex-mayor of 
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Girardot were arrested by the attorney general for using municipal resources with 
the goal of helping their political campaigns (Fiscalía general de la Nación, 2016).
In Girardot, political chicanery and vote-buying are also present. Affiliation 
with a particular candidate can help people obtain a job, at least for the four-year 
term that politicians serve. Nepotism is also related to government contracts for 
roads and infrastructure construction, creating a large power network based on 
favors that control decision making. Generally, corruption is a normalized event, 
with deep cultural roots. Residents view candidates as people who seek and attain 
power largely to achieve personal objectives, such as money or even higher levels 
of power. In addition, there is a quick turnover rate for many public positions, 
while campaign promises are seen, in the public imagination, as rhetoric and not 
something that will be carried out necessarily.
These examples represent both political instability and a lack of community 
confidence in the municipal authorities. Corruption, politicking, unemployment 
and delinquency, with all their social costs, are interconnected events that repre-
sent, at their core, a lack of belonging that drives underdevelopment and a fragile 
cohesiveness. Corruption discredits the government and limits its capacity, both 
reflecting and creating a lack of personal attachment to the city.
Problems of community participation
To understand social participation, it is fundamental to appreciate the demograph-
ics of Girardot. This municipality is predominately urban (97%), and its popula-
tion is young, with a high concentration of people aged 5–19 and 35–44 years 
(Girardot, 2016). In 2005, 39% of Girardot’s population was self-reported to be 
of Afro-descent (raizal, palenquero, negro and mulato) and only 0.1% as indig-
enous. Migration due to the Colombian internal armed conflict has influenced 
mobility into Girardot; in 2015, 1,531 residents had been affected by armed con-
flict (Girardot, 2016). Households are an average of four members and more than 
95% have a connection to electricity, water and sewage (DANE, 2008). Although 
shortages are not common these days, water storage is seen by the community as 
a way to avoid unanticipated water supply interruptions, connected to a cultural 
tradition of water storage based on difficulties in intra-domiciliary water services 
and provision:
Water storage is basically a custom [in Girardot], because our parents and 
grandparents did not have piped water … they began to store water out of 
need and to avoid travelling to the river every day, and these customs remain 
… it has proven to be a hard habit to break.
(Community member, 2014)
Religion also plays an important role in the municipality, with 94% of the pop-
ulation self-professed believers (Beltrán, 2012). Faith, however, goes beyond 
the personal level; in Girardot it reaches the public agenda. Recently, a decree 
was issued that establishes that “the city of Girardot is consecrated to God” 
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(Alcaldía de Girardot, 2015). In the actual government development plan (2016–
2019), “faith” is presented as a central policy and principle: “All our acts of gov-
ernment and our life are placed in God’s hands. Our faith is the basis of trust in 
the search for good government.” Although Colombia is a laical country, this 
should not astonish us, considering that the evangelization process, construction 
of churches and the establishment of religious values in social programs has been 
present since before 1900 (Figure 8.2).
Community participation, through local representatives, is promoted by the 
national constitution (Rocha et al., 2011). While churches support various com-
munity programs (Guarnizo, 2008a), some have also been developed by the local 
government, focused mainly on family support, youth populations and women. 
These programs have various structures but are typically run by community action 
boards (JAC), local management boards (JAL) and community participation com-
mittees (CPC). In 2017, Girardot had 108 presidents of community action board, 
local leaders that act as government and community mediators (Guarnizo, 2008b). 
The actions of these leaders, however, are often constrained by a lack of adminis-
trative support, lack of community support and fragmentation between the boards 
themselves (Guarnizo, 2008b). We found that many residents (although not all) 
in Girardot had lost confidence in these local committees and boards, largely due 
to their involvement in election campaigns (Guarnizo, 2008b). With a dominant 
perception of an absent government, actions and community behavior has become 
almost entirely based on considerations of personal benefit and advancement. At 
the community level, residents and local leaders stressed the fact that people only 
Figure 8.2  Integration of religion, social interaction and commerce in Girardot. Photo by 
Gabriel Leaño.
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attend community meetings or assemblies when they can receive some form of 
benefit, such as free food or gifts. A community leader told us:
As we speak of politicians, we also have to talk about the community. 
For example, you offer an invitation, but if you don’t tell them, ‘We’re 
going to eat this, we’re going to give this,’ people don’t help. So, people 
get used to their individual benefit, not a general benefit. Sometimes no 
one attends an assembly because people have no interest or love for their 
community … because they are used to paternalism, injected into us many 
years ago.
(Community leader, 2017)
In Girardot, people are suspicious of altruistic motives and see any motivation for 
community participation as something that is linked, in some form, with a drive 
for individual benefits. This is discussed as a lack of interest or love for the com-
munity, sentiments that are related to feelings of unstable local governance and 
the transience of a tourism economy but also paternal expectations – that the gov-
ernment and religious organizations will address community needs. In this case, 
paternalism should be understood as a behavior based on receiving and asking for 
benefits rather than collectively organizing to address them.
Motivation for collective action, beyond those with a selfish or material dimen-
sion, were noted and found. These were often motivated by the language of “the 
common good,” frequently connected to religious beliefs and ideologies but also 
the drive to be recognized, to gain prestige, in efforts to link individual benefit 
with wider social benefit. Individual benefits cannot be completely or casually 
demonized; it is necessary to understand how individual benefits can connect with 
a common good and how a project, such as the Girardot Aedes-Free project, 
can articulate and create synergies between individual expectations and these 
broader sentiments of collective responsibility. Taking this into account, we tried 
to understand the intersection between Aedes aegypti–transmitted diseases and 
ideas of individual and community action.
The importance of Aedes aegypti–borne 
diseases for the community 
Dengue is a common disease in Girardot, given its status as an endemic city.4 
From 1999 to 2010, 6,205 cases were reported in Girardot, with an average of 
563 cases per year, in a population of about 100,000 people (Padilla et al., 2012). 
Residents are, therefore, used to living with the virus and its vector, although per-
ceptions and responses are generally dismissive of its importance, outside major 
epidemics (M. García, 2012). During non-epidemic periods, for example, Dengue 
is underestimated and considered a simple “flu”:
I think few people see this disease as a priority. More guidance is needed 
because this disease kills … [but] many people, perhaps from lack of 
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education or because of their beliefs, think that nothing will ever happen 
to them.
(Vector control staff, 2017)
On the other hand, in an outbreak or when case fatalities occur from severe 
Dengue, attention increases significantly as the media, politicians, health authori-
ties, community leaders and families raise awareness, often leading to an increase 
in prevention and control actions. As soon as an epidemic or death is reported, 
Dengue acquires this high-profile status. The spotlight ebbs and flows according 
to the epidemiological chart. In this sense, residents’ motivation, especially for 
household-level practices, adjusts in parallel to epidemic dynamics. In Girardot, 
as with Colombia more generally, Dengue outbreaks occur every three or four 
years,5 and Dengue only really becomes important to residents during these out-
breaks. This cyclical behavior initially changed with a Chikungunya outbreak in 
2014 and later with a Zika outbreak in 2016, which became a critical juncture, 
or policy window, for Aedes aegypti–transmitted diseases. The regular cycle had 
changed. Health services were overwhelmed, especially with Chikungunya, which 
had never before been reported in the country. These parallel epidemics increased 
the profile of vector control, through additional information and communication 
campaigns, enhanced epidemiological surveillance, staff training activities and 
greater emphasis on addressing water storage risk behaviors (Ministerio de Salud 
y Protección Social, 2016b):
We had an exclusive emergency service [in 2014] only for chikungunya 
cases … and it was overwhelmed. … Initially, we didn’t know about the 
disease, so the government and the Ministry of Health sent in experts, which 
in a certain way appeased the desperation of the health system. What was the 
result? Companies’ workers were sick for 15 days or even months, which 
was total chaos. In the health sector, staff were also ill for months – that was 
complicated – like a three months’ crisis. Then, people were trained and the 
situation calmed down. … With Zika, it was no longer as difficult because 
people were already informed.
(Health service staff, 2017)
Government actions were not responsible for controlling Chikungunya; rather, 
the virus only stopped because of herd immunity, when a large percentage of 
the population was exposed. The health system in Girardot very nearly collapsed 
due to the increased influx of patients.6 During the Zika outbreak, things were 
different. The health services were not strained in the same extreme way due to 
the virus’ asymptomatic and mild symptoms but also from better planning and 
preparedness.
Due to the magnitude of the Chikungunya epidemic, and its chronic phase of 
disability and pain (WHO, 2008), the perception of Aedes aegypti–transmitted 
diseases as temporal and “flu-like” changed. This outbreak in Girardot reduced 
hotel occupancy rates and impacted the local economy. The fact that tourists from 
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Bogotá decided not to travel to endemic zones like Girardot motivated the munici-
pal authorities to re-think prevention actions. The Zika outbreak, and the threat of 
microcephaly, also increased prevention activities, eventually becoming a national 
government concern. This materialized in a national campaign entitled “Vuelta a 
Colombia contra el Zika,” in which the media and health sector were trained 
in vector control behavior change and communication techniques (Ministerio de 
Salud y Protección Social, 2016c), and surveillance was enhanced in the public 
health system (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2016a). In Girardot, 1,936 
cases of Zika where reported between September 2015 and January 2016, with an 
overall attack rate of 18 cases per 1,000 residents. Sixteen pregnant women with 
Zika virus were reported, although none gave birth to any cases of microcephaly 
(Rojas et al., 2016). Ongoing studies are being conducted to assess the incidence 
of Zika and its effects in birth conditions and neurological disorders in Colombia.7
Temporality is a central issue in understanding Dengue actions in Girardot. 
Based on the crisis of governance, and the instability of civic identities, atten-
tion to Dengue has been based on crises: sometimes Dengue matters and some-
times it does not. Perceptions of time play an important role in health promotion 
behaviors, as does ideas of risk and long-term consequences of infection (Hall & 
Fong, 2007; Kreuter et al., 2003). Both Chikungunya and Zika have, due to their 
chronic and long-term consequences, changed these perceptions. Furthermore, 
because both outbreaks caused noticeable economic crises in Girardot, affecting 
tourism-related income (services and hotels), these new arboviral diseases served 
as “moments of opportunity” for shaping collaborations, knowledge, participation 
and vector-control measures. As Horton (2016) discussed this:
Epidemics change governments … Epidemics change the relationship 
between doctors and the state … Epidemics change the public conception of 
disease … Epidemics reshape knowledge … Epidemics change the public … 
Epidemics change societies.
Both Girardot and our project were affected by the heightened awareness to mos-
quitoes. National entities such as the Ministry of Health, the media and even polit-
ical figures such as Colombia’s First Lady, Maria Clemencia Rodriguez, launched 
“Vuelta a Colombia contra el Zika” campaign to control Dengue, Chikungunya 
and Zika. Girardot, and our project, were visited as part of this prevention cam-
paign (Presencia de la República, n.d.). In the context of these events, the project 
changed its original name from “Dengue-Free” to “Aedes-Free.”
Likewise, inter-sectoral activities were strengthened. Since 2014, our project 
had planned to build a municipal inter-sectoral action group to tackle vector-borne 
diseases. In partnership with several local actors, we proposed an intervention 
plan based on educational and research activities that included the scaling-up of 
the covers within the local vector-borne disease plan. An inter-sectoral committee 
was created, which involved different public and private institutions including 
from education, transit, social development secretaries, health service institutions, 
churches, local universities, public schools and public service companies. At the 
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beginning, the research team led meetings and proposed actions. This included, 
making the committee official through a municipal decree, different education 
activities with local media and tourists, and conducting research on how Dengue, 
Chikungunya and Zika impact Girardot’s population (Figure 8.3).
At the end of 2016, the municipal council approved the committee based on 
a municipal agreement led by the Health Secretary. This was an important mile-
stone in the project, as it signaled that our efforts at coordination were, to some 
degree, working. During the first year of the committee, educational activities 
were conducted, including information bulletins for tourist and training activities 
with local students, as well as the creation of a local research group of interested 
public health staff and community-based recycling and cleaning activities. To 
ensure that members felt valued, we sought clear objectives and to disseminate 
results in ways that promoted the actions of the committee and enhanced social 
recognition. This is important because there are many challenges that limit mem-
ber commitment: lack of financial resources, time and availability, changes in 
government authorities and constant rotation of committee members. Enhancing 
members’ responsibility by aligning their own institutional goals with those of 
particular committee activities has been our main strategy.
Intervention buy-in and project sustainability
Understanding structural level factors such as the political context, governance, 
resident motivation and risk perceptions are necessary for developing effective 
mosquito control interventions. But achieving this requires that the knowledge 
generated by the research team, as well as the social learning acquired by key 
Figure 8.3  Members of the intersectoral committee, Girardot.
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stakeholders (during participatory workshops, the implementation process and in 
reflections on challenges encountered in the field) are somehow integrated into vec-
tor control activities, plans and policies. In general, our insecticide-treated cover 
intervention was widely accepted, but when we evaluated specific usage patterns, 
we found that some covers were removed, and others were damaged, with holes 
in the fabric and many completely destroyed. The central question became: why 
did people remove their covers or fail to fix the covers when needed (Figure 8.4)?
Literature on repairing insecticide-treated bed nets, mainly for malaria, has 
addressed this question (Panter-Brick et al., 2006). Enabling factors such as 
awareness, community priorities, repaid skills, access to material, readiness to 
change and motivation have all been reported. Factors that limit the maintenance 
of mosquito nets include the opposite of these factors, such as a lack of access to 
resources, time constrains, issues of cost and household social dynamics (Panter-
Brick et al., 2006). Some of these elements were important to the use (and misuse) 
of covers and their (non) repair in Girardot. Placing heavy objects above the cover 
was common and led to the net breaking or the frame being damaged in ways 
that would still allow mosquitos inside. This practice was related to the common 
saying, “If something is free, I don’t really care about it.” This kind of expres-
sion was the typical explanation given by residents about misusing or discarding 
the covers. However, there is a paradox, because if the covers are given for free, 
people do not care for them, but they also would not pay for them:
Why do people not take care of the covers? Maybe because they didn’t pay 
for them. Maybe when they pay, they take care. … But if you charge, it would 
be worse because people will not install it.
(Resident, 2017)
Everything is now subsidized and begging has been promoted. So, why 
should I work, if I will receive things for free or at half price? As the old 
expression goes, you will win your bread with your forehead sweat, not with 
Figure 8.4  Water container covers, Girardot. The photo to the left is the installation process 
of a cover in Girardot. Some water containers are big deposits placed in the 
backyard. The photo to the middle is a cover that was installed in 2015, which 
was still functioning in 2018 because she has been careful with it. The photo 
to the right is an image of a misused cover that had not been well maintained. 
Photos by the authors.
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the effort of others. Because of subsidies and assistance, logically people do 
not progress. This has driven laziness. Where does this begin? First with the 
Catholic church and second the political parties; we give so much to the poor-
est that we have impoverished them, taking away the power to progress.
(Resident, 2017)
The root of this behavior was explained as a form of “paternalism,” as under-
stood and discussed by residents. Paternalism is seen, here, as a historically-based 
dynamic known to affect the poorest people or communities that lack resources 
and is carried out by power elites like political parties or even religious groups 
through their charity work. In this case paternalism has been linked to the impov-
erishment of community action and a dilution of a sense of responsibility. It is an 
ideology of passivity that is reinforced by economic destitution, a lack of edu-
cational opportunities and weak sentiments of belonging, among other things. 
Paternalism, as an action of “giving-for-free” is related to clientelism. Eric Wolf 
(1996) describes clientelism as an exchange and reciprocal relationship between a 
client and a boss, based on unequal social terms and structures (Rodríguez, 2002). 
This concept has also been defined using other descriptors: informal, voluntary, 
unequal and unconditional. It is based on a patron-client relationship influenced 
by a postcolonial context (Rodríguez, 2002).
This pattern has repeated itself in new area of social life in contemporary 
Colombian society. Scarce public resources like job positions, access to social 
programs and other benefits have become exchangeable goods (Rodríguez, 2002), 
which in some cases means linking votes with corruption. In others, it means 
that hierarchical power relationships have permeated public behaviors; people in 
Girardot revealed that they have become accustomed to “receiving everything for 
free,” as groceries, even houses have become distributed in social benefit pro-
grams.8 This social context has reinforced this behavior, linked to paternalism, 
clientelism, corruption and a lack of community empowerment.
In the second quote above, a well-known priest from the Catholic Church, with 
decades of experience working with the community, commented on how social 
programs in Girardot have perverted community action. The city administrations 
have historically developed social programs based on subsidies, for example 
free housing for prioritized populations (Ministerio de Vivienda, 2015), educa-
tion subsidies (Secretaría de Educación Girardot, 2002), housing improvements 
(Alcaldia de Girardot, 2017) and subsidies for elderly population (Hsbnoticias, 
2017). The priest argued that such subsidies and assistance have influenced resi-
dents’ laziness and impoverished them, as it creates an expectation of “free” and 
“easy” goods and services. This is a strong position and it is unclear just how 
generalizable it really is, but maybe it can explain why some residents do not care 
about water tank covers.
Not fixing the covers, when they were broken, was often related to lack of 
knowledge on how to fix them. The community believed that the cover was the 
“property of the project,” so that they were not supposed to fix or change the cov-
ers in any way. As one household member expressed:
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The cover usually fell down. … Have I thought about repairing it? No, we 
haven’t made those modifications because we respect how project has placed 
them. Maybe later you will say that we damaged the cover because we 
manipulated it.
Some people, however, also removed their covers or failed to fix even small holes. 
Others did repair and alter their covers, sewing-up holes and changing the fabric. 
Using the covers is, ultimately, based on the end user’s perception of its utility, 
which are related largely to ideas of disease risk. The literature shows that aware-
ness and community priorities are important here (Panter-Brick et al., 2006). In 
Girardot, we found that specific types of people tended to have higher disease risk 
perceptions. These were naturally more “careful” people groups: elderly women 
and small families of only two or three members. Despite some obvious problems, 
in general the community supported the project and took care of the covers:
What was the level of acceptance? It depends on what people think; if they 
think that the cover is useful they will take care of it. … I think that based 
on the first follow-up, 80% of the people liked the covers, and if they liked 
the covers, they will take care of them and the intervention can be sustained.
(Field staff, 2017)
The goal of the project, however, was to create a sense of ownership and, hence, 
sustainability. There were a couple of important issues to consider here. While the 
physical barriers and insecticides on the covers prevented mosquito oviposition, 
the cover design and its installation were also perceived as a general household 
improvement:
The cover is functional; it protects the tank and controls the mosquitos. But 
people also say that the advantage of the cover was that the house looks 
pretty; now, it was more than a water tank.
(Field staff, 2017)
The fact that the cover provided some decorative value increased residents’ care 
and value for the covers. This has also been reported in other Ecohealth initia-
tives; for example, in Central America, the walls and floors of rural houses were 
improved using local materials to prevent Chagas disease, and in Mexico, insec-
ticide-treated nets were used to build window screens. In both cases, apart from 
controlling vector infestation, these interventions also helped improve the quality 
of housing, which positively affected community acceptability of the intervention 
(Monroy et al., 2011; Vazquez-Prokopec et al., 2016).
Ownership and sustainability is also influenced by context-based strategies. 
Residents argued for the importance of “spreading the word” via person-to-person 
information dissemination. This type of dissemination is a natural form of infor-
mation diffusion, although in many cases public health interventions often focus 
much more on “material” (like printed information sheets) and formal meetings. 
 Vector control in a Colombian city 189
Recognizing that most health information is disseminated in casual conversa-
tions with friends, family and neighbors, taking this seriously required a shift in 
how “risk messages” are understood and disseminated. In our project, we found 
that information about the intervention and its benefits was rapidly disseminated 
through neighbor-to-neighbor conversation. People started to ask us for covers 
before they were installed, something that was likely influenced by our inclusion 
of students in all project activities.
The covers have been installed in Girardot, and local authorities have assumed 
the leadership of the project. Now our role (as engaged researchers) is to con-
tinue to be participants of the intersectoral committee, and to watch what happens. 
Local suppliers of the covers and seamstresses have the capacity to replicate the 
intervention. We will have to see what happens…
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter has explored the social and physical landscape of a Colombian 
city, and how mosquitoes and water cover, to prevent their breeding, exempli-
fies the importance of assessing local notions of belonging in participatory health 
programs.
Our research approach was meant to maintain a wide perspective on the 
complex interactions between social and ecological systems. Nevertheless, the 
richness and complexity of Girardot’s urban space surpassed our expectations, 
leading us to explore and appreciate the influence of historical, social and emo-
tional forces in this Aedes-endemic city. Focusing only on epidemiological char-
acteristics hides these complexities, especially in post-colonial settings. Since the 
founding of the Republic of Colombia in 1886, society has undergone important 
transformations with the creation and growth of modern cities, transport networks 
and government institutions. In Girardot, all of these changes have created new 
pathogenic opportunities due to a domiciled vector (Aedes aegypti), susceptible 
populations (for example, tourists from Bogotá), urban growth and the circulation 
of new arboviruses from Africa and Asia (Powell & Tabachnick, 2013; Sorre, 
1933). The lack of belonging, driven by weak community bonds and the instabil-
ity of the political system, has added challenges for controlling mosquitoes.
This took time for us to understand in Girardot. Our role, as outsiders, was to 
offer tools, promote community empowerment and leave enough space for natural 
adaptations. This included, as we discussed above, the creation of the intersecto-
ral committee and its work in engaging residents, leaders and students in project 
activities. National guidelines based on integrated vector management (IVM) are 
a suitable starting point for these types of projects but designing and applying this 
approach also means engaging in the interface between spatial and psychosocial 
realities. In this case, insecticide treated covers were found to be a suitable pre-
vention strategy targeting the most productive Aedes breeding sites in Girardot. 
But translating this into long-term change is much more challenging than we orig-
inally assumed, impacted by the relationships between, and cognitive frameworks 
of, residents, authorities and local leaders. In 2018, our research activities have 
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now formally ended. Our final activity was to present the results of our 10 years 
of work to local authorities and other key actors, as a final step in transferring 
leadership to local stakeholders.
In conclusion: a city, as the physical setting of the drama between vectors, 
viruses and humans, should never be understood as an immutable place (Gregoric 
Bon, 2010); rather, it is a configuration of social, material, and affective practices. 
Feelings of belonging, or their opposite, an anxiety of displacement, transience 
and uneasy social conflicts, are often invisible mediators of this urban territory, 
with its water containers and mosquito reproduction. Such emotional attach-
ments are not a static surface but instead are dynamic meeting-places between 
ecologies and histories in the making, with particular relevance for public health.
Notes
1 This project was developed based on several grants over the years from TDR-WHO, IDRC 
and Colciencias. We are grateful to our local project staff (especially Oneida Arboleda), 
local leaders and residents that took time for our many interviews, and provided notewor-
thy insights that assisted us greatly with the analysis that appears in this chapter.
2 Our approach lined up with national policies, specific with the National Integrated 
Management Strategy (Estrategia de Gestion Integrada) that aims to enhance intersec-
toral actions and promote sociocultural and technical adaptation of policies and guide-
lines for the prevention and control of communicable diseases (MSPS, 2012). Our 
challenge was to use formative research to adapt interventions to the specific context 
of Girardot.
3 To untangle them, we conducted team discussions, fieldwork interviews with different 
local actors, focus groups, and participant observations between 2014 and 2017.
4 Girardot is one of the 18 municipalities that account for 50% of Dengue cases in 
Colombia between 1999 and 2010 (Padilla et al., 2012).
5 This is related to the circulation of all Dengue serotypes, the accumulation of exposed 
individuals, the infestation of the vector and the nature of local urban ecosystems 
(Padilla et al., 2012).
6 Officially, there were 8,955 cases of Chikungunya reported in Girardot in 2014 and 
2015, although many cases were also not reported due to self-medication and high 
demand of health services at the time (Pacheco et al., 2017).
7 This includes collaborations between the US CDC and the Colombian National Health 
Institute to investigate the longer-term effects of Zika virus infection during pregnancy 
(CDC, 2016).
8 The “Mi casa ya” Gobern National Program has provided free houses to 100,000 
households in Colombia. In Girardot, 467 families have benefited from this program 
(Vivienda, 2013).
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Americans and people all over the world are paying a horrible price for the knowl-
edge-oblivious anxiety about modern genetic technology in plants, animals, and 
now mosquitoes.
(Milloy, 2016)
This quote came from an opinion piece published in the Tallahassee Democrat 
(a popular Floridian newspaper), entitled “Technology Can Save Us from Zika” 
(Milloy, 2016). After a Dengue fever outbreak struck the island of Key West, at 
the tip of the Florida Keys, between 2009 and 2010, plans were proposed for an 
experimental trial of OX513A, a genetically modified mosquito. Few had heard 
of the OX513A mosquito or of the UK-based company, Oxitec, that had devel-
oped it when plans for the trial were made public in 2011 (Araújo et al. 2015). 
Targeting Aedes aegypti, and based on precepts of the Sterile Insect Technique 
(SIT), the product was originally advertised as a solution to Dengue fever, the 
most common arboviral disease, causing an estimated 390 million annual infec-
tions worldwide (Powers and Waterman 2017).1 Once described as an “envi-
ronmental plague for the new millennium” (Lennox and Arata 1999), Dengue 
is the most widespread and rapidly spreading vector-borne disease (Gubler, 
2002: 332). It is also not an easy disease to control; Aedes mosquitoes breed 
in multiple sources of clean domestic water sources (“even in a bottle cap,” 
as health promotion materials often state), a biological characteristic that has 
earned them the prerogative title of the “cockroaches” of the mosquito world. 
Rapidly increasing Dengue rates, together with a lack of confidence in or enthu-
siasm for current control tools, has been an important driver for increased fund-
ing, political commitment and investment in novel vector-control technologies. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO 2014:11), we need “to find 
improved solutions for fighting vectors and the diseases they transmit.” Because 
Aedes aegypti is the mosquito responsible for a number of important arboviral 
“emerging infectious diseases” (EIDs), the technology has garnered consider-
able attention as cases of Dengue fever, along with Chikungunya, and now Zika 
have appeared in seemingly unexpected, and yet somewhat predictable, places 
(Adalja et al. 2016).
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Reinventing mosquito control
Experimental trials and nonscalable relations 
in the Florida Keys
Priscilla Bennett
196 Priscilla Bennett 
Reinventing mosquito control
In the realm of global health, scholars have long identified the various prob-
lems associated with “top down” public health interventions. In the attempt to 
design programs that are generalizable, strategies tend to overlook the importance 
of particularity and specificity in local settings (Adams et al. 2014; Biehl and 
Petryna 2013; Nading 2012). Declaring diseases as “global,” writes Alex Nading 
(2014: 203), “presumes that it matters, materially and semiotically, in the same 
way from place to place.” In the scaling up of global health programs, with nar-
ratives of progress and the increased commitment to technological innovation, 
certain landscapes of disease nevertheless remain dismissed, neglected or simply 
forgotten (Kelly and Beisel 2011; Lakoff 2010). Such disregard for “the social and 
political contexts in which people live out their lives,” writes Lock and Nguyen 
(2010: 14), commonly result in inefficiency and unintentional consequences in 
the long term.
For mosquito-borne illnesses and vector-control programs, ethnographic 
insights can help refine program efforts through attending to “the political impli-
cations and limitations of public health engagement more broadly” (Kelly et al., 
2017: 4). Based in Nicaragua, Nading’s (2014; 2015; 2017) work on Dengue con-
trol shows how a focus on the emergent aspects of what are deemed “global” 
diseases often obscure the complex, and yet invariably essential, “local” biologies 
and ecologies that sustain them, mediate public health responses, and can make a 
difference to program outcomes. Adams et al.’s proposal for “slow research” as a 
method for improving global health engagement is a useful call to action. In this 
critical view, differences across local settings are treated “as if they were a kind 
of background static – a variable, but not necessarily one critical to the design of 
the research or intervention.” The logics and political economy of “scaling-up” 
together with knowledge norms that prioritize large-scale comparisons facilitate 
this view (Adams et al., 2014: 180–1). In contrast, more locally grounded, or 
“slow,” approaches promise to improve effective health interventions by paying 
better attention to biosocial conditions and are increasingly finding sympathetic 
advocates.
Broadly, these scholars advocate for an analytical framework designed to 
notice what Tsing (2012; 2015) has described as “nonscalable forms” – those 
details of a particular site that cannot be extracted from the diversity of their con-
texts and remain the same. As new and aspiring expansive projects come into 
contact with such diversity, the transformative connections and relationships that 
ensue can then produce new agendas. Tsing (2005) has referred to this process as 
friction –“encounters across difference” through which standardization occurs as 
projects seek to make these diverse forms commensurate. The diversity of local 
sites is then obscured or lost through the translation process, as project elements 
are made uniform and expandable. But those nonscalable forms can have mean-
ingful consequences for long-term outcomes, as “scalability is always incom-
plete” (Tsing 2012: 515).
Oxitec’s technology has received a wide variety of criticism. These have 
included concerns about unknown public health risks, the uncertain environmen-
tal impacts it could unleash and the company’s conduct in previous trials. But it 
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also includes a suspicion that the OX513A mosquito may be just another “magic 
bullet” approach that will inevitably fail, like those in the past, to truly solve the 
dilemma of mosquito-borne disease (Subbaraman 2011; Resnik 2014).2 In their 
article “The Five Things To Know about Genetically Modified (GM) Insects for 
Vector Control,” Alphey and Alphey (2014) note that genetic methods are not 
standalone solutions. The authors reinforce the view that genetic methods should 
be viewed as powerful additions to integrated vector management programs as 
they come with both specific strengths and limitations. Oxitec has maintained that 
their technology is not a means of mosquito eradication, although they insist it 
will be the most effective Aedes aegypti control technique.3
In order to develop good, or effective, scalability in large-scale projects (like 
releasing genetically engineered mosquitoes) global health projects still require 
some degree of engagement with, or at least acknowledgement of, nonscalable 
relations. It is only through their interaction with nonscalable phenomena, or the 
elements that resist standardization in particular settings, that projects solve ways 
to expand and become portable. But scalability often conceals the variations that 
allow for this expansion in the first place, as they seek to replicate activities and 
products in the same way across diverse sites, although they will inevitably be 
integrated into particular localities and take on new forms and meanings. Rather 
than putting the emphasis on how incorporating local particularities into policy 
and practice can improve global health programs, this chapter looks at how local 
particularities have influenced and shaped the innovation of a new global health 
technology and its scale-up.4
While the project in Key West unfolded, with the goal of releasing the first 
genetically engineered mosquito on American soil, it faced a number of regula-
tory hurdles, practical challenges and a good deal of citizen opposition. In the 
face of such cultural, social and political resistance, Oxitec has had to contend 
with blending local and global concepts of scalability, as it “moves from small to 
large without redoing the design” (Tsing, 2012: 507). Although some may con-
sider that, even in this circumstance, such local specificities were not critical to 
the proof-of-concept of the OX513A mosquito release, local differences still had 
to be sufficiently incorporated both conceptually and practically in order for the 
project to expand “to scale.” In tracing these nonscalable relations, there are big 
and small stories to tell.
Envisioning paradise
There is a kind of otherworldliness that casts itself across the island of Key West 
once the sun goes down on the southernmost tip of the continental United States. 
Ambient lights illuminate tangles of strangler figs on the front lawns of historic 
Conch Houses. Tour groups circle the famous Kapok tree that stands outside the 
courthouse, listening to eerie tales of local legends as Key West “Gypsy” chick-
ens roost in the branches above (Figure 9.1). Down the road, the waters of the 
Florida Straits wash up against the site of Southernmost Point marked by its iconic 
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concrete buoy. A bustling tourist stop during daylight hours, stillness settles over 
the island after the sun goes down, feeling a long way from anywhere as the crowds 
disperse towards restaurants and bars once frequented by Ernest Hemingway. One 
is easily “struck,” as Barnett (2009: 139) described it, “by [the island’s] distinctive 
sense of place and by its sense of a lingering past” (Figure 9.1).
The Port of Key West is host to over 800,000 cruise ship passengers a year 
(DOH-Monroe 2017: 13). On any given day, an average of nearly 17,000 visi-
tors are estimated to be in Key West, mingling with its more than 25,000 regular 
inhabitants.5 But the now celebrated “Tropical Vacationland” was once a place 
that inhabitants escaped from. Pestilent diseases such as Dengue and yellow 
fever and relentless mosquito swarms afflicted the island, as they also once did 
in many areas of Florida. In his article “Influence and Impact of Mosquito-Borne 
Diseases on the History of Florida, USA,” Hribar (2013: 53) emphasized that 
“it is only within the last 60 years or so that Florida has become the nation’s 
year round playground.” Mosquito control, together with the introduction of mod-
ern air conditioning, has played a large role in this transformation. One of the 
island’s popular historical tales offers a glimpse into the region’s transformation. 
A real estate developer, Richter Clyde Perky, who sought to eliminate the hordes 
of mosquitoes that stood in the way of his fishing retreat’s success, constructed 
two bat towers on Sugarloaf Key in the 1920s. His is one of several attempts to 
reinvent the Keys as a tropical paradise, which faced the difficult challenge of 
Figure 9.1  The popular Kapok tree on Whitehead Street in front of the Monroe County 
Courthouse in Key West.
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ridding the region of the mosquitoes that plagued it as both carriers of disease and 
incessant pests. Reportedly upon opening the bat tower, “the bats took flight and 
never returned.” Documents of the incident allege that Keys inhabitants, known 
as “Conches,” not surprised by this turn of events, “claimed ‘that mosquitoes ate 
the bats’” (Patterson, 2004: 54; McIver 1989).
Toppled by the impacts of Hurricane Irma in September, 2017, the last surviv-
ing tower had stood for over 80 years on a site where drones were deployed in 2015 
for what was called “reconnaissance” for mosquito breeding areas (Filosa, 2015): 
a lasting testament to how far the Keys have come in mosquito control operations. 
Yet mosquitoes continue to be a part of life in the Keys, where living with, or 
more accurately, avoiding them, requires a fair amount of daily management. But 
historical accounts depict what seemed at the time to be an insurmountable strug-
gle of thick swarms and disease outbreaks that emerged alongside military and 
commercial expansion on the island. The sportswriter George Washington Sears, 
in the late 19th century, once described the “key mosquito” as “poisonous, viru-
lent, persistent, and oh, so numerous,” that rendered the Florida Keys “uninhabit-
able” (Nessmuk, 1886: 282). Repeated epidemics of yellow fever afflicted Key 
West almost every year throughout the second half of the 19th century (Hardy 
and Pynchon, 1964: 8). Albert W. Diddle, writing in the 1940s, highlighted the 
“trials and tribulations” of the Keys unique history due to its climate, geographic 
location, political bureaucracy, epidemics and wars. Illustrating the burden of dis-
ease on the Keys community, he described the island’s experience of insecurity, 
as follows:
The transient nature of the population and the ingress of travelers increased 
the possibility of outbreaks of disease for several decades. During these peri-
ods the citizens often became panicky. Sometimes the sick were abandoned 
and left to die … where there was a ‘hint of the appearance of yellow fever 
in the city, trunks were hurriedly packed and the first steamer leaving Key 
West took the family away,’ not to return until the ‘Northers’ blew away ‘the 
poison of disease’ in the late fall.
(1946: 19–20)
In Barnett’s account of the city’s laborious reinvention as today’s popular tourist 
destination, he begins with an evaluation of the many slogans that have sought 
to capture and help recreate the island’s geographic and cultural separation from 
mainland America. These have tended to “promise a place apart from the rest 
of the nation” (2009: 139). Key West in the popular American imagination now 
carries, he argues, nothing like what 19th-century islanders had in mind. As the 
city grew to become an important commercial port, acting as a hub linking the 
United States to the Caribbean islands and Central America, the local economy 
relied almost entirely on its multinational connections. Walter C. Maloney (1876: 
17–18), in his dedication address of the new city hall in the late 19th century, 
declared the island “the Commercial Emporium of the State of Florida” both for 
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its advantageous geographical position and accessible harbor. Incoming foreign 
vessels required coal and provisions, which supported local businesses, and a 
flourishing wrecking industry that developed alongside commercial port activities 
was a main source of income for residents (Stebbins, 2007: 36–7). Despite the 
city’s heightened vulnerability to the oppression of a number of diseases, par-
ticularly yellow fever (see Figure 9.2), that arose with the burgeoning industry, 
Key West was the largest city in Florida in 1890, and, as many of its history tours 
now advertise, was also once the wealthiest. In their analysis of the culture and 
economy of Key West, Steinberg and Chapman argued that “the Key’s identity 
and economy were more a result of their proximity to adjacent sea-lanes than their 
relations with mainland Florida” (2009: 3). As the shipping industry waned and 
links to the greater part of the state eventually solidified, the city’s history of pros-
perous “ship salvaging, smuggling, sponge diving, cigar rolling, transshipment, 
and U.S. Naval operations” (while not entirely a thing of the past) are primarily 
relived through the many historic museums and tours that cater to the island’s 
most important industry today (Steinberg and Chapman, 2009: 2–5) (Figure 9.2).
Although outbreaks of yellow fever were eventually brought under control in 
Key West at the turn of the century, Dengue fever continued to afflict the island. 
Figure 9.2  “Yellow Fever” historical marker number 53 of the Key West Historic Marker 
Tour located at 625 White Street.
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Criticizing the city for what he considered inadequate measures towards resolv-
ing the mosquito problem, a physician and yellow fever expert complained over 
a century ago:
Dengue has broke up Key West socially and financially several times, and 
probably will give us pains and scares again. … It is proper to say that Key 
West is doing nothing and perhaps will never do anything to check the mos-
quito pests.
(Murray, 1903: 1339)
But decades of intense efforts in organizing community leaders and rallying 
support for a statewide mosquito control program (together with broader scien-
tific advancements in tropical medicine) eventually paid off (Patterson, 2009). 
Although the economic encumbrance and extensive human suffering caused by 
epidemics of Dengue fever, yellow fever, and malaria helped to propel the devel-
opment of a Florida-wide mosquito control program (Hardy and Pynchon, 1964: 
32–33), it was tourism that led to the establishment of what many regard today as 
a top mosquito control program. In its transition from a commerce and production 
economy throughout the 1930s, tourism development became a top priority for 
Key West. An article entitled “Declare war on mosquitoes” from The Key West 
Citizen in November 1938 announced:
Good news to Key Westers interested in making this city an ideal resort and 
vacation center is contained in the announcement by Dr. Charles Williams, 
assistant surgeon general of the U.S. Public Health Service, that a group of 
six federal inspectors would work here the entire winter in mosquito eradica-
tion activities. … In summary, it looks as though Key West [is] finally getting 
some action to rid the city of the cause of most tourist complaints … a new, 
brighter and better Key West is arising.
The government’s efforts towards eradicating disease were so effective that mos-
quito-borne illness temporarily slipped into a mostly forgotten past,6 making the 
challenge even greater for health officials to foster community awareness when 
the “final stop on the Overseas Highway” (as Key West is sometimes called) 
experienced a Dengue fever outbreak after decades of calm. Mosquito control in 
the Keys had become focused on minimizing the nuisance of insects for visitors 
and inhabitants, until on September 3, 2009, when Dengue was confirmed in a 
recent traveler to Key West. It was the first reported autochthonous, or locally 
acquired, case in Florida since 1934, and in the continental United States since 
1945 (CDC, 2010: 580). Active surveillance in 2009 identified 24 cases in addi-
tion to the three originally confirmed; further cases began surfacing on April 13, 
2010 (Radke et al. 2012). Total reported and confirmed cases came to approxi-
mately 93, the last being reported in November 2010.7 A guest columnist in the 
local paper called attention to the forgotten possibility of disease when they com-
mented that “although mosquito-borne diseases have been absent from many 
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residents’ minds, Keys mosquitoes always have the potential to carry disease like 
yellow fever, malaria, West Nile virus and dengue – and many more diseases are 
making their way around the globe” (Fitzsimmons, 2010).
On top of the challenge of controlling the outbreak, a rise in the number of 
reported cases of Dengue in 2010 also attracted unwanted attention from the 
media. Speculations grew on how this (re-)emerging disease outbreak may spread 
to the rest of the country, with some medical experts fearing Dengue could spread 
across the Eastern Seaboard (Grady and Skipp 2010), and become endemic in the 
United States (Franco et al. 2010: 273). As a “gateway” for new exotic diseases, it 
would not be the last incidence of mosquito-borne illness on Key West but rather 
the first in a series of harsh reminders of the possibility of arbovirus transmission 
and the many complications involved in its control.
Key West’s Dengue problem
Like any typical weeknight in the Keys, bars overflowed with flip flop–clad tour-
ists and live music spilled out into the streets. Out with local friends, I had hoped 
to spend the evening simply enjoying the aspects of Key West that lure several 
million visitors there each year. I began to understand the often-overheard com-
plaints from locals about the invasion of tourists. After a few weeks and some hard 
lessons living on the island, I had taken up the habit of checking the city’s cruise 
ship calendar, avoiding certain areas of Old Town on the days ships were in port, 
which could sometimes include up to three per day. My local guides often led us 
away from boozy Duval Street to one of the many tucked away spots in a dense 
area of bars, restaurants, and entertainment venues. Old Town has a reputation 
for its littered streets, dirty puddles, filled-to-capacity sidewalks and slow traffic. 
But what it lacks in comfort and convenience it makes up for in charm. Making 
our way to one of the many eclectic bars the island is known for, our conversation 
led (as many in Key West do) to what had lured me to the island in the first place.
There is a reason that Key West often makes it on to top ten lists for “best 
places to travel solo,” “top destinations for singles” or “favorite islands with a 
laid-back atmosphere.” Conversations with strangers come rather easily in a place 
with a constant flow of people and one of the highest numbers of alcoholic bev-
erage licenses per capita (DOH-Monroe 2017). I found that people were often 
enthusiastic about sharing their personal experiences and perspectives on mos-
quitoes. A couple from Alabama seated next to me one evening expressed their 
disbelief of the swarms they fought off during a previous golfing trip in the Upper 
Keys. A local, joining the conversation, questioned me in a casual tone on the 
hazardous nature “of that stuff they’re spraying.” While most people were well 
aware of mosquitoes’ presence, few of my friends who worked outside of the pub-
lic sector had heard about Dengue, even those employed in the service industry.
Moments like this highlighted the different experiences of disease not only 
across large geographical distances, but also within communities, as experiences 
of illness often hold “different significance in different spaces and for different 
actors” (Beisel et al., 2016: 8). Responses to the transmission of Dengue fever in 
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the 2009–2010 outbreak exposed the many challenges involved in the organiza-
tion and coordination of community-based vector control programs. Due to dif-
fering systems of management, understandings, and priorities involved in disease 
response, approaches and opinions across agencies clashed on who held respon-
sibility. The official newsletter of the Florida Mosquito Control Association 
(FMCA), documented the outbreak as it unfolded in Key West. In a column writ-
ten by entomologist Walter Tabachnick (2009: 13), the Florida Keys Mosquito 
Control District’s (FKMCD) response was first described as both effective and 
impressive, commended for conducting “aggressive mosquito control … brought 
to bear in an attempt to reduce human cases and protect public health.” As more 
cases of Dengue were reported in 2010, mounting criticism targeted state and 
local institutions for failing to adequately publicize the event (Grady and Skipp 
2010). Reports claimed the outbreak “could have been stopped in 2010 with the 
active participation of the public in control efforts” (Tabachnick, 2010:6).
In a study assessing multi-level decision-maker responses to the Key West out-
break, Hayden et al. (2015) found that local and federal stakeholders considered 
the “lack of perceived severity of risk” to be the main obstacle for better public 
involvement in vector control and disease prevention. One respondent claimed it 
was due to “a large failure in effectively communicating a message they are ready 
to listen to and act upon” (Hayden et al., 2015: 398). One of the central challenges 
health officials faced was figuring out the best methods for delivering effective risk 
communication and health promotion during the outbreak. Community leaders and 
stakeholders were well aware of the important implications of the outbreak, with 
the major focus falling on reduced tourist dollars. But disagreement surfaced over 
how best to articulate and convey “dengue control and prevention messaging.” 
While some health authorities claimed that “widely disseminated information” was 
necessary in curbing disease transmission, other city officials and community lead-
ers argued the events were being sensationalized by the FKMCD to influence their 
budget. Ensuring the health of tourists and residents, while at the same time main-
taining the island’s image as a carefree paradise proved to be a delicate balancing 
act, particularly as the two interdependent qualities came into direct conflict.
Stakeholders focused their attention on protecting what was also labeled a 
major risk factor for the reemergence of mosquito-borne illness: global travel. 
Although the specific time and route of the Dengue introduction to Key West was 
not identified, a recurring narrative I encountered focused the blame on visitors 
and immigrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries (see also Kelly 
et al. 2017). Reports uncovered the existing concern over travelers returning from 
Dengue-endemic regions, as well as immigrants from these same countries, as 
potential sources for reintroduction (Radke et al. 2012). A senior employee with 
the mosquito control district commented at a town hall meeting in December 2014:
We are a densely populated island … a mostly urbanized area … an ideal 
location for the Aedes aegypti mosquito. … With a high number of tourists 
regularly visiting the island of just under twenty-five thousand people, a lot of 
people come in and out and that has a big effect on any mosquito-borne issue. 
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While Key West was being criticized as a site “where the importance of the tourist 
industry to the local economy creates an automatic resistance to publicity of any 
factor, such as a disease outbreak, that could negatively impact tourism” (Rey, 
2014: 996), the FKMCD came under scrutiny for using the Dengue outbreak to 
their advantage – “There’s no glory in prevention” a doctor of infectious disease 
reasoned to me. Having an already contentiously sizable budget (O’Hara, 2011b), 
an editorial in the local paper in 2010 accused the district of “hyping dengue to 
justify a big tax increase. This appears to smack of the current political genre: 
‘You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.’” Bad press wasn’t the only con-
cern, but the editorial also revealed disagreements on who carried the responsibil-
ity for public health:
The Mosquito Control District has 71 Full-time and 26 part-time 
employees – an air, land and sea mosquito attack force – whose jobs it 
is to swat the Florida Keys’ Population of the dengue fever mosquito. … 
We thought the current annual $10 million budget was to prevent such an 
occurrence.
There seemed to be no right answer for the mosquito control district. They were, 
as Tabachnick (2010: 7) described it, in a “Catch-22”: denounced for inciting 
public alarm in their urge for public participation against a perilous situation, 
and accused of budgetary opportunism, while also being criticized for ineffective 
measures against the outbreak, which others charged was the sole responsibility 
of the district.
In response, the FKMCD and the Florida Department of Health-Monroe 
County (DOH-Monroe)8 launched the Action to Break the Cycle of Dengue 
(ABCD), a campaign that was centered on community involvement some insisted 
to be necessary to curb the spread of the “new” disease (Adalja et al. 2012). The 
call “to mobilize the Keys to reduce the breeding of Aedes aegypti,” included 
the involvement of multiple government organizations, community partners and 
residents (Whiteside, 2011). A combination of tactics were enacted: encourag-
ing individuals to dump standing water, organizing neighborhood trash cleanups, 
creating school educational programs, handing out door-hangers (see Figure 9.3), 
and using radio spots and editorials to encourage personal protection and control 
measures (Adalja et al. 2012; Rey 2014; Hayden et al. 2015). During my ethno-
graphic fieldwork, a public health leader in the ABCD campaign, having strongly 
emphasized community awareness as crucial to its success, expressed reserva-
tions about the proposed implementation of genetically engineered (GE) mosqui-
toes. The possibility of it “taking the responsibility away from the public” was 
counterintuitive, he argued, to an effective and sustainable (community-based) 
mosquito control program.
The ABCD campaign was based on what Kelly and Lezaun (2014: 380) have 
described as an attempt to “rejoin disease control with the tasks of urban mainte-
nance.” An estimated 1,935 seasonal housing units were documented as occupied 
by part-time residents in 2010, limiting access to domestic inspectors who have 
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close to 9,400 households to cover.9 Densely situated housing throughout the city, 
known and unknown cisterns, unkempt swimming pools, and residents who are 
forgetful, absent, or reluctant to take action (as I experienced personally with 
my own landlords), pose a significant challenge to urban maintenance. Domestic 
inspectors can only manage to visit individual households about once a month, 
leaving them, as one inspector emphasized, to rely on residents to maintain their 
own homes (Figure 9.3).
Monroe County was not the only area affected by Dengue fever following the 
initial case in 2009. Infections were reported across several other Floridian coun-
ties into 2012 (Añez and Rios 2013). As Florida became depicted as “a gateway” 
to mosquito-borne disease (Bouri et al. 2012), Key West felt like the beginning 
Figure 9.3  ABCD Campaign flyer (front and back) issued to residents and local businesses 
by MCHD (now DOH-Monroe) and the FKMCD in 2011.
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of the route. Almost four years since the last confirmed case, the health depart-
ment was still receiving phone calls asking about the status of Dengue. Although 
no cases were reported since 2011, the outbreak had a lasting impact. Research 
later found that the particular Dengue virus strains isolated in Key West suggested 
endemic transmission in Monroe County (Muñoz-Jordan et al. 2013), heighten-
ing ongoing concerns of the outbreak’s impacts on the local economy. A health 
department employee who had dealt with public relations during and after the 
outbreak expressed his frustration with the looming insecurity that had settled 
over Key West: “People think that disease is going to show up here and then go 
marching up the Keys onto the mainland.” Prior to our meeting, he had received a 
phone call from parents whose child had recently returned from summer camp in 
the Keys. Although a doctor had not diagnosed the child, the parents were insist-
ent it was Dengue fever. It didn’t help that outbreaks of Chikungunya, which had 
been spreading throughout the Caribbean since December 2013, were the cause 
of heightened anxiety for the county. Health officials listened with bated breath on 
conference calls with other Florida county health departments for any mention of 
the Florida Keys and mosquito-borne illness: “People think that chikungunya or 
any disease is coming to the Keys first. We don’t want to hear [the two] mentioned 
in the same sentence,” he whispered from the seat next to me. For Key West, solv-
ing the difficult challenge of Aedes aegypti and Dengue went much further than 
mosquito control alone (Tabachnick, 2012: 4).
A global health intervention and nonscalable difference
As experiments and public health interventions are becoming “ever more closely 
linked” in global health (Beisel and Petryna, 2013: 18), disease outbreaks present 
an opportunity for emergent technologies. An article from the Miami New Times 
claimed that when a new mosquito control director took over the Florida Keys 
district in 2011, he was given two orders: “Cut the budget while killing more mos-
quitoes, and ensure that no cases of dengue fever grab headlines like they did in 
2009 and 2010” – headlines which portrayed the Keys as “a way for dengue to get 
a new foothold, or a re-foothold, in the United States” (Sweeney, 2012). While the 
outbreak initiated a refocusing of vector control to the forefront of public health 
initiatives and community-level action (Kelly et al. 2017), it also prompted con-
sideration for new approaches to accomplish the district’s goals. This began with 
a new formulation of a product already widely used throughout the Keys, the lar-
vicide Bacillus thuringiensis israelenis (BTI). The district worked with manufac-
turers to come up with the new technique as “Aedes aegypti populations remained 
at levels high enough to transmit the dengue illness,” which some were attributing 
to, “the insufficiency of collective community action” (Fitzsimmons 2010).
Another more novel method was later announced as a “birth control” pro-
ject for Dengue mosquitoes (O’Hara, 2011a). A high-profile city with a world-
renowned mosquito control program that still couldn’t prevent Dengue fever, this 
was pitched as a golden opportunity (Palmer 2015). Although it is one of sev-
eral transgenic technologies that target disease vectors, Oxitec’s positioning and 
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timing have helped to locate it at the front of the line. In his article “GM Mosquito 
Trial Alarms Opponents, Strains Ties in Gates-Funded Project,” Enserink (2010: 
1030) reported, “Few deny that in the race to develop disease-fighting mosquitoes, 
Oxitec has an impressive lead.” First promoted as a solution to curbing the spread 
of Dengue fever, he stated that: “Oxitec sees a key market in Ae. aegypti, the vec-
tor for dengue … for which no drugs or vaccines exist.”10 Experimental trials of 
the OX513A mosquito, carried out in the Cayman Islands and Malaysia, sought to 
test the effectiveness of the genetically engineered mosquito in reducing the popu-
lation of Aedes aegypti (Harris et al. 2011; Lacroix et al. 2012). Field releases in 
Brazil, a site of extensive research for Oxitec, showed a marked decrease in the 
“target wild population” of mosquitoes, the degree of which researchers claimed 
would be effective in Dengue prevention. Results in Brazil were consistent with 
the previous Cayman trials, “suggesting that differences between the two loca-
tions, including the environment or wild mosquito strain, made little difference” 
(Carvalho et al., 2015: 2).
The emphasis on the mosquito’s ability to suppress populations in spite of 
ecological or biological differences supported the technology as a feasible method 
“in preventing epidemic dengue,” although the company has yet to demonstrate 
its effects on disease outcomes (Chakradhar, 2015: 418). While the technology’s 
ability to reduce local Aedes aegypti populations (through male OX513A mosqui-
toes interbreeding with wild ones, and producing unviable offspring) is essential 
to its success, other differences would prove just as critical to its future as a vec-
tor control intervention. Attempts to gain regulatory approval for field trials in 
Key West quickly exposed that there is more to the OX513A and its trials than 
just the technical aspects of performance. In her history of yellow fever control, 
Stepan (1978: 398) highlighted that while the evidential side of science is critical 
to its own advancement, “external factors often play an important role,” particu-
larly when it comes to the political and economic factors that attach degrees of 
urgency to a disease, and the priority given to the research and application of a 
solution. Expected to continue its “world-class operation” (DOH-Monroe, 2017: 
31), the FKMCD proposed experimental trials of the OX513A as a way to over-
come the multiple political and technical challenges of controlling both the vector 
and engaging its (human) urban public:
Unlike insecticides traditionally used for vector control, Oxitec mosquitoes 
can easily get inside private properties, where much of the vector problem 
persists. ‘The male mosquito will always find the female. It doesn’t have to 
ask permission to enter the house.’
(Waltz, 2016: 221)
Project plans for Key West came shortly after the company’s first open-field trial 
in Grand Cayman in the fall of 2009 (Subbaraman 2011), which was met with 
stark criticism for its perceived lack of public consultation. One report claimed, 
“There were no town hall meetings or public debates because the government 
of the Cayman Islands didn’t deem them necessary” (Enserink 2010: 1030). 
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Supporters and critics alike stressed public engagement as a pivotal factor in the 
level of anticipated success for Oxitec across diverse global sites of engagement. 
Brazil has been cited as one such success due to “the result of a stronger effort to 
engage that community” (Storr 2014). But there has been no shortage of engage-
ment efforts in Key West, with Oxitec and the FKMCD recalibrating their moves 
more than once.
There is a lot to be gained for Oxitec in conducting field trials in Key West. 
When trials were first undergoing consideration, the occurrence of disease seemed 
ample justification, while the district’s considerable funding, the local ecosystem 
and geographical features and the infrastructure and resources already available, 
were beneficial to collecting valuable data (Kolbe and Ngai 2016). The advan-
tages were clear – trials in Key West seemed both feasible and advantageous 
to the future of the product, as one lead research team member from Oxitec 
explained, with regulatory approval and testing in the United States, the product 
could be improved and made more affordable, and other countries without regula-
tory frameworks would look to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (the 
lead regulatory agency at the time) for guidance in adopting the new technology. 
But the regulatory process for experimental releases was unclear at best when tri-
als were first proposed for Key West (Pérez 2016). The FDA eventually asserted 
jurisdiction over genetically engineered mosquitoes interpreting the technology 
as a “new animal drug” under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, a desig-
nation that was later challenged (FDA 2017; see also Lin 2017).11 After trials in 
Key Haven were rejected by residents and local government officials decided to 
cancel experimental trials in the suburb community, Oxitec resubmitted an appli-
cation for a new site in the Florida Keys. In October 2017, the FDA issued final 
guidance clarifying that mosquito-related products, that function as pesticides, 
would be regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A few pub-
lications in the local paper expressed satisfaction over the change in regulatory 
oversight, but little more was publicly discussed.
Public engagement proved a central element in helping to guide the regulatory 
process, with the FDA opening up and extending public comment periods “before 
determining its next steps” (FDA 2016). Yet public forums hosted by the FKMCD 
and Oxitec to “inform the public” about the planned trial in Key Haven became 
more of an opportunity for attendants to demonstrate dissent. Opponents argued 
against the genetically engineered qualities of the technology, the “undemocratic 
nature” of the experiment, and the unknown environmental and legal ramifica-
tions that the technology’s approval might unleash (i.e. establishing a precedent 
for releasing more genetically modified organisms in the future) (see Kolbe and 
Ngai 2016; Ernst et al. 2015; Tabachnick 2012). Others expressed distrust in for-
profit public health: “Hurricanes, bring them on; long-timers here seldom evacu-
ate. Mosquitoes, well, that’s the price of paradise. Zika, this too shall pass, like 
dengue. But science and government, I’m not so sure about” (Alvarez 2016).
The Keys have a history of suspicion about American state power. Steinberg 
and Chapman (2009) described the emergence and legacy of the short-lived 
“Conch Republic” in 1982 as the Florida Keys tried to secede from the United 
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States in response to a government-imposed roadblock to control illegal immi-
gration. In their analysis, the authors reconsider the notion of sovereignty as “less 
about the power to isolate and exclude than it is about the right to maintain some 
degree of control, or at least dignity, in a world of connections, inclusions, and 
fragmented, unstable identities” (Steinberg and Chapman, 2009: 1). Early public 
health interventions imposed by the Florida State Board of Health were origi-
nally met with “enmity,” as documented by Hardy and Pynchon (1964: 15), in 
the development of regulations and procedures for quarantines due to “govern-
ment supervisions and restrictions which the people view as imposed more for 
the benefit of other communities than for Key West.” Reactions to the proposed 
trials by a portion of the local community revealed a similar stance. A commenta-
tor at a town hall meeting in 2014 protested, “Because we are a small area, and 
a minimally populated area, and Key Haven suites you perfectly, we object to 
that. We really do, because we are humans and we don’t like being treated like 
guinea pigs.”
Making “knowledge, landscapes, and projects scalable,” as Tsing (2012: 523) 
argues, is a difficult endeavor. Defined by moments of both success and failure, 
scalable projects by design attempt to cover up and block what Tsing (2012) iden-
tifies as “the transformative diversity of social relations.” For experimental trials 
set for Key West, solving the nonscalable elements involved a continued effort in 
solving the public health aspect of alarm. Conducting public engagement required 
confronting not only the ecological, political and economic complexities in which 
publics are situated, but also the culturally informed values and multiple, compet-
ing narratives of epidemics that came to influence intervention and response. It 
became clear from the activities in Key West that expansive projects such as the 
OX513A rely not only on their technical performance in particular sites, but also 
their ability to contend with local differences to justify their technology as an 
appropriate intervention in the first place.
Meyerson and Reaser (2003: 307–8) argue that it is often a “formidable chal-
lenge to convince policy makers, industry, and the public to adopt a compre-
hensive approach to biological security … when imminent threats and tangible 
benefits from protection are not readily apparent.” Challenges in implementing 
many public health interventions often “revolve around conflicts between local 
needs and these universal solutions” (Beisel et al., 2016: 8). Opponents in the 
Keys saw the “unknown risks” of the technology to outweigh those of the disease:
In a way, the mosquito control district’s progress has undermined the effort. 
The district moved quickly, and with success, to control a dengue outbreak in 
2009 and 2010, mostly through a large aerial spraying effort and by sending 
workers door to door to inspect properties and spray them. If that worked, 
why do they need mutant mosquitoes?
(Alvarez 2016)
In response, Oxitec aligned their approach “with a humanitarian impulse to privi-
lege solutions to a common crisis over gains for individuals” (Reeves et al., 2012: 
210 Priscilla Bennett 
11), linking “local well-being” to “global well-being.” Key West became represent-
ative of global circumstances, a version of the future that other regions currently 
unaffected by, but with the conditions for Dengue, could soon face (Nading, 2015).
As part of that technique, the OX513A as a public health intervention became 
framed in practices of securitization. In this “tale of conflict,” Alex Nading (2015: 
26) writes, “both support for Oxitec and criticism of it hinge upon ‘scalar nar-
ratives’ that anticipate crisis”: the OX513A as a solution to an emerging global 
health threat, or the source of a potential global environmental threat. Before trials 
could get underway for the collection of data necessary for eventually commer-
cializing the product in the United States, the company has had to try to situate 
Key West as a global site, an example of the future for emergent infectious dis-
ease and a possible solution to it. It is an example of what Adams et al. (2014: 
184) argue to be “the global in situ … always itself a local phenomenon.” A com-
mon orientation in contemporary global health, so Nading points out, is to impede 
anticipated pandemics. This discourse of emergence turns diseases into security 
issues, and classifying them as global, “presumes a level playing field – a ‘stand-
ardizable body’ – that simply does not exist” (2014: 204). Large-scale framings 
centered on preparedness have the adverse effect of extracting diseases from their 
historical, political, social, and economic contexts and lures us into thinking of 
them as predictable and ahistorical.
Emphasizing its biological vulnerability, such practices helped turn Key West 
into a site demanding health intervention and technological innovation, position-
ing it at the border of its own security along with the future of the rest of the 
nation’s (Anderson 2010). But as efforts are made to standardize a tool (in this 
case, OX513A) for disease control, emergence becomes a foundation for justify-
ing scalability. The focus is not necessarily on the disease itself; rather, OX513A 
can scale because it is bound to the threat of a malicious and dynamic disease vec-
tor (Aedes aegypti), which means that it can scale, conceivably, everywhere the 
mosquito is found. Making trials work in accordance with local difference does 
not contribute to Oxitec’s project everywhere, but will influence it nonetheless, 
as it moves forward in Key West and elsewhere. This is the kind of articulation 
“between scalable and nonscalable elements” Tsing (2012: 515) argues is funda-
mental in the making of a portable commodity.
Discussion and conclusions
“Don’t forget about Zika,” read the title of an editorial in The Key West Citizen 
on June 16, 2017: “It’s quiet now, but no one knows for how long.” Barely more 
than a year prior, in May 2016, Oxitec delivered a statement before the US House 
Committee on Science, Space and Technology during the hearing titled “Science 
of Zika: The DNA of an Epidemic.” The company spoke on the ongoing Zika 
crisis in Puerto Rico, urging members:
In view of that urgent health need … to give the FDA all your support and 
encouragement so they can expedite the approval of our application … the 
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FDA needs more tools at its disposal in order to help protect Americans. We 
want to make this technology available in the coming months rather than the 
coming years.
Soon after this meeting, the CDC reported locally acquired cases of Zika in the 
United States on June 15, 2016, in Miami-Dade County (Valentine et al., 2016: 
1129). By that August, Oxitec had been awarded regulatory approval for trial 
releases in the Keys. Being such a controversial issue, an initiative to gauge sup-
port was held during the 2016 presidential election. Two nonbinding referenda 
were held on the November ballot for Key Haven residents and residents of 
wider Monroe County. Voters from Key Haven, a suburb of Key West and the 
designated trial site, voted overwhelmingly in opposition to releases. Residents 
expressed a variety of objections to the release, particularly public health risks of 
human exposure to GM mosquitoes, inadequate regulatory review, possible envi-
ronmental ramifications, and the negative impact the trials could have on property 
values. One resident was quoted in a report published by the public radio station 
(FONSI) after the FDA released a preliminary safety report: “We’re concerned 
that this is being shoved down our throat. … If 90 percent of Key Haven had den-
gue or Zika, I would be the first on here listening to a solution to a problem. … 
We don’t have a problem” (Klingener 2016).
In response to majority approval by the wider Monroe County residents, 
the mosquito control board of commissioners gave their consent to move for-
ward with releases of the OX513A pending approval, but under the condition 
of relocating the trial site. As of early 2018, Oxitec was actively campaigning 
for support from city councils and county commissioners as they anticipated 
EPA approval in the near future. The release site would be determined following 
approval through collaborative decision-making between the mosquito control 
district and Oxitec.
In a study on the implementation and use of mobile malaria rapid diagnostic 
tests (RDTs), Beisel and authors demonstrate that rendering RDTs effective as 
mobile and suitable technological solutions involves more than just the practi-
cal design features of the product: “A key aspiration for these technologies,” the 
authors describe, “is to make them as universal as possible – so usable across 
many different places and by different people” (2016: 8). Through the analytical 
lens of co-construction, the authors identify that standardization does not come 
prepackaged, rather, the “ease and speed” these technologies hope to deliver are 
only ever achievable in practice, as users and technologies interact. The end result 
is a heterogeneous standardization that is only achieved through “tricky moral 
negotiation” in particular settings, bringing new uncertainties along with them.
Oxitec has similar ambitions motivating their attempts to conduct trials in mul-
tiple sites across the globe. The universal aspect of the technology is dependent 
on the framing of mosquito-borne illnesses as emergent, which situates its port-
ability and applicability within the mosquito that the company targets. As the 
disease vector spreads across the globe (and climate change threats to increase its 
population), the implementation of the OX513A would ideally follow. Beisel et 
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al.’s analysis shows that health interventions often frame perceptions of illness, 
making them “technical and intervenable in ways that can be counted, evaluated 
and targeted” (2016: 8). The simplicity of technologies is often taken for granted 
as a result, made to seem appropriate for application across an array of settings, 
but complexities inevitably emerge as their execution and subsequent interac-
tions with local particularities expose that processes of disease transmission and 
infection are not so easily “knowable, stable, and bounded” (Nading, 2013: 69). 
Disease often unfolds in ways that defy expectations, operating instead as Lowe 
(2010: 644) best illustrates, “through infections and re-assortments that are coin-
cidental, responsive, opportunistic, and often non-rational.”
The particular circumstances of Key West that become integrated into such 
projects of scale, either apparent or obscured, will undoubtedly influence the 
outcome(s). The questions we are left with are: which ones and how? Eventually, 
Tsing argues, those nonscalable effects “that once could be swept under the rug” 
will make a difference (2012: 523). As the OX513A has already shaped how we 
envision the future for disease response, we should consider what it might take 
for these technologies to effectively engage with local circumstances, while also 
giving attention to the multiple factors that render places vulnerable to disease in 
the first place.
Aspiring global projects face both complications and advantages in their devel-
opment within local settings. Key West has shaped both the OX513A as a public 
health intervention as well as the regulatory pathway and reception for genetically 
engineered pest technologies more broadly. The project has incited both old and 
new questions regarding the role of the public in scientific endeavors, challeng-
ing the meaning and practice of responsible innovation, and framing the broader 
conversation in terms of the future role of genetic technologies for the prevention 
of mosquito-borne illness. Importantly, the negotiation process that continues to 
unfold has provided some degree of democratic decision making in this high-profile 
experimental trial that could certainly come to set a precedent for future projects.
Notes
1 The Release of Insects carrying a Dominant Lethal (RIDL®) gene system technology 
was developed before the OX513A was conceived as a product. The Aedes aegypti was 
chosen as one of the first mosquitoes for which to develop this technology as research-
ers sought to target a widespread and economically significant vector species (Thomas 
et al. 2000).
2 The OX513A has become a magic bullet approach in the public imagination, a narra-
tive that developed as the technology itself attracted attention as a solution to global 
mosquito control challenges, one that could be implemented at scale anywhere around 
the world.
3 While the OX513A is considered one of the most successful demonstrations of RIDL 
technology, other strains can be designed for a number of vector species with specific 
sterility-inducing transgenes considered suitable to different settings and circumstances 
(Gabrieli et al. 2014).
4 I would like to thank the community of Key West for inviting me to participate in sev-
eral enlightening gatherings and events that informed this chapter. Thank you also to 
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members of Oxitec, the staff at the Florida Department of Health in Monroe County, the 
Florida Keys Mosquito Control District and other government officials and local advo-
cates for spending time with me and discussing their perspectives on mosquito control, 
public health, activities for the anticipated experimental trials, and life in the Florida 
Keys. A special thank you to Josh Reno for his insights into the broader implications of 
this research and suggested revisions, and to Kevin Bardosh for inviting me to be a part 
of the SULID network.
5 The FCRC Consensus Center’s City of Key West Comprehensive Plan data and analy-
sis 2012 report estimated an average of 14,241 overnight visitors with an additional 
average of 2,734 day-trip visitors in Key West. Close to three million visitors pass 
through Monroe County each year, and account for nearly 60% of the total local econ-
omy (DOH-Monroe 2017).
6 Three human cases of West Nile virus were reported in Monroe County in 2001 but 
were quickly contained (Hribar et al. 2003).
7 See the Florida Department of Health website: http://www.floridahealth.gov/diseases-
and-conditions/dengue/index.html
8 It was previously the Monroe County Department of Health (MCDH).
9 According to DOH-Monroe (2017), there is also an undocumented number of seasonal 
residents occupying the island in recreational vehicles each year.
10 Currently one Dengue vaccine, Dengvaxia (CYD-TDV) by Sanofi Pasteur, is licensed 
in several countries, beginning with Mexico in December 2015 (WHO 2016), with five 
additional candidates under evaluation.
11 The FDA issued draft guidance #236 in January 2017 in an effort to clarify circum-
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